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SUMMARY 
The problem of universal oppression has caused Gutierrez, 
Cone and Moltmann to advocate that God is orchestrating an 
historical programme of liberation from socio-economic, racial 
and political suffering. They feel that God's liberating actions 
can be seen in the Abrahamic promise, the exodus and the Christ-
event. Moltmann, especially, has emphasized both the trinitarian 
identification with human pain and the influence of the freedom 
of the future upon the suffering of the present. According to 
our theologians, Jesus Christ identified with us, and died the 
death of a substitutionary victim. Through the resurrection, 
Jesus Christ overcame the problem of suffering and death, and 
inaugurated the New Age. The cross and resurrection were the 
focal point of God's liberating activity. Liberation, or 
freedom, from sin and suffering is now possible, at least 
proleptically. We are to understand the atonement as having been 
liberative rather than forensic or legal, although judgement is 
not ignored. Both the perpetrators of injustice and their 
victims are called upon to identify with, and struggle for, 
freedom, with the help of the liberating Christ. 
We agree with our theologians that God has historically 
indicated his desire for justice and freedom. The magnitude of 
evil and suffering still existing, however, forces us to abandon 
the idea that God is progressively liberating history. 
Nevertheless, we affirm the idea that the Trinity has absorbed 
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human suffering into its own story through the incarnate Son. 
Jesus identified with suffering in a four-fold way, namely: its 
existence, the judgement of it, the overcoming of it, and the 
need to oppose it. This comprehensive identification gives 
Christ the right to demand the doing of justice, because the 
greatest injustice in history has happened to him. The atonement 
was forensic, rendering all people accountable to Christ; but it 
was also liberative, validating the struggle against oppression. 
Furthermore, at his second corning, Christ will be vindicated in 
whatever judgement he will exact upon the perpetrators of 
injustice or oppression. For today the resurrection still gives 
hope and faith to those who suffer and to those who identify with 
them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING 
One of the most troubling aspects of human existence is the 
problem of social suffering. Indeed, the human story is 
tragically marred by various manifestations of evil. Some would 
try to deny or down-play the magnitude of the problem or claim 
that it is not the church's concern. We are going to proceed on 
the basis that God takes the problem of suffering seriously, and 
so should we. It must be understood that in this present study 
we are concerning ourselves with systemically-caused suffering 
in the form of racial, political and socio-economic oppression. 
We are not suggesting that evil and suffering are all there is 
to life; one surely finds streams of goodness and freedom. It 
is the sheer force of suffering, however, that attracts our 
urgent attention. 
2. IS FREEDOM FROM SUFFERING POSSIBLE? 
Liberation, Black and Hope theologians have 
themselves to the possibility of actual social freedom. 
committed 
We shall 
observe this in the first three chapters of this present study 
as we consider the theologies of Gutierrez (Latin American 
liberation theology), Cone (North American black political 
theology), and Moltmann (European political theology of hope) 
respectively. Moltmann's theology has a different point of 
departure from the praxis oriented theologies of Gutierrez and 
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Cone. However, all three share parallel concerns when it comes 
to the problem of suffering and oppression. While these 
theologians are concerned with suffering and freedom, Moltmann's 
emphasis on God's trinitarian identification with human pain 
gives a unique dimension to the discussion. 
Our primary concern will be to observe how these theologians 
relate the problem of oppression to the cross and resurrection 
of Jesus. In the first three chapters, we will see what these 
theologians think about suffering, the divine response to it, the 
nature of freedom, and our responsibility as human beings. For 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann, the above concerns express the 
meaning of the cross and resurrection. Chapters four and five 
will deal respectively with our response to these theologians and 
our own ideas on the relationship between social suffering and 
the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
3. WHAT IS OUR THESIS? 
The thesis we wish to establish is simply that God, through 
the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, has comprehensively 
identified with, and overcome, human social suffering. Christ 
now demands that we in turn strive for social justice or freedom. 
For the theologians under consideration, God's answer to the 
human predicament of suffering is the promise of liberation, or 
freedom. God has chosen or opted to be on the side of the poor 
and oppressed. In fact, from creation onwards, God has indicated 
in one way or another his desire for our freedom. The Abrahamic 
promise and the exodus illustrate this, and, of course, the very 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus took place to bring about 
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the possibility of liberation. For Gutierrez and Cone, there has 
been an ongoing 'historical flow of liberation', and the cross 
and resurrection were the focus or central point of this flow. 
Moltmann is similar in his thinking, although he emphasizes the 
future as it influences the present. 
For Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann the atonement became the 
mechanism which assures the presence and possibility of 
liberation or freedom in history. Furthermore, these authors 
maintain that the atonement is not to be understood in forensic 
(legal) terms. The central meaning of the atonement is 
deliverance from sin and its consequences, rather than a legal 
judgement for breaking God's laws. As the Risen One, Christ is 
the Liberator, who is present now with the oppressed, and who 
also calls upon us to live justly and fight for freedom. 
We are in total agreement with the view that God is against 
evil and oppression. However, we doubt that God has set up a 
specific programme of historical liberation as such. To be sure, 
the exodus illustrates Yahweh's compassion and covenant 
faithfulness as he liberated the Israelites from Egyptian 
overlordship. Furthermore, the prophetic message strongly 
emphasizes the 'doing' of justice. Also, the life and death of 
Jesus reflected his concern for the poor and oppressed. He 
identified with them, amongst other things. Yet none of the 
preceding necessitates an ongoing and identifiable history of 
liberation. This is not to deny that God 'works' in history; it 
is merely to question whether there is really a divinely 
orchestrated pattern of political or social liberation in 
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operation. For us, the sheer weight of evil and social suffering 
today speaks against any such idea. 
Nevertheless, we believe God has responded to the problem 
of suffering or oppression. Apart from his verbal pronouncements 
against oppression and all forms of injustice, God, in Jesus, has 
encountered the problem in a deeply personal way. The Son of God 
was incarnated into humanness with all of its alienation and 
suffering. Jesus experienced human pain and victimization. He 
then became the Crucified One (Holtmann), the Suffering Servant 
or Lamb, bearing the Father's wrath and judgement on evil and 
oppression. The Crucified One also became the Abandoned One for 
a while. Jesus was experiencing this as our representative and 
substitute. 
The resurrection signalled Jesus' own victory over 
oppression, evil, death and Satan. This victory can be shared 
by those of us who wish to fight against evil and suffering. 
Jesus therefore calls us to do justice and he can rightfully 
judge those who do not. Furthermore, Jesus will be vindicated 
in his eschatological (future) judgement on us because he has 
personally experienced and overcome the evil of oppression. We 
can place our faith and hope in Christ, the Resurrected One. 
For us, identity, rather than liberation as such, is the key 
concept here. After looking at Gutierrez, Cone and Holtmann, we 
will be proposing a four-fold level of identity between Jesus 
Christ and ourselves, especially those of us who are the victims 
of evil and oppression. The scheme is as follows: 
First Level 
Second Level 
Third Level 
Fourth Level 
Jesus Christ 
problem of 
identified 
evil and 
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with the 
sin-caused 
suffering. (The trinity took in, and 
still takes in, our pain.) 
Jesus Christ identified with judgement 
on evil and suffering. (This is based 
on the judgement he took in our place.) 
Jesus Christ identified with victory 
over evil, suffering and death. 
Jesus Christ today identifies with the 
struggle against evil and suffering. 
(Even though there is no flow of 
liberation, as such, we are still 
mandated to fight against oppression. 
Christ shares this struggle with us.) 
Ultimate victory, already proleptically 
achieved at the cross and resurrection, 
will be fully realized at the eschaton 
(second coming of Christ). 
It is to be noted that this thesis concerns itself primarily 
with the problem of suffering, as over against the issue of one's 
personal destiny. From time to time, however, we will make 
reference to the themes of creation, sin and personal salvation 
in order to discuss certain points. Obviously the concerns of 
physical suffering and liberation are the same, experientially, 
for Christian and non-Christian. Jesus Christ can identify with 
the pain and suffering of either. 
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In our view, Gutierrez, Cone and Holtmann run the risk of 
offering too much to the victim of today. If Jesus Christ as 
Liberator is supposed to have been bringing in freedom 
(liberation) then we would adjudge his work as having been very 
ineffective. The history of human suffering up to this point 
does not offer positive evidence for a universal liberating work 
of God, even if it is argued that we must participate in our own 
destiny. We nevertheless will be indicating that these authors' 
concern for doing justice is commendable, as is their idea of the 
divine 'option' for the poor. However, we will be opposing the 
idea of the cross and resurrection as being the focal point of 
ongoing historical liberation. It is indeed a focal point, but 
it is so in the sense of demonstrating the total identity of 
Jesus with the problem of suffering. Jesus Christ still offers 
good reason for faith and hope, and the doing of justice. The 
good reason is his own life, death and resurrection. Gutierrez 
and Cone also emphasize the centrality of Jesus, but not in the 
same way as we will be doing. Actually, we find ourselves 
indebted to Holtmann for his emphasis on God's trinitarian 
identification with us through Jesus. 
To sum up, our central thesis which we wish to advocate is 
as follows: in the cross and resurrection Jesus Christ has fully 
identified with human suffering. As the Suffering Servant and 
our substitute, Jesus experienced divine judgement on evil and 
suffering. This judgement was highlighted in his rejection by 
the Father and in his death. The resurrection signalled his 
victory over death and evil. Accordingly, Christ, who continues 
to personally identify with our pain today, calls for the doing 
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of justice and will be vindicated in his own eschatological 
judgement on perpetrators of evil and oppression. One can at 
least experience spiritual and psychological liberation now, 
should social freedom not materialize. 
4. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Firstly, we, like our authors, shall be using the terms 
poor, weak. powerless, oppressed, vict:im and sufferers 
interchangeably to describe those suffering from social 
injustice. These people are those who are systemically prevented 
from controlling their own circumstances; they are trapped by 
forces opposed to their well being. In contradistinction to the 
above group, we have the terms perpet:rat:or, or oppressor, which 
refer to individuals or political and social systems (including 
ecclesiastical indifference) which bring about pain or suffering 
on others. We will be using the term evil in its connection with 
the problem of socially-caused suffering. 
Secondly, in our discussion, we shall be using the term 
Christ:-event: to refer to the actual cross and resurrection of 
Jesus. At the same time we shall normally be using the term 
Jesus to refer to the historical person of Jesus and the term 
Christ: in connection with his resurrection and post-resurrection 
activity. In actuality we regard the historical and resurrected 
Jesus to be one and the same person. Nevertheless we are 
sensitive to the debate over the continuity and discontinuity 
between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith. From time 
to time we shall use the term Jesus Christ: when referring to 
Jesus in a general way. 
CHAPTER ONE 
GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ: SOCIETY AND LIBERATION 
At the time of writing, Easter has been celebrated throughout the 
Christian world. For Gutierrez, the events of the cross and the 
resurrection are pivotal for human hope of liberation from 
oppression of any kind. In this chapter, we shall attempt to 
understand Gutierrez by looking at the historical context and 
impact of the cross and resurrection as he sees it. Depending 
on the theme in hand, Gutierrez treats the cross and resurrection 
either singly or as a unified event. 
1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CROSS AND RESURRECTION 
In this section we will note Gutierrez's understanding of 
Yahweh's general historical relationship to humanity, including 
the problem of oppression, which led up to the Christ-event. 
1.1 The Unity of History 
We begin here because this helps us to comprehend 
Gutierrez's understanding of oppression and liberation. He 
maintains that Yahweh relates to history as a whole, rather than 
selectively. The 'distinction of planes' model1 is inadequate 
because it does not properly account for an ongoing 
interrelationship, rather than functional separation, between the 
human and the divine in history (1974:53-77). The idea of 
salvation-history within general history does not appeal to 
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Gutierrez. He states that: 'there is only one human destiny, 
irreversibly assumed by Christ, the Lord of history. His 
redemptive work embraces all the dimensions of existence and 
brings them to their fullness. The history of salvation is the 
very heart of human history' (1974:153). History, then, is 
already salvific. In a later defense of this position, Gutierrez 
{1990b:l26) states: 
in the actual order of the economy of salvation there 
is not a history of nature and another history of 
grace, a history of fellowship and another of sonship 
and daughter hood. Rather, the connection between 
grace and nature, between God's call and the free 
response of human beings, is located within a single 
Christo-finalized history. 
Man's historical experience is actually the continuing of 
creation. In fact man 'is the crown and centre of the work of 
creation and is called to continue it through his labour' 
(1974:158). Gutierrez says this in reference to Gen 1:28 and in 
the context of linking creation, the Exodus and liberation 
together (1974:154-160). We shall observe how Gutierrez relates 
liberation to the cross and resurrection later. Here, we are 
merely emphasizing that the two are part and parcel of the 
unified historical flow, significant for man's historical, 
creative, and liberative efforts. For Gutierrez, then, God, 
through Jesus Christ, participates in history and is identified 
with the human situation, especially that of oppression. The 
cross and resurrection are not isolated events within an isolated 
salvation-history. They are Yahweh's way of responding to the 
need of human liberation, the liberation of history 
(1990b:117,120). Let us move on to the problem of history -
man's inhumanity to man. 
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1.2 The Human Condition 
For Gutierrez, the existence of oppression cannot be denied. 
Liberation and political theology are primarily concerned about 
the problem of avoidable human suffering. Gutierrez is of course 
writing from within the context of the Latin American situation, 
but he means to relate his concerns to humanity in general. In 
the introduction we emphasized the existence of oppression, but 
here we are seeing it as an historical adjective. Gutierrez 
addresses himself to economic and social oppression and relates 
his understanding of liberation and salvation to the conflictual 
nature of history. Concerning the relation of Christianity to 
this, Gutierrez (1974:174) states: 'Christianity, rooted in 
Biblical sources, thinks in terms of history. And in this 
history, injustice and oppression, divisions and confrontations 
exist. But the hope of liberation is also present'. 
Gutierrez takes the existence and effects of sin very 
seriously. Some might question his understanding of the actual 
depth of human depravity, 2 but he cannot be accused of down-
playing the problem of sin. Gutierrez (1974:35) states that: 
'Sin - a breach of friendship with God and others - is according 
to the Bible the ultimate cause of poverty, injustice, and the 
oppression in which men live'. Gutierrez (Ibid) advocates the 
systemic nature of sin, but makes the point that: 'things do not 
happen by chance and that behind an unjust structure there is a 
personal or collective will responsible - a willingness to reject 
God and neighbor'. Again, in discussing the relationship between 
social and personal sin, Gutierrez (1990b:137) states that 'the 
importance of the social consequences of sin does not mean 
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forgetting that sin is always the result of a personal, free 
act'. For Gutierrez (1990b:136), sin involves the rejection of 
the love and Fatherhood of God and the consequent lack of love 
towards the neighbour. It is a rejection of love as a gift from 
God. Sin, then, is the negation of love (1990b:138). What is 
more, 'because sin is a radical evil, it can be conquered only 
by the grace of God and by the radical liberation that the Lord 
bestows' (Ibid). 
1.3 The Response of Yahweh 
Within the context of an historical oneness, the problem of 
human oppression, and the root cause of sin, Yahweh responds. 
For Gutierrez, as with other liberation theologians, the exodus 
is paradigmatic. Gutierrez (1990b:118,119) is careful to point 
out that the exodus is the result of Yahweh's covenant with 
Israel. It is at the same time, however, a 'social and political 
liberation'. Gutierrez thus sees the exodus as both a 
comprehensive and paradigmatic event. He states: 'The sense is 
not that the event must be repeated as such in the history of the 
Christian community but rather that the deeper meaning of the 
event - the liberating intervention of God - is permanently 
valid' (1990b: 119). 
For Gutierrez this intervention reveals that Yahweh opted 
for the 'poor'. Yahweh liberated (freed) the Jews from Egyptian 
oppression but this is also a picture of the divine response to 
universal human oppression. Gutierrez (1974:158) calls upon 
Andre Neher to make his point: 
the first thing that is expressed 
passover is the certainty of freedom. 
a new age has struck for humanity: 
misery. If the Exodus had not taken 
in the Jewish 
With the Exodus 
redemption from 
place, marked as 
it was by the twofold sign of the overriding will of 
God and the free and conscious assent of men, the 
historical destiny of humanity would have followed 
another course. 
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In quoting Neher, Gutierrez is supporting the 'historical 
dialectic approach', that is, Yahweh liberates the oppressed 
while calling on them to participate in their own liberation. 
For Gutierrez, we are to learn from the exodus paradigm that 
those liberated are expected to be in communion with the 
Liberator. In the concrete illustration of Israel, Yahweh 
belongs to the freed, and they in turn belong to Yahweh - a 
'double belonging' (Gutierrez 1983:9). This double-belonging, 
then, implies reciprocal action between Yahweh as Liberator and 
the Jews as victims. Gutierrez does not seem to want to 
demythologize the text and place the emphasis of action on the 
Israelites who would have later theologized Yahweh into the 
incident. 
Gutierrez (1983:7-11) also supports his belief in the Old 
Testament divine 'option-for-the-poor' by referring to those 
prophetic passages (Deut 24:17-18; Jer 7:1-7, 22:13-16; Amos 4:1-
3; Mic 3: 9-12) that speak of Yahweh's anger at oppression and his 
call to 'do justice'. For Gutierrez (1974:160, 1983:15), 
however, one must also consider the Abrahamic and New Covenants 
which contain liberative historical promise. We will return to 
these later when we consider the meaning of the crucifixion of 
Jesus. Our point here is that Gutierrez sees a continual 
historical flow of divine response in favour of the oppressed. 
If one believes in a unified (albeit complex) history, then the 
problem of universal oppression elicits an ongoing universal and 
historical response from the Yahweh of justice. The historical 
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context leads us to consider now the event of Jesus Christ. This 
event is the supreme response of God to human suffering. 
2. THE HISTORICAL IMPACT OF THE CROSS AND RESURRECTION 
The phrase 'historical impact' is, of course, a continuation 
of the idea of 'historical context'. We are dealing here, 
however, with that short historical time period in which Jesus 
Christ impacted human history. The suffering and rising of Jesus 
of Nazareth (historical Jesus) is, for liberation theologians 
such as Gutierrez, the very foundation of human hope and 
liberation from suffering. Two main themes appear in the writing 
of Gutierrez on this point: identity and freedom. 
2.1 Christ Identifies with the Poor 
The idea of identity dramatizes the belief in Yahweh's 
option (choice) for the victim. It is not merely Yahweh 'knowing 
about' human suffering, rather it is divine participation in that 
same suffering. For Gutierrez this is demonstrated in the birth, 
death and resurrection of Christ. The concept of the incarnation 
becomes important. It is more than just the time when Jesus was 
born - it refers to all that Jesus Christ did and does. The 
incarnation fulfils the New Covenant (1974:192) and brings all 
people into Yahweh's concern: 'Since God has become man, 
humanity, every man, history, is the living temple of God. The 
"pro-fane", that which is located outside the temple, no longer 
exists' (1974:194). Gutierrez emphasizes that one encounters God 
in the historical poor, and this is because of the divine option 
for them. This does not mean that Gutierrez is an objective 
universalist a la Rahner's 'anonymous christianity', as he does 
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admit to the need for 'conversion' (1984:95-106, 1990b:56). It 
does mean, however, that Yahweh is subjectively present in human 
history, with special preference for the oppressed. Gutierrez, 
we note, does not greatly emphasize the relation of the 
incarnation to human sin in general, which comprises the guilt 
of both the perpetrator and victim. This would be because of 
Gutierrez's problem with the quantitative notion of salvation in 
the light of his unitary view of history (1974:150-152). 
For Gutierrez the incarnation meant that God the Son came 
from glory into human poverty. In fact Jesus 
was poor indeed. He was born into a social milieu 
characterized by poverty. He chose to live with the 
poor. He addressed his gospel by preference to the 
poor. He lashed out with invective against the rich 
who oppressed the poor and despised them. And before 
the Father, he was poor in spirit. (1983:13.) 
Gutierrez is saying, then, that Yahweh deliberately entered into 
human suffering. Jesus did not walk alongside sufferers - he 
became one. He both lived as, and spoke up for, the social 
victim. The 'living as' means Jesus was in solidarity with the 
poor. For Gutierrez this was a real, existential solidarity, and 
it carries through into the liberative event of the cross and 
resurrection, which we shall observe later. rt is in this chosen 
poverty that, for Gutierrez, we see the divine-human meeting; 
that Jesus Christ was indeed the Son of God; and that the 
disciples of Christ (essentially the poor) should understand and 
follow Christ (1983:13,142-3). 
Jesus' historical poverty was, for Gutierrez, an existential 
statement. This statement was conflictive. The Zealots, who 
found Jesus mysterious, the Jewish leaders, who felt their 
security threatened, and the political leaders all had problems 
with Jesus. 
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To the authorities he was a traitor (1974:231). 
Gutierrez (1984:49-50) talks about Peter's rejection of the 
conflictual nature of the Messiah's mission, a conflict that was 
and is unavoidable. Peter had to understand that the reasons for 
Jesus' confrontation with the rulers were to be found 'in the 
proclamation of the good news of the Father's love of all 
humankind, especially the poor. This marks the character of 
Jesus' messiahship. What was rejected in him, and led to his 
death on the cross, was the same nucleus of his teaching: the 
kingdom of God' (1984:50). Jesus' kingdom preaching was 
reflecting the divine option for the oppressed. 
Gutierrez (Ibid) adds that Jesus experienced hostility not 
because of pure political grounds, but 'precisely because it was 
a religious teaching that affected all human existence'. In fact 
Jesus, as God, died as a subversive for the poor (1983:61). The 
link between Jesus' words and deeds led to his death on the cross 
( 1983: 104) . If we read Gutierrez correctly, then, Jesus was 
addressing history, unitary history, with the poor as the 
effective target. This created immediate historical conflict, 
as the divine identity with the poor enunciated the divine 
option. In fact, the coming of the kingdom into history is 
heralded by historical manifestations of human liberation 
(1974:167), and the cross is foundational in this. For Gutierrez 
(1983:61) Jesus' historical actions show him (Jesus) to be the 
hermeneutical principle in understanding Christian reality. 
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2.2 Christ Frees the Poor 
Following the method of Gutierrez, we will start with what 
he says about the cross (on liberation) and then see what he says 
about the cross and the resurrection together. 
2.2.1 Freedom and the cross 
As implied earlier, for Gutierrez, the themes of identity 
and freedom, or liberation, are intertwined. Speaking of the 
need for the church to adopt a liberative evangelical poverty, 
Gutierrez (1974:300, 1979:14) refers to Christ's kenosis (Ph 2:6-
11) and suggests: 
He does not take on man's sinful condition and its 
consequences to idealize it. It is rather because of 
love for and solidarity with men who suffer it. It is 
to redeem them from their sin and to enrich them with 
his poverty. It is to struggle against human 
selfishness and everything that divides men and 
enables there to be rich and poor, possessors and 
dispossessed, oppressors and oppressed. 
Gutierrez is urging the church to adopt the Christlike attitude 
of humility. Our interest here is what Gutierrez says about 
Christ. The formula seems to be: Jesus, who is God, identifies 
with man's sinful condition and thus enters into solidarity with 
the oppressed, and that this is a redemptive (liberative) 
mechanism. Again, Gutierrez (1983:96) declares that Jesus' 'de-
facto practice - a messianic practice' of identification with the 
weak ended so that 'he died in solidarity with the violent death 
of the oppressed in this world ... No, Jesus did not die "at the 
end of his days". He died before his time, by execution'. 
Jesus, then, identified with and assumed the sinful 
condition of men, especially the oppressed. This inevitably led 
him to the cross as a victim. We say 'victim' because Gutierrez 
says he died 'before his time'. All of this, however, is 
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liberative. Gutierrez teaches that Jesus died for sinful mankind 
which has inherited the consequences of sin, but the primary 
beneficiaries of his death are the oppressed, those who suffer. 
As we said earlier, for Gutierrez 'Christ as liberator' is the 
hermeneutical key to understanding reality. The cross, then, was 
a liberative or freeing event more than anything else. However, 
Gutierrez (1990b:l38) does maintain that this liberation is for 
the purpose of communion: 
Liberation from sin is one side of the coin; the other 
is communion with God and others. According to a 
classic distinction, freedom from is directed toward 
freedom for. It is to this freedom for that Christ's 
saving work is also directed. By nailing sin to the 
cross, Jesus opened the way for us to full communion 
with the Father. 
Gutierrez argues that our lives, touched by God's communion with 
us, must be marked by communion (loving giving) with others. The 
cross is Yahweh's way of experiencing the oppressed status of 
'victim' due to the consequences of sin. It frees people, 
especially the oppressed, to relate as Yahweh wants us to. It 
also calls the non-victim to identify with the victim. 
Gutierrez can be asked just how the cross forms part of a 
liberative mechanism? To this point, Gutierrez has shown Jesus 
to be God who identifies with human suffering by suffering 
himself. Sin is 'nailed to the cross': this opens up freedom for 
communion, and has historical significance. In all of this Jesus 
is exemplary to man. But how does this free people from 
suffering? Gutierrez's immediate answer would be along the lines 
of resurrection hope, divine intervention and creative human 
participation in historical destiny. Gutierrez does not seem to 
offer, however, an explanation of the historical-divine mechanism 
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of liberation in relation to the actual cross and resurrection 
event. To be fair to Gutierrez, we wonder if it is possible to 
derive such an explanation. 
For Gutierrez (1984:46) Christ, as crucified, is the 
Messiah, and the suffering Son of God. Also, this declaration 
'is the nucleus of christological faith', and by believing in 
Christ we have life (Ibid). Interestingly, Gutierrez (1984:49-
51) uses Jesus' rebuke of Peter, who balked against the impending 
death of the Messiah, as a way to illustrate obedient 
discipleship. As Jesus could not be hindered in his messianic 
mission, so we today must 'get behind' Christ. 
In reference to Jesus' reading of Isaiah 61: 1-2 in the 
synagogue (Lk 4: 16-21) , Gutierrez ( 1983: 14) maintains that Christ 
is proclaiming a 'kingdom of liberation and justice' and states: 
This proclamation of the kingdom, this struggle for 
justice, leads Jesus to death. His life and death 
give us to know that the only possible justice is 
definitive justice. The only justice is the one that 
goes to the very root of all injustice, all breach 
with love, all sin. The only justice is one that 
assaults all the consequences and expressions of this 
cleavage in friendship. The only justice is the 
definitive justice that builds, starting right now, in 
our conflict-filled history, a kingdom in which God's 
love will be present and exploitation abolished ... 
Gutierrez goes on to refer to Isaiah 65:17-22 which talks about 
the conditions of the new heavens and earth. The death of Jesus, 
then, is a liberative, justice-bringing event, which confronts 
sin and reflects the presence of the ever-growing kingdom of God. 
Jesus really does say that he is going to bring justice and 
freedom (Lk 4), so the cross must indeed be linked to his self-
proclaimed mission. 
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One can, of course, spiritualize the Lukan passage into its 
purely spiritual 'injustice', 'poverty', 'captivity' or 
'blindness' terms. Or, like Gutierrez, one can interpret the 
passage at face value - literally. For Gutierrez (1974:167), 
'Christ does not "spiritualize" the eschatological promises; he 
gives them meaning and fulfilment today. (cf Luke 4:21)' and, 
the 'grace-sin conflict, the coming of the kingdom, and the 
expectation of the parousia, are also necessarily and inevitably 
historical, temporal, earthly, social, and material realities'. 
Gutierrez is here actually not excluding the spiritual life. He 
is merely reflecting his view that the gospel pertains to all 
dimensions of existence (1974:166-168). One often comes across 
the debate over whether redemption is spiritual or temporal. 
This debate bothers Gutierrez (1974:166-167), who insists that 
there should not be a dualism between the two in the first place. 
For Gutierrez there is no hidden spiritual sense to be found in 
the biblical promises. In actuality: 
The hidden sense is not the "spiritual" one, which 
devalues and even eliminates temporal and earthly 
realities as obstacles; rather it is the sense of a 
fullness which takes on and transforms historical 
reality. Moreover, it is only in the temporal, 
earthly, historical event that we can open up to the 
future of complete fulfillment. (1974:167.) 
2.2.2 Freedom and the Resurrection 
In this section, we will observe those concepts which 
Gutierrez relates to both the cross and resurrection together, 
as well as to the resurrection only, as there is overlapping in 
these areas. Let us begin with Jesus himself. 
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2.2.2.1 The Resurrection of Christ 
Obviously the first effect on Christ is that through the 
resurrection he overcame his own death. Gutierrez ( 1984: 68) 
reminds us of Romans 6:9: 'For we know that Christ being raised 
from the dead will never die again; death no longer has dominion 
over him'. For Gutierrez, a resurrected Christ is vital as it 
forms the basis of death to life spirituality. Gutierrez does 
not seem to be encumbered with doubts about the real resurrection 
(physical) of Jesus Christ. 
Earlier we mentioned Gutierrez's statement that Jesus died 
'before his time' rather than 'at the end of his days'. 
Gutierrez (1983:96) then goes on to say: 'Nor were his days 
thereby ended, for his resurrection is an affirmation of life, 
confirming him as the Christ, the messiah, and setting the seal 
of God's approval on his message of justice and life, the message 
that defied a homicidal society'. For Gutierrez (Ibid) the 
messianic practice of Jesus must become our own. The death and 
resurrection of Jesus qualify him to be our means to share his 
'denunciation of injustice, his sharing of bread, his hope for 
resurrection' . We learn from Gutierrez's words, then, that the 
meaning of the Christ-event, for Christ as well as us, was not 
concentrated only on the cross. The resurrection signals a 
trinitarian salvific economy in that the Father raised Christ by 
the Spirit for the liberation of the oppressed {1984:67). 
2.2.2.2 The Resurrection and Liberation 
For Gutierrez {1974:175-176, 1983:62), sin 'cannot be 
touched in itself, in the abstract. It can be attacked only in 
concrete historical situations - in particular instances of 
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alienation'. Radical liberation is thus called for, including 
political liberation. Gutierrez (1983:63) states: 
Only in aggressive, efficacious participation in the 
concrete historical process of liberation shall we be 
able to put our finger on the basic alienation present 
in all partial alienation. This radical liberation is 
the gift Christ brings to us. By his death and 
resurrection he redeems the human being from sin and 
all its consequences. 
In his writings, Gutierrez adds that all this is gratuitous, an 
act of divine grace (for example 1984:107-113). Sin and all its 
consequences means that we are in slavery to sin, and Gutierrez 
often quotes Medellin on this. Liberation from slavery is 
freedom. This freedom is redemption. 
We mentioned earlier that for Gutierrez liberation is for 
freedom or communion of man with Yahweh and neighbour. This 
liberation is integral (1983:144-145), in relation to the three 
planes from which people need liberation, namely: alienation from 
God, society, and neighbour. For Gutierrez, then, radical 
liberation is complex, a unity. Concerning the levels of 
salvation Gutierrez (1990b:122) states: 
The stress, therefore, is on the third level: the work 
of Christ that liberates us from sin and brings us 
into communion with him. The changes that may take 
place in the social sphere are important, but they are 
also inadequate from the Christian viewpoint. For a 
"social transformation, no matter how radical it may 
be, does not automatically achieve the suppression of 
all evils". 
This stress on the third level does not obviate the unity between 
the levels or planes. Interestingly (and against Moltmann), 
Gutierrez (Ibid) affirms the view expressed by the Council of 
Chalcedon, in relation to the nature of Christ. Chalcedon speaks 
of the distinction as well as of the unity between the human and 
divine natures of Christ. Gutierrez (Ibid) states: 'Furthermore 
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the profound unity given by the divine person in virtue of being 
the Son does not suppress the human nature of Christ. My 
treatment of "total or integral liberation" is inspired by this 
Chalcedonian principle'. 
Christ's death and resurrection make this possible. The 
dynamic we have, then, is liberation from oppression along with 
communion with God (via Christ) resulting in freedom to love the 
neighbour. Gutierrez, to be sure, does not reduce liberation to 
purely the political-social level. 
Gutierrez proposes the complex salvation-liberation model 
in order to attack sin at the concrete level. Without denying 
the personal element Gutierrez nevertheless formulates the sin-
1 iberation (slavery-freedom) model because of the historical 
manifestation of human suffering. Gutierrez would surely not 
deny that human suffering is not the only historical arena in 
which sin is confronted. However, for Gutierrez the primary 
purpose of the cross and resurrection is of a radical freedom 
from alienation and suffering. 
2.2.2.3 The Resurrection and Life 
Gutierrez is fond of using the 'death to life' motif in his 
discussion of liberation. Death would refer to both existential 
deprivation and physical demise; whereas life would refer to 
salvation or liberation, newness, hope, and eschatological 
resurrection. For Gutierrez (1974:300), the incarnation, as it 
is worked out in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, 
results in our freedom: 'To die and to rise again with Christ, 
is to vanquish death and to enter into a new life (cf Rom 6:1-
11). The cross and resurrection are the seal of our liberty'. 
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This liberating experience implies one's solidarity with the 
poor. New life is not merely a state of being: it is a way of 
being. We note that Gutierrez calls for a union with Christ in 
the act of dying and rising. The cross and resurrection 
effectuate this possibility. Any acceptance of a saviour means 
the following of that saviour. 
This following is worked out, according to Gutierrez 
(1984:30), in the 'dialectic of death followed by life'. In fact 
in this 'dialectic and in the victory of the risen Jesus, the God 
of our hope is revealed'. Gutierrez (Ibid) categorizes this as 
a 'paschal spirituality', one in which oppressive death occurs. 
However, 
it embodies the conviction that life, not death, has 
the final word. The following of Jesus feeds upon the 
witness given by the resurrection, which means the 
death of death, and upon the liberating efforts of the 
poor to assert their unquestionable right to life. 
(Ibid.) 
We see that in Gutierrez, then, the dialectic of death followed 
by life expresses the dialectic of the divine-human effort in the 
liberation of history. The dynamic seems to be that the cross 
and resurrection set in motion the liberative effort, while in 
the historical present the oppressed, and those in solidarity, 
participate in their own freedom. Christ is with and in them, 
but he calls on them to act. 
In relation to freedom from suffering, then, the cross and 
resurrection provide the means and motivation to overcome, to go 
from death to life. Earlier we noted the idea of Christ 
liberating people from sin and its consequences. In connection 
with this, Gutierrez (1974:176) says: 'This is why the Christian 
life is a passover, a transition from sin to grace, from death 
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to life, from injustice to justice, from the subhuman to the 
human. Christ introduces us by the gift of his Spirit into 
communion with God and with all men'. The idea is that as Christ 
identified with and liberates the oppressed in his actions, so 
we can now identify with Christ as liberator. Our identifying 
(part and parcel of our liberation from suffering), of course, 
means a life of seeking justice, or life, for others. In line 
with Gutierrez's notion of the three planes model of liberation, 
it can be asked how this identification can occur. Gutierrez 
(1983:148), in stressing the avoidance of purely 'verticalist' 
(pietism) or 'political-horizontalist' notions of salvation, 
perhaps answers the question in his approving quotation of John 
Paul II at Puebla: 'We are liberated by our participation in the 
new life brought to us by Jesus Christ, and by communion with him 
in the mystery of his death and resurrection'. Gutierrez (Ibid) 
is making the point that the poor can enter into 'communion with 
the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ' and thus be 
influential in the historical process. Gutierrez insists on 
integral liberation to counter charges of political reductionism, 
and falls back on the cross and resurrection to do so. 
Some might say that it is not clear what is meant by the 
mystery of the death and resurrection, and just how we engender 
communion with them. Gutierrez, as we saw earlier, speaks of the 
'gift of the Spirit of Christ' as the means of entering this 
communion. Gutierrez develops this line when dealing with 
'walking in the spirit'. In his treatment of the matter, 
Gutierrez (1984:65-71) opts for a kind of realized eschatological 
approach to our resurrection, or spiritual bodies. Paul's words 
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(Rom 12:1; 1 Cor 15:35-49; Ph 1:20, for example) are 
contemporized to the present. Our spiritual body is actually the 
giving of ourselves unreservedly to the control of the Spirit, 
assuming we have been baptised and that 'we live even now the 
resurrection of the Lord', inchoately possessing 'fullness of 
life' and appropriating the fact of our being the temple of the 
Holy Spirit (1984:66-67). 
The Spirit gives spiritual life (Rom 6:6, 8:11), and we are 
freed from death, sin and law by the Spirit of the Lord (2 Cor 
3:17). The Spirit brings about the death-life dialectic 
(1984: 67-68). Gutierrez ( 1984: 68) says that death 'has been 
overcome in the body of Christ Jesus that was nailed to the 
cross, whereas life proclaims its final victory in the risen body 
of the Lord'. In fact Gutierrez (1984:68-69) goes on to assert 
that one's membership in the body of Christ, as the church, is 
so because of membership in Christ's actual risen body. 
Gutierrez's logic at this point seems to point towards a semi-
pantheistic identification. Gutierrez (1974:151,158, 193-194) 
would of course think along these lines in the light of his view 
that Christ is now present in all men who are the temple of the 
Spirit, whether they know it or not. For Gutierrez people can 
still say 'no' to Yahweh, but it is a •no' to a Christological 
presence already within their experience (1974:151). 
For Gutierrez (1984:70-71) one has to decide between death 
and life (flesh and spirit), to realize that being Christian is 
to 'be free from all external coercion', and to realize the gift 
which is our human body. Further, we must understand that: 
it is important not to miss the profound continuity of 
the entire process. The resurrected body of the Lord 
is the body of flesh and the crucified body that were 
the medium of his presence in history. We are in the 
same situation through our belonging to the body of 
Christ. Our own bodies, freed from the flesh with its 
death-dealing power, become spiritual and a means of 
life and solidarity. (1984:70-71) 
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Gutierrez (1984:71) is careful to add that Christians (those who 
have chosen to go from death to life) will still face the 'powers 
of death and life'. However, the Spirit is there to help us in 
our filiation (sonship). In fact: 
the fact that God is a father, the gift of filiation, 
the fellowship that f iliation demands these 
constitute "the mystery which was kept secret for long 
ages but now is disclosed" (Rom 16:25-26) in the death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ. (Ibid.) 
The eucharist is important for Gutierrez who sees it as 
demonstrating the work of Christ and the sacramental (liberative) 
task of the church in history (1974:262-264). For Gutierrez 
(1974:263) the eucharist celebrates 'the cross and the 
resurrection of Christ, his Passover from death to life, and our 
passing from sin to grace'. Christ was (and remains) the Paschal 
sacrificial 'Lamb of God' in line with the exodus Passover lamb 
and shed blood; he is also the victorious Apocalyptic lamb 
(1984:39-40). For Gutierrez (1983:107): 
[in) "the breaking of the bread" - that staple lacking 
to the disinherited of the earth - the life of the 
resurrected Christ becomes present reality. This life 
of his assures us that death is not to triumph, and 
that sin and injustice will be abolished. 
(cf 1990b:80-81.) We see, then, that for Gutierrez the eucharist 
is at once celebratory and catalytic in historical liberation 
from suffering. 
In the midst of contemporary historical suffering, then, a 
suffering worshipper can appropriate the idea that the cross and 
resurrection have counteracted his very suffering. Admittedly, 
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if the eucharist contemporizes the actual victory of the 
resurrection, then it at best can be only a proleptic victory. 
However, Gutierrez would himself maintain that liberation is a 
protracted affair. It is one thing to claim that Yahweh is, on 
the basis of the cross and resurrection, working in the ongoing 
historical dialectic to overcome suffering. It is another thing 
to emphasize Yahweh's ongoing judgement on oppression. Gutierrez 
speaks of both elements (overcoming, judging), but he strongly 
emphasizes the former. 
We return to the earlier question of how Gutierrez suggests 
we understand communion with the 'mystery' of Christ's death and 
resurrection. We have so far pointed out the following: 
communion with the death and resurrection event; participation 
in the new life proffered by the event; the submission to the 
Spirit of Christ who gives spiritual (liberated, freed) life; the 
identity with the body of Christ (corporate and literal); and 
finally the celebration and continuing appropriation of this all 
in the eucharist (and baptism). If all of this happens because 
of our conscious assent to the divine initiative to liberate, 
then according to Gutierrez, we will pass from death to life, we 
will appropriate the gift of Christ, that is, radical liberation. 
One might ask Gutierrez how this radial liberation, or the act 
of passing from death to life is applied to the non-christian 
poor. Gutierrez approaches this issue from the point of view of 
the parables of the sheep and goats (Matt 25:31-46) and of the 
good Samaritan (Lk 10:25-37). For Gutierrez (1974:201) the term 
'least' can refer to christian or non-christian. The issue to 
be realized is that 'God's temple is human history; the 'sacred' 
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transcends the narrow limits of the places of worship' 
(1974:201). However it is not merely human history; it is rather 
the human history of the oppressed. 
For Gutierrez the issue revolves not so much around who is 
christian or not, as it does the act of encountering the Lord. 
As Gutierrez (1974:202-203) puts it: 
our encounter with the Lord occurs in our encounter with 
men, especially in the encounter with those whose human 
features have been disfigured by oppression, despoilation, 
and alienation and who have "no beauty, no majesty" but are 
the things "from which men turn away their eyes" (Isa 53:2-
3). These are the marginal groups, who have fashioned a 
true culture for themselves and whose values one must 
understand if he wishes to reach them. The salvation of 
humanity passes through them; they are the bearers of the 
meaning of history and "inherit the kingdom" (James 2:5). 
Gutierrez would agree that, given enough time, more and more 
oppressed, as the oppressed, will respond to liberative 
evangelism. We recall that for Gutierrez (1974:151), anyone who 
consciously or unconsciously participates in liberation is part 
and parcel of the saving process. Further, all things have been 
created and saved in Christ (1974:158). It is not clear how 
Gutierrez relates the above to the previously mentioned idea of 
'conscious assent' to the dialectic of liberation. As Gutierrez 
calls for conversion, faith and hope, it cannot be said that he 
interfuses faith with ethics. 
3. ESCHATOLOGICAL IMPETUS AND THE CHRIST EVENT 
3.1 The Place of creation 
Earlier we noted Gutierrez's view on unitary history. Now 
we return to history as it is beholden to the cross and 
resurrection. In a similar vein to the theologies of hope, 
Gutierrez understands history to be a continuous flow. The end 
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of history may be open, but there is an eschatological framework 
beginning from even before creation. For Gutierrez (1974:154): 
'The creation of the world initiates history, the human struggle, 
and the salvific adventure of Yahweh'. Israel is called to faith 
in creation as the means and the arena of redemption. Gutierrez 
refers to the Psalms and Prophets to establish this. For 
example, Gutierrez (Ibid) states: 
The stress (on faith in creation], however, is on the 
saving action of Yahweh; the work of creation is 
regarded and understood only in this context: "But now 
this is the word of the Lord, the word of your 
creator, 0 Jacob, of him who fashioned you, Israel: 
Have no fear; for I have paid your ransom; I have 
called you by name and you are my own" (Is 43: 1 cf 
42:5-6) 
This faith in creation and Yahweh is the same as faith in 
Yahweh's goal of history, that is to say, a totally free 
humanity. The exodus illustrates this. Gutierrez ( 1974: 155) 
says that for Israel the 'creative act is linked, almost 
identified with, the act which freed Israel from slavery in 
Egypt'. Israel, as the subjected ones, had to see that Yahweh 
is at once creator and liberator. For Gutierrez (1974:156-157), 
creation 'is regarded in terms of the Exodus, a historical-
salvific fact which structures the faith of Israel'. Yahweh, 
then, calls Israel to witness to the Creator-Liberator God. In 
fact, the 'eschatological horizon is present in the heart of the 
Exodus' (1974:157). Earlier we noted the divine-human dialectic 
demonstrated (as Gutierrez posits) in the exodus. Here, we are 
emphasizing Gutierrez's idea of the historical continuum or 
movement. 
This continuum is culminated in Jesus Christ. For Gutierrez 
(1974:158): 
The work of Christ forms a part of this movement and 
brings it to complete fulfillment. The redemptive 
action of Christ, the foundation of all that exists, 
is also conceived as a recreation and presented in a 
context of creation (cf Col 1:15-20; 1 Cor 8:6; Heb 
1:2; Eph 1:1-22). 
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Gutierrez further maintains that Christ's work is a new creation, 
in which Christ gives meaning and liberation to history 
(creation), to all humanity. For Gutierrez (1974:158), then: 
'Creation and salvation therefore have, in the first place, a 
Christological sense: all things have been created in Christ, all 
things have been saved in him (cf Col 1:15-20)'. The cross and 
resurrection, then, form part of, and culminate, Yahweh's 
eschatological plan for humanity. Creation throws us into 
existence, the exodus demonstrates Yahweh's option for the 
oppressed, and the Christ-event impacts history with 
eschatological freedom. Humanity, especially the oppressed and 
those in solidarity with them, are called upon to appropriate the 
benefits of the cross and resurrection and participate in the 
historical movement towards freedom from suffering. 
So what we have, then, is radical liberation (that is to say 
all-embracing, the possibility of passing from death to life), 
being made the impetus of the historical flow. The basis for 
this is Yahweh's initiative in creation, exodus, and Christ. 
Participation, that is entering into communion with the cross and 
resurrection and thus working for freedom, completes the flow of 
the divine-human dialectic. 
3.2 The Place of Promise 
The concept of promise appeals to Gutierrez. For him the 
'Bible is the book of the Promise, the Promise made by God to men 
which is the efficacious revelation of his love and his self-
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communication; simultaneously it reveals man to himself'. 
(1974:160). In simpler terms, the Promise is all about love and 
redemption (1984:95), which is worked out in Yahweh's goal of 
historical freedom (therefore freedom from suffering) for man. 
Man participates in the promise. Abraham becomes the father of 
believers because the promise was first made to him (Gen 12:13, 
15:1-6) in that he and his descendants are 'heirs of the world' 
(Rom 4:13) (1974:160). For Gutierrez (1974:161) the promise is 
realized in the various promises relating to the Old Covenant, 
the Kingdom of Israel, the prophets, and the eschatological 
Kingdom of God. The promises are partial fulfilments of the 
Promise. In fact: 'There exists a dialectical relationship 
between the Promise and its partial fulfillments' (Ibid). There 
is ultimate meaning in the Promise. Actually, the 'Promise is 
gradually revealed in all its universality and concrete 
expression: it is already fulfilled in historical events, but not 
yet completely; it incessantly projects itself into the future, 
creating a permanent historical mobility' (Ibid). 
For Gutierrez (1990b:95) Christ fulfils the Father's loving 
promise in a 'sovereign and unparalleled way'. Jesus' being 'The 
Truth' is to be seen as his fulfilling the Promise, establishing 
Yahweh's fidelity. As Gutierrez (1990b:97) puts it: 
In Jesus Christ, who is the full and unexpected 
fulfillment of the Father's promise, history and 
eschatology are tied together, the present and the 
ultimate meaning of time. All this is expressed in 
the words "I am the truth. 11 Jesus Christ is the first 
and last word, the alpha and the omega, the beginning 
and the end (Rev 22:13). 
Concerning the dialectical relationship mentioned above, the 
'resurrection itself is the fulfillment of something promised and 
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likewise the anticipation of a future (cf Acts 13:23); with it 
the work of Christ is "not yet completed, not yet concluded", the 
resurrected Christ "is still future to himself"' (1974:161). 
Gutierrez's discussion on the Promise (liberative-
redemption) is for the purpose of rejecting what he sees as a 
false dilemma between either spiritual or temporal redemption 
(1974:168). We will recall that Gutierrez opts for a unified 
view of history in relation to God, and for a multidimensional 
understanding of salvation. From this framework, the real issue 
is fulfilment of the Promise as multidimensional. Thus, 'Christ 
does not "spiritualize" the eschatological promises; he gives 
them meaning and fulfillment today (cf Luke 4:21); but at the 
same time he opens new perspectives by catapulting history 
forward, forward towards total reconciliation' (1974:167). 
The Promise is also fulfilled in the New Covenant, which 
replaces the Old Covenant, and is an important vehicle for the 
Promise (1974:161). As Gutierrez (1983:15) says: 'Jesus Christ 
is himself the New covenant. In him God becomes the Father of 
all nations, and all men and women see that they are his children 
and one another's sisters and brothers'. In that we would see 
Gutierrez still maintaining his call for a conscious entering 
into the liberative process, the New Covenant can only 
provisionally apply to non-Christians or the oppressed who are 
ignorant of the Promise and who still have to 'see' that they are 
Yahweh's children. This of course would have a special 
application to those who are oppressors. Anyway, for Gutierrez 
(Ibid): 'The universality of the new covenant passes by way of 
Christ's death and is sealed by his resurrection'. 
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3.3 Change, Faith. and Hope 
The whole point of liberation from suffering is that it will 
change the negative dimension of history. Gutierrez (1974:193) 
talks of the universalization of Yahweh's historical presence, 
which also moves out of the Temple into history: 
Christ is the point of convergence of both processes. 
In him, in his personal uniqueness, the particular is 
transcended and the universal becomes concrete. In 
him, in his Incarnation, what is personal and internal 
becomes visible. Henceforth, this will be true, in 
one way or another, of every man. 
Christ, then, as the Abrahamic heir, is here universalizing 
Yahweh's liberating presence. As the New Covenant, Christ takes 
Yahweh from Israel to the whole world. 
We have referred before to Gutierrez's idea Of 
multidimensional salvation. This salvation brings historical 
change or mobility, a possibility of going from death to life. 
In defining the effect of salvation, Gutierrez (1974:151-152) 
quotes from CELAM: 
Thus the center of God's salvific design is Jesus 
Christ, who by his death and resurrection transforms 
the universe and makes it possible for man to reach 
fulfillment as a human being. This fulfillment 
embraces every aspect of humanity: body and spirit, 
individual and society, person and cosmos, time and 
eternity. Christ, the image of the Father and the 
perfect God-Man, takes on all the dimensions of human 
existence. 
Put somewhat differently, 'Jesus is the irruption into history 
of the one by whom everything was made and everything was saved' 
(1983:61). 
We come back to the question of mechanism. The question 
still remains as to just how the cross and resurrection effect 
liberation, especially in relation to the problem of ongoing 
human suffering. As we said earlier, Gutierrez chooses to focus 
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on hope in divine faithfulness and participation in liberation. 
To be sure, Gutierrez is cognizant of the question 'where are the 
signs of liberation amidst persistent suffering'?. Gutierrez 
presents his case by positing what can be expected, that is, 
liberation, life, and freedom; he also expresses how the 
oppressed should work out this expectation - faith and hope. 
For Gutierrez (1976:66) faith is accepting 'the gratuitous 
gift of divine sonship' which implies joining the fight against 
injustice, so much so that faith 'thus appears to us ever more 
as a liberating praxis'·· Thus faith is not passive; rather it 
is catalytic. Faith is entering a journey in order to love 
others because God first loved us, especially the oppressed 
(1983:20). In fact faith is to believe in a loving (just) God. 
To believe 'is to proclaim the kingdom as Christ does - from the 
midst of the struggle for justice that led him to his death' 
(Ibid). For Gutierrez, then, conversion, which is going from 
death to life (radical liberation), is worked out in the exercise 
of the gift of divine sonship (filiation). This exercise is a 
show of faith, of believing that the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ are in relation to the active human quest for 
freedom. 
Faith, however, is buoyed by hope. In seeking for 
'authentic communion' (that is brotherly love), we must show the 
gift of sonship as we 'opt for the cross of Christ and have hope 
in his resurrection' (1979:16). This hope will encourage one as 
he seeks freedom from suffering in our conflict-filled history. 
Gutierrez sympathizes with Moltmann's belief in future justice, 
but he feels that Moltmann is calling for a misplaced hope. For 
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Gutierrez (1974:218), Moltmann errs by replacing a 'Christianity 
of the Beyond with a Christianity of the Future' in a way that 
neglects the fight against injustice in the present. Rather, we 
must participate now in a liberating praxis (course of action). 
'The death and resurrection of Jesus are our future, because they 
are our perilous and hopeful present' (Ibid). In this context 
one must lay oneself open to the gift of the future as one 
opposes injustice. 'Thus hope fulfills a mobilizing and 
liberating function in history. Its function is not very 
obvious, but it is real and deep' (Ibid). 
For Gutierrez (1984:118), hope (of the resurrection) is no 
nebulous above-history thing; rather it stimulates historical 
activity against injustice. Implicit in the belief in the 
resurrection is the fight for life. Faith and hope can move an 
oppressed people to embark on a course of a spirituality of 
liberation in confidence (1984:120). It is in this context that 
Gutierrez (Ibid) quotes from a Chilean bishops' document: 
Despit~ all the negative signs, we urge you to hope. 
Hope is an essentially Christian virtue. It is 
grounded in our certainty that in the death of Jesus 
Christ God has assumed all our sufferings and failures 
and that in the resurrection of Jesus God has overcome 
evil. In God's hands life is mightier than death. 
Again, for Gutierrez (1990b:80-81), the eucharist celebrates the 
liberating actions and results of Easter, one element of which 
is hope. 
Eschatologically speaking, then, the historical changes 
begun and set in motion by the death and resurrection of Jesus 
are appropriated in faith and hope. In the presence of 
persistent social suffering Gutierrez obviously has to consider 
the pattern of failures and victories. He points to the 
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inevitability of disappointments but also to the hope of future 
success. Concerning the ordinary person, Gutierrez (1983:191) 
states: 'Yes, the popular movement knows its retreats and 
vacillations - what historical process does not? But it knows 
its constancy, as well, its hope, and its political realism'. 
Gutierrez (1983:81) discusses the differences between the 
optimists and pessimists. For Gutierrez (Ibid) the pessimists, 
who say that reality dictates against liberative success, fail 
to understand that liberative action, no matter what immediate 
negative consequences may arise, engenders optimism. Gutierrez 
(Ibid) states: 'We affirm a utopia on the way to becoming a 
historical reality - through difficulties and hard struggles, to 
be sure, and with an open eyed awareness of the present 
situation'. 
This utopia is to be brought about by human work but in the 
context of the divine-human dialectic. 'The human plan and the 
gift [promise of liberation) of God imply each other' (1974:238). 
For Gutierrez (1974:238-239), to 'hope in Christ is at the same 
time to believe in the adventure of history, which opens infinite 
vistas to the love and action of the Christian'. Part of the 
church's task is to identify and witness to God's liberating 
action in history. The church is to witness to the kingdom of 
God. For Gutierrez (1990b:l58) the kingdom is to be understood 
as something that favours the poor, this preference being 
exhibited in the Christ-event. The resurrection is important 
here, as 'life' conquers 'death'. Gutierrez (1990b:159) relates 
the resurrection to the kingdom-task of the church in the 
following way: 
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Testimony to the Lord's resurrection is situated between 
acceptance of the grace of the kingdom and the historical 
demands that this grace makes. The task of the church is 
located precisely between these two terms. The church is 
called to be a sign of the life of the kingdom within 
history and to make that life a reality, thus placing 
itself under the judgement of the word of God. 
The resurrection (and therefore also the cross) then, is behind 
both the being and kingdom-responsibility of the church. This 
church exists because of God's liberating grace while it is 
tasked to witness to the grace of liberation. 
God's liberating action is, for Gutierrez, further linked 
to the poor as agents of evangelization. Evangelization is, of 
course, the announcing of, and participation in, liberation. 
With reference to Latin America, Gutierrez (1990b:151-152) speaks 
highly of the 'basic ecclesial communities'. These are 
communities comprised of the poor who relate to the liberative 
evangelization of the church and develop in liberative communion 
and fellowship. Concerning these communities, Gutierrez 
(1990b:152) says: 
They are a manifestation of the people of God as existing 
in the world of poverty but at the same time they are 
profoundly marked by Christian faith. They reveal the 
presence in the church of the "nobodies" of history or, to 
use another expression of the council, of a "messianic 
people" (Lumen Gentium, No 9). They are, in other words, 
a people journeying through history and continually 
bringing about the messianic reversal - "the last shall be 
first" - that is a key element in every truly liberating 
process. 
These communities, then, are sacramentalistic, as they reflect 
the meaning and purpose of the cross and resurrection. 
Gutierrez, to be sure, believes that Christ is to culminate 
human liberative effort. This future has been determined by the 
cross and resurrection. For Gutierrez (1990b:141) the 'truth 
that sets human beings free is Jesus himself'. Referring to 
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Gaudium et Spes Gutierrez posits that Christ will himself present 
to the Father a kingdom of freedom and justice. This kingdom 
will reflect past human liberative efforts which will be 
'cleansed this time from the stain of sin, illuminated and 
transfigured' ( 1990b: 141) . Gutierrez ( 1974: 196-203) uses the 
parable of the sheep and the goats to speak indirectly of divine 
judgement on oppressors. If one's love of neighbour and Christ 
do not equate with each other, or do not exist, then one would 
remain unreconciled with Yahweh. 
4. SUMMARY 
To this point we have been presenting Gutierrez's approach 
to the cross and resurrection in relation to human suffering. 
On the basis of the previous discussion, let us now briefly 
summarize Gutierrez's approach. 
Human history is characterized by conflict, and, as 
experienced in Latin America, this conflict focuses on political, 
economic, and social oppression. Yahweh opposes this and makes 
an option for the poor (oppressed). This option began with 
creation, at which point Yahweh's salvific plan for unitary 
history was set in motion. The exodus demonstrated Yahweh's 
option and the possibility of his liberating intervention in 
history. Yahweh spoke also through the prophets, enunciating his 
call for justice. In this, and the covenants, the divine Promise 
of freedom, and preference for the poor, was made clear. 
This freedom (from domination by oppression) is really for 
all history, beginning, of course, with the oppressed. Creation, 
exodus, and the cross are historically linked and are historical 
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landmarks of Yahweh's liberative actions. The oppressed, and 
ultimately all people, are players in the historical flow of 
liberation. The cross and resurrection culminate the historical 
flow as they fulfil the Promise and eschatologically open up the 
future. 
In his death, Jesus died as a victim, in solidarity with the 
oppressed. This death was a justice event. The resurrection 
sees Jesus conquering death, vanquishing evil, and providing 
radical multidimensional (all life areas) liberation (freedom 
from domination). This makes possible the passing from death to 
life of the oppressed, in short - creating the possibility of 
freedom. For Gutierrez, freedom pertains to both the personal 
and systemic levels, bringing certain historical change. 
The oppressed are to appropriate God's gift of freedom, by 
the Spirit, in faith (which implies liberative commitment) and 
hope. One can do this by entering into personal communion with 
the mystery of the death and resurrection of Christ. This can 
be done by any who are committed to liberation, even if they are 
doing it unknowingly. The divine option, as it is exercised in 
Christ, results in a universal, identifying, and liberating 
Christo-presence, especially amongst the oppressed. Oppressors 
will benefit from the cross and resurrection if they confess and 
therefore enter into solidarity with those who suffer. 
Conversion is needed, which in reality is the act of 
confession, enjoying communion with Christ by the Spirit, and 
existentially identifying with the cause of freedom (i.e. having 
faith). Both oppressor and oppressed can enter into this. God 
calls for the oppressed to appropriate the power and promise of 
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the cross and resurrection as a basis for active participation 
in their own liberation. That is to say, God is on their side, 
in a divine-human dialectic. There will be failure and victory, 
with victory being ultimately certain, as God has planned the 
open liberation of history. Christ suffers and rejoices with the 
oppressed now. There will be, however, an eschatological handing 
over of a fully liberated (i.e. eschatologically consummated) 
history to the Father by the Son. The kingdom will have come in 
its fullness. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Gutierrez (1973:56) here refers to Jacques Maritain's 'New 
Christendom' approach. 
2. That is, Gutierrez would not go for a total depravity a la 
Jean Calvin. 
CHAPTER TWO 
JAMES CONE: BLACKNESS AND FREEDOM 
Now we move to that kind of oppression which is at once 
socio-economic and ethnocentric white racism. In line with 
Cone, we have chosen to speak in terms of 'blackness'. Speaking 
from a victim's point of view, Cone bathes the issues of 
suffering, divine response, and human hope with the drama and 
emotions of the black experience. As in the previous chapter, 
we shall focus on the cross and resurrection and related factors. 
Like Gutierrez, Cone appears to treat the cross and resurrection 
as a unified event. 
1. THE BLACKNESS OF SUFFERING 
Here we wish merely to establish that for cone, black 
suffering is a reality. It is not our purpose to enumerate 
example after example of this suffering: black theology exists 
because racial oppression already exists. In The Spirituals and 
the Blues (1972) and God of the Oppressed (1975) Cone speaks of 
the evils of black slavery and the differing world views of slave 
and master. In connection with this, Cone relates the slave 
experience to musical styles such as the seculars, blues, 
spirituals and gospels. Cone's own experience is reflected in 
detail in My Soul Looks Back (1982). 
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In establishing the content of black theology, Cone 
(1986a:15) strikingly says: 'Realizing that white racism is an 
insanity comparable to Nazism, black theology seeks to articulate 
a theological ethos consistent with the Black revolutionary 
struggle' . Further, in determining the sources and norm of black 
theology, Cone (1986a:24) states that the 'black experience is 
existence in a system of white racism. The black person knows 
that the ghetto is the white way of saying that blacks are sub-
human and fit only to live with rats'. 
The American white church presents a major stumbling block 
for Cone. This is because he understands them 'almost without 
exception' (1985:182) to be preoccupied with pietistic concerns 
at the expense of social concerns. Thus the churches become, by 
their silence, and also active participation, agents of 
injustice. Cone (Ibid) concludes that 'all institutional white 
churches in America have sided with capitalist, rich, white, male 
elites, and against socialists, the poor, blacks and women'. In 
fact for Cone (1979d:120) the white church is a manifestation of 
the Anti-Christ. 
How does sin fit into all of this? cone (1986a:l03-104) 
understands sin as estrangement from meaningful being, as well 
as existence in opposition to positive community. Sin is a 
community concept, rather than an abstractly theological one. 
As Cone (1986b:41) states: 
For the basic human sin is the attempt to be God, to 
take his place by ordering the societal structures 
according to one's political interests. Sin is not 
primarily a religious impurity but rather social, 
political, and economic oppression of the poor. It is 
the denial of the humanity of the neighbor through 
unjust political and economic arrangements. 
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The 'problem of sin', for Cone (1975:237), 'is an alienation from 
God that it is always connected with injustice and oppression'. 
It is important for Cone that whites give up analysing the 
black ethos, especially in theological terms. While it is agreed 
that all people are sinners, one must allow that only blacks can 
speak about black sin. The different cultural and Christian 
identities demands this (1986a:51). We observe that Cone allows 
blacks to analyze white sin, however. White sin is the oppressor 
mentality, or, whiteness itself - a thing whites are incapable 
of perceiving (1986a:106-108). Cone (1986a:106) advocates his 
views in the light of the fact that '[black] theology believes 
that the true nature of sin is perceived only in the moment of 
oppression and liberation'. 
So what is sin in the black context then? Certainly, the 
black church is to deal with her own sins (including oppression 
of one another), but it is also to remember the black 
responsibility as liberative agents ( 1979a: 354) . The black 
community, as oppressed, sins if it denies or forgets (like 
Israel of old) that authentic existence involves the affirmation 
of God as their liberator (1986a:105-106). Concerning the 
question of what is wrong with the world, then, Cone (1986a:107) 
states: '[only] the oppressed know what is wrong, because they 
are both the victims of evil and the recipients of God's 
liberating activity'. Cone (1986a:51) symbolically, yet 
dramatically, states that for the oppressed, sin is attempting 
to 'love' oppressors on their own terms rather than killing them. 
For Cone, then, the inter-linkage between sin, racial suffering, 
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and the unnecessary acceptance thereof by blacks, is part and 
parcel of what we can call the 'blackness of suffering'. 
2. THE BLACKNESS OF GOD 
2.1 Revelation and the Divine option 
The brief observation of Cone's reflection on sin and racial 
suffering now allows us to consider his understanding of the 
divine response to suffering. This response culminates in the 
cross and resurrection, but to understand this we must first 
consider revelation in relation to suffering. Cone (1986a:l06) 
avers: 
Because sin is inseparable from revelation, and because 
revelation is an event that takes place in the moment of 
liberation from oppression, there can be no knowledge of 
the sinful condition except in the movement of an oppressed 
community claiming its freedom. 
We understand our situation of suffering-as-sin in the light of 
the divine revelation. This revelation is contextual. Whites, 
then, can never hope to comprehend the black condition - but God 
can and does. 
God does this because of who he is. According to Cone 
(1975:62), God is not an 'eternal idea' or an 'absolute ethical 
principle'. Rather, he is a God of historical involvement. As 
Cone (Ibid) puts it: 
He is the political God, the Protector of the poor and the 
Establisher of the right for those who are oppressed. To 
know him is to experience his acts in the concrete affairs 
and relationships of people, liberating the weak and the 
helpless from pain and humiliation. 
So revelation is God in action, it is God who presents himself 
in a situation of need. 
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For Cone, then, the divine revelation is the expression of 
the divine option to be on the 'side' of the oppressed. We shall 
see this as we proceed. Cone (1986a:45) plainly states: 'There 
is no revelation of God without a condition of oppression which 
develops into a situation of liberation. Revelation is only for 
the oppressed of the land' . God reveals himself through 
historical action, in human history, for human freedom (1973:53). 
Cone does not support the propositional (conceptive) notion of 
revelation as this would negate the idea that revelation is in 
the context of, and is also the promise of, historical 
liberation. For Cone (1975:62) there is no truth about Yahweh 
unless it is the 'truth of freedom'. 
In discussing the sources of black theology, Cone (1986a:27) 
posits the following question: 
What are the implications of black history for the 
revelation of God? Is God active in black history or 
has God withdrawn and left blacks to the mercy of 
white insanity? ... If God is not for us, if God is 
not against white racists, then God is a murderer, and 
we had better kill God. The task of black theology is 
to kill gods that do not belong to the black 
community. 
Cone is here symbolically stating that true revelation, which 
issues in liberation, is determined by its relevance to the black 
situation. To the question, 'has there been true revelation?' 
Cone answers, 'Yes.' The yes is seen in God's history of self-
disclosure in Israelite history (1986a:47) and, of course, in the 
Christ-event. Black theology investigates this. 
Obviously, the exodus event is the opening key here. Yahweh 
responded to the Hebrew cry for help, and, through Moses, 
effected the exodus-liberation. This liberation also placed 
Israel into a covenant relationship with Yahweh the liberator, 
--
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in which Israel herself must act justly (1975:64). For Cone 
(1975:65), then, in the 'Exodus-Sinai tradition, Yahweh is 
disclosed as the God of history, whose revelation is identical 
with his power to liberate the oppressed'. The prophets also 
declare Yahweh's opposition to injustice as well as his call for 
justice. Further, even in the so-called David-Zion tradition, 
(which has to do with the Davidic covenant), the theme of 
promised liberation is present (1975:68-69). Further revelation 
was seen in Yahweh's delivering Israel from the exile in what was 
her second exodus (1975:72). 
As history is also the medium of the divine liberative 
revelation, the life of Jesus continues the meaning of Old 
Testament revelation. Cone (Ibid) sees the New Testament 
presenting Jesus as the continuation of the Law and Prophets, as 
well as the inaugurator of a new age. For Cone (1975:73) the 
early church saw the historical Jesus as reflecting the meaning 
of both the Exodus-Sinai and David-Zion traditions. This meaning 
is that Yahweh liberatively responds to the poor. 1 
For Cone, the fact that Jesus was incarnated into the Jewish 
culture reflects Yahweh's disposition for the oppressed. 'He was 
not a "universal" man but a particular Jew who came to fulfil 
God's will to liberate the oppressed' (1975:119). 
Jesus, as this Jew, came to bring about the Abrahamic 
blessing of the promised reconciliation of the world (Ibid). Of 
course, this reconciliation is worked out in liberation. God 
identifies with the helpless in Israel by becoming a poor Jew 
(1986a:5). Cone (1986a:ll4) sees the birth narratives as 
mythological, but stresses that they point to the natural social 
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poverty of Jesus. Thus the meaning of Jesus' existence was 'one 
with the poor and outcast'. The Messiah Jesus was humiliated and 
abused in his birth, and his continuing identity was with the tax 
collectors and sinners (1986a:115). God, in Jesus, was fully 
identifying with the poor 'precisely because they are poor' 
(1986a:117). Jesus opted against Satan, earthly powers, and the 
rich (1986a:2). For Cone (1973:54, 1986a:117) Jesus' 
identification with the poor is seen in his message that the 
kingdom is for the poor alone. 
For Cone the general nature of Jesus' birth was that of 
entering into slavery in order to show the inhumanity of 
servitude (1975:111,120). Further, however, it was to signal the 
overthrow of the perpetrators of oppression. This is highlighted 
in the Magnificat and the synagogue address (1975:73,75). The 
Magnificat (Lk 1:49-53) stresses the providence of God in dealing 
with the rich and powerful. In the synagogue, we have Jesus 
declaring his mission of freedom for the poor, blind, victims and 
prisoners (Lk 4: 18-19) . The effectuating of all this, of course, 
implied a great personal cost for Jesus Christ. 
2.2 suffering and victory 
We need to begin here by seeing how Cone links the divine 
option for the poor or oppressed with redemptive suffering. It 
is at this point that we take note of Cone's view of the baptism 
and temptation of Jesus Christ. Cone relates these to the theme 
of suffering, more specifically the Suffering Servant. 
Concerning the baptism, Cone (1975:74) sees the descent of the 
Spirit and the Father's announced pleasure in the Son as 
indicative of Jesus' liberative mission. Jesus' own self-
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understanding and the Spirit descent signal the inauguration of 
the new age of liberation. Cone links Psalm 2:7 with Isaiah 42:1 
here. The baptism allows Jesus to assume the oppressed status 
of sinners (1986a:115). 
The wilderness temptations depict Jesus as rejecting any 
revolutionary role that would separate him from the poor 
(1975:75). No glorifying or oppressive means of messiahship is 
acceptable for Jesus. 
of the humiliated, 
Rather, his 'being in the world is as one 
suffering poor' (1986a:115). For cone 
(1975:75), then, the meaning of Jesus' mission as seen in both 
the baptism and temptation is: 'Lordship and Servanthood 
together, that is, the establishment of justice through 
suffering'. Jesus Christ therefore came to identify with and 
bring .about liberation (freedom) for the oppressed. Jesus, as 
the Suffering Servant, is an important theme for Cone. This is 
part and parcel of the notion of redemptive suffering. 
Cone begins his discussion of redemptive suffering by 
referring to the Israelite experience. In so doing, he discusses 
the issues of punitive and unjust suffering and looks at various 
approaches describing the Israelite experience. The Deuteronomic 
formula, (that suffering is always in proportion to sins 
committed) , is rejected by Cone ( 197 5: 165-168) as being too 
simplistic and naive. The prophets themselves (for example Jer 
12:1; Hab 1:13) found no answer in that formula. Ecclesiastes 
is 'skeptical and sometimes cynical' (1975:168) and it falls upon 
Job to supply some more realistic answers. While Yahweh does 
judge for sin, the question of unexplainable suffering remains. 
Cone (1975:170) sees Job as suggesting that the testing of faith, 
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and especially the possibility of redemptive suffering, 
constitute reasonable answers to the theodicy question. 
Israel was not to think Yahweh had abandoned her; rather, 
the exilic suffering of Israel was redemptive. For Cone 
{1975:171), Deutero-Isaiah's message was just that. Israel was 
to see herself as Suffering Servant. In fact for Cone 
{1975:172), Israel was to bring in justice by bearing the sins 
of other nations. In this, she would be judged by Yahweh, for 
others. Cone (Ibid) states: 
Her mission is to be Yahweh's people in the world by 
expressing the liberating presence of God among the 
nations. This act is the vicarious suffering of the 
innocent for the guilty. This is the meaning of 
Israel's double portion which she received from 
Yahweh's hand: expiation for her own sins, and 
transformation into a new being for the sake of 
others. 
Cone (1975:172-173) adds that Israel was elected to this 
experience. Furthermore, this election implied the call to 
suffer for justice. This justice-suffering is redemptive in that 
she suffered with her Lord who identifies with the oppressed. 
Thus it is Yahweh himself who, by his identification with human 
suffering, makes it redemptive. In Israel, it could be said that 
Yahweh was 'bearing the pain of sin so that liberation will 
become a reality among all people' (1975:173). This history, 
along with the issues of sin and racial suffering, brings Cone 
to consider the Christ-event. 
This he does in the context of Jesus as the Suffering 
Servant. 'The cross of Jesus is God invading the human situation 
as the Elected One who takes Israel's place as the Suffering 
Servant and thus reveals the divine willingness to suffer in 
order that humanity might be liberated' (1975:135). According 
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to Cone (1975:174-175), Jesus Christ was fulfilling the prophecy 
of the sad and stricken lamb of Isaiah 53:3-5. In this way, on 
the cross, 'God's identity with the suffering of the world was 
complete'. As the Suffering Servant, God through Jesus absorbs 
human pain and humiliation into his own history. The pain of the 
oppressed becomes God's pain ( 197 5: 17 5) . This is the God who 
became a sacrificial victim (1975:80,175). Indeed, the pain of 
the cross is seen in God's suffering for and with us for the 
purpose of liberation (1975:139) as the Suffering Servant. 
Christ overcomes his and our suffering through his resurrection, 
freeing the oppressed to fight for freedom in joy (1975:175). 
All this demonstrates the option of Yahweh for the 
oppressed. The cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ links the 
Exodus-Sinai and David-Zion histories with the Suffering servant 
reality. This brings us now to consider the results of the life, 
dying and resurrection of Jesus. We shall look at the concepts 
of victory, freedom and the liberating presence of Christ. For 
cone those themes are interlinked. 
The cross and especially the resurrection, then, signal the 
divine victory over human pain. The poor no longer have to be 
determined by their poverty, as the resurrection means victory 
over oppression. As Cone (1986b:6) states: 'The Incarnation, 
then, is simply God taking upon the divine self human suffering 
and humiliation. The resurrection is the divine victory over 
suffering, the bestowal of freedom to all who are weak and 
helpless'. For Cone it is quite clear that the gospel means 
freedom. There are those who will maintain that the gospel 
should transcend race and politics. In response to this, Cone 
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(1979e:183) claims that 'Jesus did not die on the cross in order 
to transcend human suffering, but rather that it might be 
overcome'. A battle was needed; it was fought; it was won. 
For Cone, the concept of victory is bound up with what he 
terms the 'objective side of reconciliation'. Liberation is 
God's method of effecting reconciliation. For Cone (1975:229) 
liberation is deliverance from 'unfreedom to freedom' whilst 
reconciliation is the 'bestowal of freedom and life with God'. 
The Old Testament depicts salvation in terms of political 
deliverance, which, Cone (1975:230) maintains, reflects the 
interrelationship between liberation and reconciliation. This 
theme is then acted out in Christ: 'Christ is the Reconciler 
because he is first the Liberator' (Ibid). As the Oppressed One, 
Jesus assumed the existence of the oppressed and died for them. 
This made clear that 'poverty and sickness contradict the divine 
intentions for humanity' (Ibid). Together, the cross and 
resurrection mean the ultimate defeat of slavery. Thus people 
are now able to be reconciled with God as the power of death and 
sin has been destroyed by him (Ibid). 
In all of this, Cone (1975:232) draws political implications 
from the classical victory motif of the atonement as first 
propounded by Aulen. In this context, Cone speaks of the defeat 
of Satan. For Cone (Ibid), Satan is a figure who mythically 
represents metaphysical and earthly realities of evil. Satan and 
the principalities and powers are to be found in the American 
system, American bombs, the prison system, and such like. God, 
however, has defeated all this. As Cone (Ibid) says: 
He [Satan] is alive in those who do his work. Satan 
is present in those powers, visible and invisible, 
that destroy humanity and enslave the weak and 
helpless. And it is against Satan and his powers that 
Christ has given his life. Because Christ has been 
raised from the dead, we know that the decisive 
victory has been won. We have been redeemed, that is, 
set free from the powers of slavery and death. That 
is the objective side of the biblical view of 
reconciliation. 
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This victory of Christ is expressible also in terms of 
freedom. Some might ask whether God would choose the status of 
victim. For Cone (1986a:l18), however, God's assumption of human 
pain and death reveals his divine freedom to do so. The 
resurrection, then, reveals that God defeated oppression and 
created the possibility of freedom. So the freedom of God paves 
the way for the freedom of man. Cone (1975:81) sees Christ's 
actions as reflecting 'a new vision of divine freedom, climaxed 
with the cross and resurrection' in which God demonstrates his 
option, and makes freedom available. In reality, liberation 
becomes a 'project of freedom' (1975:138,157) on the basis of the 
divine initiative. 
In discussing the relation between suffering and freedom, 
Cone opposes the idea of retributive justice. For cone 
(1975:176) the life, death and resurrection of Jesus make this 
idea inadequate. According to Cone (Ibid) there is a better 
understanding: 
God is not an even-handed Judge who inflicts punishment 
according to the crime. Rather, he is the Loving Father of 
Jesus, the crucified and risen One, who suffers on our 
behalf. The legalistic structure of the orthodox formula, 
therefore, fails to deal with the complexity of divine 
involvement in suffering and the divine call of freedom to 
the oppressed in their situation of injustice. 
In other words, freedom is the issue here. The Christ-event is 
to be understood in terms of deliverance rather than forensic 
(legalistic) punishment. 
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Cone speaks of discontinuity and continuity between the Old 
and New Testaments in regard to social freedom. The continuity 
is seen in that in both God desires to liberate the oppressed 
(1975:80). However, the discontinuity is seen in that the 
freedom offered by Jesus Christ is even more than the historical 
freedom as seen in the exodus. 'And it is this more which 
separates the Exodus from the Incarnation ... While both stress 
the historical freedom of the unfree, the latter transcends 
history and affirms a freedom not dependant on sociopolitical 
limitations' (Ibid). 
This transcendent freedom gives birth to hope in the midst 
of historical suffering, hope that suffering shall eventually be 
overcome. Hope and freedom, however, have a demand. This demand 
is none other than the call to fight against injustice. The 
resurrection, signifying Christ's victory over suffering, frees 
the oppressed for a liberation struggle (1975:81). 'In Jesus' 
death and resurrection, God has freed us to fight against social 
and political structures while not being determined by them' 
(1975:158). We will return to the aspect of struggle later. 
What are the boundaries of this demand? For Cone, 
(1986a:87), only the poor can truly know freedom. This is 
because freedom is the opposite of oppression. Thus the poor are 
the primary beneficiaries of the Christ-event. Ultimately, 
however, one can only be truly free when all people are free 
(1982:113). There must be a •universal vision' in which the 
cross and resurrection liberate people 'into God's coming 
kingdom'. The resurrection, then, which offers the gift of 
freedom, is actually a political event (1975:125). Justification 
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is in reality the freeing of blacks from white power (1975:236); 
while salvation is definable in terms of freedom in present and 
future history (1979b:540). Jesus lived and died to give life 
(1975: 118). 
Along with victory and freedom, the poor themselves become 
the historical field for the divine presence of the liberating 
Christ (Christo-presence). Blacks understand that: '(Jesus 
Christ) is the divine one who transcends the limitations of 
history by making himself present in our contemporary existence. 
This is the meaning of Jesus' resurrection' (1975:125). One, 
then, does not receive merely the benefits of what Jesus Christ 
has done. One receives Christ himself. In fact, for Cone 
(1975:35), because God is the ground of our existence, he must 
be present in the human struggle. 
Against Pannenburg, Cone (1975:121, 1986a:30) insists on the 
immediate presence of Christ. Cone (1975:121-122) says: 
I reject Pannenburg's conclusions about the absence of 
Christ in our present not only because of the Scripture's 
testimony about the promise and presence of Christ's Holy 
Spirit (Acts 1:8; 2:1ff), but also because of the witness 
of the black Church tradition and the contemporary 
testimonies of black people, all of whom proclaim Christ's 
present power to "make a way out of no way" •.• I must take 
my stand against Pannenburg and with my people who say that 
Jesus has not left us alone but is with us in the struggle 
of freedom. 
Cone, then, does not like Pannenburg's idea of having to wait for 
a future, eschatological confirmation that Christ is, or has 
been, liberating. 
For Cone, the presence of Christ amongst the poor, then and 
now, bears upon the relationship between theology and ideology. 
Cone (1975:98) says: 'This is the dialectic of Christian thought: 
God enters into the social context of human existence and 
55 
appropriates the ideas and actions of the oppressed as his own'. 
For the oppressed's benefit, the presence of the Spirit is the 
divine presence with them, giving them insight and the power to 
do the truth (1979c:391). Cone is careful to warn against the 
deifying of black theology (and turning it into an ideology), 
wanting merely to emphasize the importance of the Incarnation 
with regard to the liberating presence of Christ. 
Cone (1986a:118) points out that the life of Jesus 
demonstrated more than mere sympathy for the poor: 'The finality 
of Jesus lies in the totality of his existence in complete 
freedom as the Oppressed One who reveals through his death and 
resurrection that God is present in all dimensions of human 
liberation'. By this, Cone means that the liberating Christ is 
present in all areas of the lives of the oppressed, the physical, 
economic, social, worship, and such like. It is thus an all-
encompassing identification. In fact for Cone (1986a:l23), the 
value of the concept of the 'black Christ' lies in the fact that 
it 'expresses the concreteness of Jesus' continued presence 
today'. 
For Cone, the themes of sin, racial suffering, the Suffering 
servant, the divine option (God's identity with human pain), 
victory, freedom, and presence, all point toward the role of 
Christ as Liberator. Let us see, then, how Cone relates his view 
of the 'liberator' status of Christ to the idea of the black 
Christ. 
The resurrection, for Cone (1975: 125), demonstrated the 
divine historical identity with the poor in that God assumed 
humanity 'for the purpose of liberating human beings from sin and 
56 
death'. In his discussion of the being of the Trinitarian God 
in black theology, cone (1986a:64) argues that, as Creator, God 
identified with oppressed Israel; as Redeemer, he became the 
Oppressed One to effect liberation; and as the Holy Spirit, God 
continues the movement of liberation. The Liberator role of 
Jesus is so important for cone, that the concept of 'God in 
Christ as Liberator' becomes the hermeneutical principle for 
relevant theologizing (1975:81). 
In fact for Cone, any other kind of theologizing is totally 
unacceptable. As Cone (1975:82) states: 
Jesus Christ the Liberator, the helper and the healer of 
the wounded, is the point of departure for valid exegesis 
of the Scriptures from a Christian perspective. Any 
starting point that ignores God in Christ as the Liberator 
of the oppressed or that makes salvation as liberation 
secondary is ipso facto invalid and thus heretical. 
Cone (Ibid) goes on to state that the black experience, and 
especially Jesus Christ himself are the test for this point of 
departure. 
our preceding discussion brings us to the idea of the 
blackness of Jesus Christ. If liberation is seen as freedom then 
the freeing, identifying, victorious and present Christ must be 
'black'. 'If Christ is truly the Suffering Servant of God who 
takes upon himself the suffering of his people, thereby 
reestablishing the covenant of God, then he must be black' 
(1986a:122). Cone uses the word black symbolically, but for 
blacks themselves the term connotes a harsh reality. Cone 
(1986a:119-120) maintains that the seeking of liberation is at 
the same time the encountering of the 'existential significance 
of the Resurrected One'. Christ becomes the Liberator par 
excellence. Now the black community is an oppressed one because 
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of its very blackness. Concerning Christ, then, if 'he is not 
black as we are, then the resurrectiori has little significance 
for our times' (1986a:120). For Cone (1986a:12), the word of God 
includes the idea that God has chosen to make the black condition 
his condition. 
Jesus Christ, as black, identifies with the goals of freedom 
for the black oppressed. As Cone (1973:56) puts it: 
If Jesus Christ is in fact the Liberator whose 
resurrection is the guarantee that he is present with 
us today, then he too must be black, taking upon his 
person and work the blackness of our existence, and 
revealing to us what is necessary for our destruction 
of whiteness. 
We see cone, here, directly linking the historical revelation of 
God in Christ with the black existential need of freedom. The 
resurrection evinces the divine identity with all who seek 
liberation. Those who seek are black, thus Jesus Christ becomes 
black (1975:135). In discussing the being of God, cone 
(1986a:76) refers to God's immanence. This is God in the 'depths 
of liberation', never being less than the experience of 
liberation, and thus taking on blackness. 
God, truly understood, is the God only of the blacks, as 
valid perception of him emanates only from the black experience 
(1986a:63). Cone (1986a:75) can thus say: 'I am black because 
God is black'. We have mentioned earlier Cone's idea that Christ 
can transcend historical limitations in making himself 
contemporary with present existence. Blacks who have suffered 
have also participated in this experience of transcendence. Cone 
(1975:112) points out that blacks, in faith, and by divine grace, 
can existentially project themselves to the past and then return 
to the present armed with di vine power to transform society. 
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Cone (1975:112) states: 'When the people are thrown back into 
their present social context, they bring with them this sense of 
having been a witness to Jesus' life, death and resurrection'. 
Jesus lived as an oppressed Jew (1975:119-120), thus for blacks: 
'He is black because he was a Jew. The affirmation of the Black 
Christ can be understood when the significance of his past 
Jewishness is related dialectically to the significance of his 
present blackness' (1975:134). As Jewish, Jesus identified with 
the oppressed nation which had once known liberation in the 
exodus. His cross and resurrection also locate him in the 
contemporary black situation. The victory, freedom, presence, 
and all that goes with Jesus Christ as Liberator, or Freer, 
applies to blacks as blacks, and to all sufferers as sufferers. 
All this emphasis on blackness does not mean that only 
blacks benefit from Christ. cone (1985:67), in describing the 
history and nature of black theology, maintains that for blacks, 
Christ is black. Christ, however, can be the colour of any form 
of suffering world-wide. 2 Interestingly, cone (1982:115) refers 
to his personal growth from seeing racism as the main arena of 
suffering to seeing that 'racism, classism, sexism, and 
imperialism are interconnected' and need simultaneous attention. 3 
The universal justice concern of God is applicable in various 
situations of suffering. 
3, THE BLACKNESS OF FREEDOM 
If the concept of the divine option for the poor (black) is 
correct, then God's actions and demands are couched in the same 
context. This is the dialectic that Cone posits, that for 
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blacks, liberation at once implies responsibility. Black freedom 
means the ongoing struggle for black freedom. The event of Jesus 
Christ demands this. In this section we are going to look at 
Cone's view of the black task, especially in its relation to the 
cross and resurrection. 
3.1 Freedom and the Gospel 
A brief look at Cone's understanding of salvation and the 
gospel in relation to suffering is useful here, as this forms the 
framework for responsible action. The fundamental issue is one 
of justice. God's righteousness is his act of addressing human 
evil, while his love is his doing so in the interests of justice 
(1986a:72-73). Thus the themes of justice, liberation and hope 
are the outworking of divine love (1986b:84). For society's 
victims, then, this is the kind of God that is needed. The 
gospel is God's good news that the future of humanity is not 
determined by victimization ( 1979c: 392) . This same gospel, 
however, as reflected by the exodus, the prophets and the 
Incarnation, demands that the victims participate in actions that 
promote freedom. For cone (1979b:538), the bible pictures God 
as the saviour par excellence who is responsible for the fact 
that salvation is a revolutionary historical liberation. This 
is why we have the Magnificat. According to Cone (1975:121), 
existential meaning is found in an encounter with the historical 
Jesus, as crucified and risen, who is present in the struggle for 
freedom. 
This brings us back to reconciliation. We have already 
noted Cone's view of objective reconciliation under the heading 
of freedom. Here, we merely relate it to Cone's overall view of 
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the gospel. If reconciliation is objective (on the one hand), 
then black existence is to be radically transformed objectively, 
and God in Jesus has 'performed a reconciling act of liberation 
quite independently of our faithful response' (1975:238). In the 
midst of human suffering, man can be reconciled to God because 
he (God) has removed the conditions of alienation that come from 
the evil powers (1975:236). This is possible because of the 
victorious and liberating resurrection. On the horizontal level, 
reconciliation becomes part and parcel of liberation. It 
involves new interpersonal relationships and certainly is not 
limited to mystical communion or pietism (1975:229). Cone does 
speak out on aspects of social reconciliation, but that is a 
subject for another study. 
For Cone the notion of the kingdom is an important part of 
the gospel. Let us emphasize Cone's view that the kingdom is 
only for the 'poor'. Cone (1975:79) states: 'It is important to 
point out that Jesus does not promise to include the poor in the 
Kingdom along with others who may be rich and learned. His 
promise is that the Kingdom belongs to the poor alone'. Cone 
(1973:54) is careful to state, however, that poverty is not a 
precondition for salvation. It would be the poor, though, who 
would correctly apprehend the elements of oppression and 
liberation. Cone (1973:54-55) states that in Christ's view, 
'salvation is not an eschatological longing for escape to a 
transcendent reality and neither is it an inward serenity which 
eases unbearable suffering'. It is rather God, in Christ, 
identifying with and freeing the victim. 'The repentant man 
knows that though God's ultimate kingdom is in the future, yet 
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Christ's resurrection means that even now God's salvation breaks 
through like a ray of "blackness" upon the "whiteness" of the 
condition of the oppressed I (1973:55). The repentance 
referred to here is not that of mere 'morality or religious piety 
in the white sense' (1986a:124). It is the affirming of, and 
commitment to, the 'kingdom-event'. It is perceiving the 
'irruption of God's kingdom' and understanding it as a black 
event (Ibid). Ultimately, Christ is the kingdom (1986a:3). 
The gospel, for Cone, is of course not only objective. 
Repentance is subjective, and the experience of freedom and 
suffering is intensely personal. The subjective side of 
reconciliation demands commitment to the struggle. For Cone 
(1975:141-142_), the liberated person is one who encounters God 
in faith, wherein one's self-humanity is actualized (or freed). 
The vertical dimension of faith is the call for an existential 
response to the gospel, and thus the motifs of conversion and 
worship are real and transforming. Liberation is for oppressors 
too, and it takes place when their oppressor mentality is 
overcome. This prevents hate and revenge (1975:151). For the 
victim, however, it still remains true that salvation includes 
the overcoming of oppression (1986a:128). 
3.2 Freedom and Theodicy 
The notions of freedom and gospel call for responsible 
action. We have seen earlier that freedom from hopeless 
suffering calls for this. A problem presents itself here, 
however. We have seen the cross and resurrection as victorious, 
freeing, liberating and also demanding. Yet evil still persists. 
Cone recognises this and partly responds to the problem by 
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referring to redemptive suffering. Earlier we saw Cone's view 
of this in relation to Israel and Jesus Christ as Suffering 
Servant. The cross showed the particularity of divine suffering 
in Israel's place ( 1975: 135) whereas the resurrection 
universalizes the victory (freedom) of Christ (Ibid). 4 Christ, 
as Black, was/is the Incarnate One, the God who assumed human 
pain, showing that human fullness is 'consistent with the divine 
Being' (1986a:l21) . 5 Yet despite the identity of Christ as 
Liberator, and as 'black', oppression remains widespread. 
In the context of the exodus, and of Christ as liberator, 
Cone (1975:163) asks: 'then why are black people still living in 
wretched conditions without the economic and political power to 
determine their historical destiny?' Is it that God can not or 
will not do something about the situation? Cone's discussion on 
the prophets, the wisdom literature (especially Job), and the 
Suffering Servant, which we have already noted, tries to respond 
to this question. Yet Cone admits that the problem of theodicy 
is a perpetual one. While opposing the scepticism of William 
Jones, Cone (1975:191) states: 'Nevertheless, William Jones is 
right! There is no historical evidence that can prove 
conclusively that the God of Jesus is actually liberating black 
people from oppression'. Cone (1975:192) can say, however: 'to 
William Jones' question, What is the decisive event of 
liberation? we respond: Jesus Christ! He is our Alpha and Omega, 
the one who died on the cross and was resurrected that we might 
be free to struggle for the affirmation of black humanity'. 
According to Cone (1975:165) the problem as scripture sees 
it, is not the fact of suffering; rather it is the distribution 
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of it. That is, why do the wicked prosper? Cone (1975:170) sees 
Job (as over against Deuteronomy) reflecting the axiom that 
'prosperity and adversity have no necessary connection with 
goodness and wickedness'. This does not mean that God accepts 
human evil. For Cone (1986a:BO-Bl), the death and resurrection 
of Jesus do not merely promise future freedom, they argue, 
rather, for the rejection of present suffering. Although the 
meaning of persistent black pain is a mystery, the cross and 
resurrection events declare that oppression is wrong and has been 
defeated (1975:192). 
In referring to the black slave issue, in which survival 
faith was vital, Cone (1986b:90) states: 
Love and suffering belong together in black religious 
thought. On the one hand God loves those who suffer; 
but, on the other hand, if God loves black slaves, why 
do they suffer so much? This paradox stands at the 
heart of black faith. Moses and Job, liberation and 
slavery, cross and resurrection - these polarities are 
held in dialectical tension ... 
Cone (Ibid) goes on to say that whatever doubt that might arise 
from experienced suffering, black people could still maintain 
faith in a loving God. This is because God has suffered for 
them, and suffers with them, now, in the person of Christ. The 
issue of theodicy, then, is partly answerable by identifying on 
a practical level with the suffering Jesus, which is linked to 
the theme of redemptive suffering. 
The cross and resurrection do not obviate the theodicy 
problem, but they do form a liberating response to it. Cone 
(1975:178-179) feels that scripture shows little concern for 
philosophical answers to theodicy; rather: 'Its emphasis is on 
what God has done in Jesus' cross and resurrection to destroy the 
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powers of evil and give the oppressed the freedom to struggle 
against humiliation and suffering'. It is here that the 
objective side of reconciliation relates to the subjective side. 
Cone (1975:233) sees them as belonging together, that is, the 
oppressed must now subjectively (personally) fight with God 
against human evil. This challenge exists because of the 
objective act of God. On the basis of God's suffering (cross) 
and victory (resurrection) Cone (1985:188) states: 
However, the Christian affirmation of God's overcoming 
of evil in Jesus' cross and resurrection is not a 
substitute for making a political commitment on behalf 
of the liberation of the poor. Rather Jesus' cross 
and resurrection demand that we make an option for the 
poor, because God is encountered in their struggles 
for liberation. 
As we mentioned earlier, then, freedom for the black oppressed 
is freedom to struggle for freedom. 
This makes the church an agency for Yahweh in the history 
of freedom. A question presents itself here. Who is the church? 
cone answers the 'who' question by speaking of the responsibility 
of the church. Cone (1975:148) begins by responding to white 
claims of being authentic Christians and also oppressed just like 
black Christians. For Cone the reality is that it is only blacks 
who really know true oppression and, therefore, true 
Christianity. In fact being an authentic Christian means 
refusing to 'stay in one's place' (1986a:77). Only the poor or 
the oppressed community are capable of knowing the divine will 
(1975:207) .. This is because Christ as Liberator is to be found 
in this community, and the divine will must relate in one way or 
another to the process of liberation. As Cone puts it: 
The encounter of God's liberating presence includes hearing 
the call to be obedient to the claim of divine freedom. 
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Christian behaviour is basically the behaviour that arises 
out of the oppressed community in response to God's call to 
be obedient to his will. 
The church, which must reflect the oppressed community, is 
a servant, defined by the cross (1986b:124). That is, the church 
'is that people who have been called into being by the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus so that they can bear witness to 
Jesus' Lordship by participating with him in the struggle of 
freedom' (1986b:l23). Cone {1986a:130-132) gives a threefold 
description of the church's task: a) to proclaim 'the reality of 
divine liberation'; b) to actually share in the struggle for 
freedom; and c) to be exemplary in demonstrating what a 
liberated (and liberating) community looks like. 
Thus the church is not an end in itself. 'By definition, 
the church exists for others, because its being is determined by 
the One who died on the cross for others' (1986b:124). 
Servanthood, then, means political commitment. 'We must be 
careful not to spiritualize servanthood so as to camouflage its 
concrete, political embodiment' (Ibid). This servanthood also 
means suffering; the church must be crucified, 'living under the 
cross'. The church is a church that finds itself (or should) in 
a suffering world. Its identity is to be found in the crucified 
Jesus, as well as in the act of serving the victim {1982:89). 
The church exists in the world to oppose evil (1986a:124). 
Suffering is inevitable as freedom does not preclude 
Christians from suffering {1986a:97). Both white and black are 
to understand the sacrifice of reconciliation and the need to 
overcome human evil. Symbolically and literally, reconciliation 
means death (1975:239). The suffering to be expected comes 
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because it is all about the battle between good and evil 
(1986a:101). For Cone (1975:193), one must remember the fact of 
Christ's empathetic suffering with the oppressed. This empathy 
is liberating; thus the oppressed's suffering in this context 
will lead to liberation. Here we have the familiar theme of 
redemptive suffering (or service). Just as Israel and Jesus 
suffered redemptively, so must the black (and any) oppressed. 
In this regard, Cone (1986a:56) states: 
It is God's cause because God has chosen the blacks as 
God's own people. And God has chosen them not for 
redemptive suffering but for freedom. Blacks are not 
elected to be Yahweh's suffering people. Rather we 
are elected because we are oppressed against our will 
and God's, and God has decided to make our liberation 
God's own undertaking. We are elected to be free now 
to do the work for which we were called into being -
namely, the breaking of chains. 
Cone, then, is claiming that the oppressed are favoured by 
Yahweh, but this favouring entails a praxis of struggle. The 
election is for service (suffering servants) - but this service 
will necessarily imply redemptive suffering. We saw earlier that 
it is redemptive because Jesus suffered for the oppressed in 
history, thus overcoming death and saying no to suffering. 
Blacks contemporaneously participate in this. 
When it is understood that the cross and resurrection bring 
freedom, then the fight for it becomes worthwhile, and death does 
not have the last word (1986a:141). There is an enduring hope 
here. The resurrection means that ultimate victory over 
suffering is to be expected. For Cone (1979b:540), this belief 
added a 'heavenly,' eschatological element to the practical 
christianity of the slaves. They knew that death was defeated 
in the resurrection. For cone (1975:182), then, the cross and 
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resurrection decisively defeated human evil, and the poor know 
this, and thus are freed to fight. In this context, faith and 
hope belong together. Cone argues for the importance of faith 
in the resurrection's victory. Coming back to Jones' chide, that 
there is no objective or scientific evidence of liberation, Cone 
(1986b: 13) says that the former is speaking from outside the 
position of black faith. For black faith, Jesus' liberation is 
self-evident. According to Cone {1986b:l3-14), for 'those who 
stand outside of this faith, such a claim is a scandal - that is, 
foolishness to those whose wisdom is derived from European 
intellectual history'. For Cone, then, faith is to be placed in 
Christ himself, rather than in looking purely at whatever 
circumstances one finds oneself in. 
Faith becomes an existential recognition of evil leading to 
the believer's participation in liberating activity (1986a:48). 
As the Old Testament believers had faith in Yahweh's historical 
deliverance of them from oppression, so today we must exercise 
this same faith (1986b:40-41). Faith is a total commitment to 
justice· because of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ (1986b:40). For Cone (1975:42), faith is determined by 
who and what Jesus Christ was: 
Jesus was born like the poor, he lived like them, and on 
the cross he died for them. If Jesus is the divine 
revelation of God's intention for humanity, then faith is 
nothing but trust in the One who came in Christ for the 
liberation of the poor. 
Cone (1986b:120) sees the life, cross and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ as God turning the values of the world upside down. It 
is only the oppressed, therefore, who could exercise genuine 
faith. Easter applies to them. In all of this, though, cone 
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(1982:63) declares that faith does not explain evil. Rather, it 
empowers and prevents despair. In fact, the persistence of evil 
is inexplicable because of faith. 
Again, hope exists because the poor know the support of the 
resurrected Christ. Yet this is not to ease the experience of 
suffering. Rather, hope rejects evil now, and focuses on the 
future (1986a:3). The absurdity of suffering must be defeated. 
Suffering in fact becomes unbearable when there is no hope of 
reconciliation (1986a:99). For Cone (1982:131) belief is 
synonymous with hoping in Christ on the basis of his death and 
victorious resurrection. Hope is reasonable because the cross 
speaks of God's identity with the poor and the resurrection 
speaks of the conquering of suffering (1985:173-174). The 
church, then, bears witness to resurrection hope, which is the 
hope of the future (1986b:126). However, this is not an opiate 
hope; the church is not taken out of history, because it is 
called upon to participate in the freedom struggle (1979b:540, 
1986b: 127). By definition, then, blacks who respond to the offer 
of freedom from Christ (the black Christ), commit themselves to 
an historical project in which they, together and alongside God, 
struggle to overcome suffering and to actualize human authentic 
existence. 
3.3 Freedom and the Future 
This struggle has an eschatological perspective to it, a 
sort of dialectical tension of promise and fulfilment. Human 
suffering will eventually come to an end. The eschatological 
perspective forces the poor to fight because the present 
humiliation is inconsistent with the promised future (1986a: 137). 
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For Cone, the persistence of suffering is an unwelcome reality. 
However, this does not rule out the hope of a redeemed future. 
Cone (1986a:140) states: 
Christian eschatology is bound up with the 
resurrection of Christ. He is the eschatological 
hope. He is the future of God who stands in judgement 
upon the world and forces us to give an account of the 
present. In view of his victory over evil and death, 
why must human beings suffer and die? ... As long as 
we look at the resurrection of Christ and the expected 
"end", we cannot reconcile ourselves to the things of 
the present that contradict his presence. 
Cone, then, is saying that the future eschatological hope creates 
a responsibility to oppose oppression in the present. 
We must not neglect the after-life, says Cone (1986a:141), 
but to believe in heaven is to reject hell on earth. Cone 
(1975: 160) points out that if blacks can see liberation or 
freedom in present history and the eschatological future, then 
the 'sigh of the oppressed' presses for revolution. The 
resurrection of Christ creates this possibility. Following 
Moltmann, Cone (1975:140) speaks of the present being influenced 
by the future. That is, God's future, which is at once the 
promise of freedom, can irrupt into human suffering now, and 
overcome it. Victims can be sure that the fight for freedom is 
worthwhile because the 'One who is their future is also the 
ground of their struggle for liberation'. The problem with white 
eschatology is that it ignores 'death', that is, the present non-
being of the poor (1986a:136). It does not realise that for 
blacks, freedom from, and transcendence over death is (as it was 
for the slave) eschatologically in the present and in the future 
(1975:161-162). 
Yes, human suffering persists. 
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Yet for Cone (1975:177): 
'The New Testament is clear that though the decisive victory has 
been won on the cross and through the resurrection of Jesus, the 
war against evil and suffering is still going on. The final 
victory will take place with the second coming of Christ'. For 
Cone, it is not a hopeless situation. It seems to be a case of 
the victory working itself out. Jesus Christ, through his life, 
death and resurrection, is the fulfilment of the kingdom and of 
the Day of the Lord (1979d:114). The church is God's agent until 
the second coming, at which time the kingdom will be fully 
consummated. 
We remember, of course, that the kingdom is for the poor. 
In the first instance the 'poor' refers to the black victim. 
Christ is black because he identified with and created an 
eschatological resolution to black pain. Blacks who 'know' 
freedom must struggle, alongside Christ, for the universal 
kingdom and freedom. The black Christ who struggles now, is 
already victorious because of his resurrection. Cone, as we said 
earlier, is theologizing from within his own context of suffering 
and is in solidarity with his fellow blacks who are experiencing 
suffering. As said before, though, Cone applies his themes of 
freedom and struggle to all who suffer. Even oppressors 
themselves must be liberated from their own mentality, from 
'whiteness', before universal freedom is attainable. In all of 
this, the eschatological hope dominates and the power of the 
resurrection operates. Thus we can say that, for Cone, we have 
the 'blackness of freedom', that is to say, a freedom brought by 
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the black Christ who identifies with and liberates the oppressed, 
who in turn participate in their own liberation. 
4. SUMMARY 
Racism is alive and well in America and elsewhere. It is the 
cause of much suffering and despair for blacks. Their history 
reflects a context of oppression. Sin is the cause of this. 
Both black and white are guilty of sinful acts, but what 
primarily concerns Yahweh is the sin of white racism. It is in 
this that whites play at being God. 
Blacks know of a sympathetic God because Yahweh showed his 
anger towards oppression by liberating the Jews from the Egyptian 
bondage through the exodus event. This divine 'option for the 
poor' was further demonstrated in the prophetic tradition in 
which Yahweh is portrayed as a God who fought against oppression, 
including the Jewish oppression amongst themselves. However, 
during the exile, Yahweh taught the Jews that they were also 
being used in the context of redemptive suffering. That is, 
God's reaction to suffering Israel speaks to all who suffer and 
cry for freedom. Israel became the Suffering Servant. 
In the event of the Incarnation, Jesus Christ replaced 
Israel and identified in his life, death, and resurrection, with 
the poor of the world, as an oppressed Jew. Jesus became the 
Oppressed One, and the Suffering Servant. He absorbed human pain 
into the divine self. When applied to the black situation, this 
makes Christ the black Christ. 
The Christ-event achieved a number of things. Of course the 
cross demonstrated the divine empathy for the victim as well as 
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the divine wrath on victimization. In the resurrection, Jesus 
overcame death and suffering, and thus provided the historical 
platform for defeating day to day / death' . Jesus also rose 
victorious over those earthly institutions which reflect 
1 Satanic' oppression. The resurrection also set up the uni versa! 
and liberating presence of Christ amongst the poor. Christ, as 
the black Christ, joins and works through the oppressed (black) 
in the fight for freedom. 
Thus the poor are freed to struggle for freedom. This 
entails ongoing opposition and suffering, but the blow is 
tempered when it is seen in the light of 'redemptive suffering'. 
Faith and hope are workable realities, and this is to be 
communicated to the oppressed. The church becomes God's agent 
in the outworking of God's kingdom and bringing in of freedom. 
Of course, the black believer is especially loved by God, but 
also s/he is especially mandated to participate in the historical 
project of human freedom. 
The resurrection benefits do not remove the persistent 
existence of suffering; theodicy is not fully resolved. Black 
faith and hope, however, stimulate ongoing struggle and remind 
one of the certain eschatological victory. 
ENDNOTES 
1. We are going to observe Cone's understanding of Jesus 
Christ's earthly life as one of option for the poor under our 
present discussion on revelation. When we move to discussing the 
actual cross and resurrection, the themes of the divine 
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revelation and option for the poor will of course still be 
present. 
2. As Cone (1985:67) puts it: 
Of course the blackness of Jesus did not mean that he could 
not be described also as red, brown, yellow, or by some 
other characteristic that defined materially the condition 
of the poor in the USA and other parts of the globe. Black 
clergy radicals never denied the universal significance of 
Jesus' death and resurrection. We merely wanted to 
emphasize the theological significance of Jesus in the 
context of the black liberation struggle in the USA. 
Cone (1985:67-74) goes on to explain that Black theology arose 
to counteract the racism and intellectual arrogance of white 
theologians. This applies also to European progressive 
theologies (Moltmann) which, for Cone, are too abstract and 
irrelevant for blacks. Cone ( 1985: 70-72) praises the 
contribution and insights of Frantz Fanon who 'taught' black 
theology to be suspicious of European political theologies. For 
Fanon, the Europeans used liberative language, but in reality did 
nothing to counteract slavery and death. Latin Americans such 
as Gutierrez concern Cone because they focus on classism rather 
than racism. This does not mean that Cone denies the value of 
Gutierrez et; al. According to Cone (1985:66), it was people like 
Bishop Henry M Turner and Countee Cullen who gave the main 
impetus to Black theology and the 'blackness' of Jesus. 
3. Cone's reflections on black feminism are interesting. He 
sees white and black feminism as two different things. 
Apparently black feminism is struggling to find a place within 
black theology in general and so it has to be virtually a 
movement in its own right. Cone (1985:134-135) reflects on how 
he was rebuffed by black seminarians when he read a rather mild 
pro-feminist paper to them. They reacted just like white anti-
feminists. 
says: 
Concerning the issue of black feminism, Cone (1985:137) 
It is not a joke .... I realize that many women give the 
appearance of accepting the place set aside for them by men 
as is still true of many blacks in relation to whites. But 
just as whites were responsible for creating the societal 
structures that aided black self-hate, so black men are 
responsible for creating a similar situation among black 
women in the church. Saying that women like their place is 
no different from saying that blacks like theirs .•.. If 
black men deny this connection between sexism and racism, 
it is unlikely that they will recognize the depth of the 
problem of sexism. 
Cone would argue that the cross and resurrection apply to the 
feminist cause in a particular way just as they apply to black 
people in a general way. 
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4. For Cone (1975:135): 
The resurrection is the universality of divine freedom for 
all who "labor and are heavy laden". It is the 
actualization in history of Jesus' eschatological vision 
that the last shall be first and the first last. The 
resurrection means that God's identity with the poor in 
Jesus is not limited to the particularity of his Jewishness 
but is applicable to all who fight on behalf of the 
liberation of humanity in this world. 
This applicability lies in the fact that Christ absorbs today's 
pain, and especially black suffering. 
5. Cone has been criticized for his reliance on Karl Barth. 
Deotis Roberts, Olin Moyd, and Cecil Cone are three black 
theologians who have expressed concern at James Cone's 
'Barthianism'. To be sure, James Cone does focus his black 
theology on Jesus Christ. We have seen in this chapter how, for 
Cone, Jesus Christ is the supreme revelation of God as Liberator. 
Christ enters into the social existence of the poor and thus 
reveals the divine option for them. Their story is God's story. 
The truth of liberation is practical, rather than academic, and 
it is found in the historical, revealing Jesus. 
Again, liberation itself is effectuated by Christ who 
personally identifies with the poor. This identity goes a step 
further of course. Christ not only sides with the poor, he in 
the first instance sides with the black poor. Christ becomes the 
revealing, liberating, 'black' God-Man for the oppressed blacks. 
Blacks are called upon to transcend their circumstances to 
identify with Christ himself, even in his death and resurrection. 
Thus we have a dialectical situation, revolving around the 
centrality of Jesus Christ. 
Let us briefly note what Cone (1982:82-83) has to say in 
regard to his 'Barthianism': 
Barth was the main nonblack influence in my writing of 
Black Theology and Black Power. My dependence was 
considerable; ... I knew Barth's limitations as I wrote •.. 
My use of Barth diminished in later books. 
Cone testifies to using other European theologians as well as 
Barth. He says: 
Barth was useful because of his central focus on the Bible 
and Jesus Christ, Tillich for his focus on culture and the 
human situation, Bultmann for his emphasis on preaching and 
the present existential situation, and Bonhoeffer for his 
concern for the concreteness of theology as defined by the 
ethical demands of politics. They were like a smorgasbord 
of theologies from which I took what I wanted . . . At no 
point did a European theologian, not even Barth, control 
what I said about the gospel and the black struggle for 
freedom. (1982:83.) 
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What we have, then, is Cone admitting to the influence of Barth 
et al but not the control. 
It is of interest to see just how Cone, by his own 
admission, relates Barth to black theology. Cone speaks 
especially of Barth's concept of the threefold Word of God. 
Firstly, as in Barth, Christ is at the centre of the black 
gospel. 'In sermon, song prayer and testimony, Jesus is the one 
to whom the people turn in times of trouble ... because he is the 
gospel story 1 • 
Secondly, like Barth, the black church sees the Bible as 
'the primary source for knowledge about Jesus and God' (1982:81). 
Preaching always incorporates the 'good Book'. The Bible is 
important because it is the guide for living, and the provider 
of ethical standards. 
Thirdly, Cone (Ibid) stresses the black church Barthian-like 
emphasis on preaching. It is in preaching that God speaks to the 
soul. In the black church 'preaching is understood as not only 
a human word, but primarily, through the work of God's Spirit, 
the divine Word of grace and judgement to the people'. We have, 
then, a Barthian pattern of the Word of God as revealed (Christ 
himself), written (the Bible), and preached (the divine-human act 
of preaching) . 
CHAPTER THREE 
JURGEN HOLTMANN: PROMISE, IDENTITY AND HOPE 
The theme of 'hope' has always been a magnetic one. Hope 
implies a prior dilemma in relation to which a liberating 
resolution is being offered. Moltmann's political theology, or 
his ever developing hope-theology, relates to the same problems 
of injustice as do the theologies of Gutierrez and cone. A brief 
analysis of Moltmann will reward us with a broader platform upon 
which to discuss our thesis. Moltmann's theology is anything but 
static. He has produced many works, and this, on many issues. 
It would be impossible to comprehensively represent him in only 
one chapter; thus we will be focusing on his ideas pertaining to 
the cross and resurrection. To do this, we will have to look 
somewhat at Moltmann's view of God, man, and the church, as they 
are all bound up with his view of the Christ-event and 
liberation. A full thesis could deal merely with Moltmann's view 
of 'God' alone! 
Moltmann began with his Theology of Hope (1967) and there 
expounded his hope thesis and eschatological approach to history. 
Here, Moltmann focused on the resurrection, and revealed his 
liking of Ernst Bloch and others. Later, Moltmann changed his 
emphasis to the cross, but retained the theme of hope and 
resurrection. This hope, however, was explicated in the language 
of 'theology of the cross'. In his Crucified God, Moltmann, 
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(1974a: 1-5) points out that he has always been concerned with the 
theology of the cross. Holtmann wanted to balance the 
traditional views of theologia crucis with the context of the 
resurrection. Further, Holtmann (1974a:4) felt that his present 
approach to theologia crucis would well deal with the issues of 
the di vine abandonment of the Son by the Father, man and 
liberation, and church and social criticism. Holtmann (1974a:5) 
explains that 'the theology of the cross is none other than the 
reverse side of the Christian theology of hope, if the starting 
point of the latter lies in the resurrection of the crucified 
Christ'. 
In History and the Triune God, Holtmann (1991: 165-182) 
outlines a short biography of his theological career, including 
his developing theological motivations and influences of fellow 
theologians who had impacted his theology, as well as current 
historical experiences. In this biography, Holtmann (1991:173-4) 
responds to the charge of one-sidedness, especially in Theology 
of Hope and Crucified God. He explains that the alleged one-
sidedness was due to the fact that he treated the whole of 
theology under a particular theme. Holtmann maintains that he 
is merely making certain points, that he writes contextually, and 
that he sees himself as a contributor to the overall theological 
scene. Thus theological 'truth' is broader than what he says at 
a particular time. Moltmann (1991:174) says that all of this 
'may have irritated some doctoral students concerned with my 
theology'! We will be alluding to Moltmann's view of future and 
hope throughout the chapter. At this point we shall just say 
that for Moltmann there is eschatological hope for humanity 
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because of Christ having become the eschatological 'new man' for 
us. For Holtmann, the categories of hope and future are 
foundational. 
1. THE HUMAN CRY OF ALIENATION 
1.1 The Alienation of Suffering 
Like liberation theologians and, here, Gutierrez and Cone, 
Holtmann is concerned with the evils of the present human 
condition. For Moltmann (1979:97), 'the cry for freedom can be 
heard all over the world', and there is an 'ever-deeper 
sensibility towards suffering'. In fact, Holtmann (1974b:13) 
sees the question, 'what is man?' as being conditioned by the 
reality of suffering. Moltmann (1969:38-40, 1974a:330-332) talks 
about 'vicious circles of death', these circles being various 
planes or areas of suffering. In much of Moltmann's writing 
these areas are referred to in one way or another. Let us 
briefly note these circles, which are man made, since 'hardly 
anyone believes in a personal devil •.. ' (1974a:293). 
The first is the vicious circle of poverty. For Moltmann 
(1974a:330) this 'consists of hunger, illness, and early 
mortality, and is provoked by exploitation and class domination'. 
This is seen in the unfair exploitative relations between 
industrial and developing nations which result in the rich 
getting richer and the poor getting poorer. In reference to 
Northern Europe and the USA, Moltmann (1974a:293) suggests that 
within the larger circle one finds smaller vicious circles, 
namely poverty, drugs, crime, prison and poverty again. The poor 
simply cannot counteract the status quo in their own means. We 
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can see how Mol tmann' s analysis of the economic situation 
parallels that of liberation theologians'. 
The political dimension provides man with the vicious circle 
of force, which is bound up with the poverty circle. Moltmann 
(1974a:330) maintains that this force is 'produced in particular 
societies by the domination of dictatorships, upper classes, or 
those with privileges'. In terms similar to Dom Helder Camara, 
Moltmann (Ibid) speaks of a spiral of violence involving 
oppression, revolution and new oppression. The arms race 
concerns Moltmann. 
Whereas previous military deterrent systems have secured 
peace, their escalation is now leading towards instability. 
The predictable course of the arms race is "an open spiral 
upwards into nothingness". Mistrusts and interests in 
hegemony make the armament spiral a deadly threat to the 
whole world. (1974a:330-331.) 
The recent arms and nuclear weapons limitation treaties between 
the United states and the Commonwealth of Independent States have 
not lessened the validity of Moltmann's concern. Generally 
speaking, Moltmann (1974b:98) feels that people see violence as 
a quick, easy way to resolve human conflict. For Moltmann 
(1991:48-49), violence exists as a 'crime against life', and 
those 'who do violence become inhuman and unjust; their victims 
are dehumanized and lose their rights'. 
Linked with the previous circles is the circle of racial and 
cultural alienation. Concerning racism, Moltmann maintains that 
white racism is the worst kind because it bears upon major social 
structures. 'In such countries racism is not simply an ethnic 
group phenomenon, but an instrument of domination which secures 
political, economic, and cultural privileges for the whites and 
makes second-class human beings of black and coloured people ... ' 
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(1975:133). It is in these social situations, of racial and 
cultural alienation, that people will be 'adaptable and 
compliant' because of the degrading of their personal self-
consciousness. There will be poverty and oppression because of 
this. In fact they 'become apathetic cogs in a technocratic 
mega-machine' (1974b:331). 
The circles of poverty, force and alienation are themselves 
bound up in a greater vicious circle, that of the industrial 
pollution of nature. Moltmann is strongly opposed to human greed 
and ecological damage concomitant with industrial advancement and 
profit. For Moltmann (1979:112), 'exploited nature expresses her 
protest through her silent death' . Further, the 'God of the 
machine, who promised everything to everyone seems now like an 
evil spirit, who draws everything towards destruction' 
(1974b:26). Moltmann (1974a:331) calls for a balance between 
progress and social equality in order to avoid the disastrous 
results of a mismanaged ecological crisis. For Moltmann 
(1991:71), there is 'a fellowship of creation, but today it has 
become a fellowship of suffering in which victims and 
perpetrators share and from which there is no escape'. We will 
see later how Moltmann calls for a proper appropriation of man's 
relationship to creation. 
Moltmann (1974a:331) next places the economic, political, 
cultural and industrial circles into a 'deeper, more embracing 
drive: the vicious circle of senselessness and godforsakenness'. 
Here, Moltmann is referring to a world characterized by 
perplexity, disheartenment and loss of existential purpose. 
People make no sense out of life's vicious circles and this leads 
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to apathy and often 'an unconscious death-wish' (1974a:332). 
These circles of economics, politics, social alienation, 
industrial pollution and senselessness are linked together and 
'bring the human life involved in them to a state of 
dehumanization and death' (Ibid). 
In his discussion of the passibility of God, Moltmann has 
cause to reflect on the apathy of man in relation to the 'God of 
action and success'. Men become inhuman because of the drives 
for power and success. Moltmann (1975:71) states: 
In short, he who believes in the God of action and success 
becomes an apathetic man. He takes no more notice of the 
world, of other men, or of his own emotions. He remains 
oblivious to the suffering his actions cause. He does not 
want to know about that and represses crucifying 
experiences from his life. 
People, then, especially the exploiters, are concerned purely for 
themselves. Of course this apathy which finds itself in both 
victim and perpetrator is a stumbling block to liberation from 
that very apathy. 
Moltmann (1983:132-133) sees man's quest for power and 
possessions also in terms of 'life' and 'death'. People will 
seek these things because at death it all goes away. So the fear 
of death causes a selfish and therefore oppressive mode of life. 
In all of this, there will always be victim and perpetrator. 
This has dire consequences: 
This hunger for pleasure, for possessions, for power - this 
thirst for recognition by way of success and admiration -
this is the sin of modern men and women. This is their 
godlessness and godforsakenness. The person who loses God 
makes a god out of himself. (1983:132.) 
Of course, for Moltmann the victim experiences death now as well 
as afterwards. Throughout his works, Moltmann seems to hold to 
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the view that all people begin as godless and godforsaken, God's 
partiality for the 'poor' notwithstanding. 
The category 'poor' is used by Moltmann (1983:76) in a 
similar way to Gutierrez and Cone. Prisoners, the blind, the 
despised and rejected of society, and the oppressed constitute 
the poor. Moltmann (Ibid) states: 
The poor are all the people who have to put up with 
violence and injustice without being able to defend 
themselves. The poor are all the people who have to exist 
on the very fringe of death, with nothing to live from and 
nothing to live for. But in Jesus' message the poor are 
surely all of us too, since we have nothing to offer the 
coming God except the burden of our guilt and the rags of 
our exile - like the Prodigal Son. 
The victim and perpetrator, then, have equally to do with God. 
Of course the 'feast of freedom' which Moltmann champions (for 
example 1983:77) is more immediately relevant to the victim. 
1.2 The Alienation of Failure 
Human suffering (of the kind to which we have been 
referring) and failing go hand in hand. Under this heading we 
will briefly observe Moltmann's understanding of man's failed 
attempts to improve the status quo and his relation to the 
Creator. We could have placed the circle of industrial pollution 
here, as an example of failure, but we choose to keep Moltmann's 
'circles' together as a unit. 
One area in which man has failed is in the dialectical 
battle between 'being' and 'having'. The survival ethic of 
having to 'have' overrides the more humane ethic of right being 
(1969:54-56). This is both a personal and social problem. Man 
fails to resolve the problem because it is complicated by the 
fear and reality of death, as mentioned earlier. The spectre of 
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death inhibits a proper self-identification with one's bodily 
life (1969:56-57). 
Despite his early indebtedness to Ernst Bloch's concept of 
future hope, Moltmann (1974b:47-59) feels that Marxism, or 
dialectical materialism, falls short upon the ultimate issue -
that true humanity requires the presence of the divine. 
Alienation is more than just an economic-social issue. The 
marxist state of utopia, while commendable in its concerns, bears 
the faults of atheism and potential domination. Moltmann 
(1974b:57) states: 'It is not a good exchange to have a 
divinization of totality in place of a divinization of authority, 
and to have authoritarianism replaced by totalitarianism. Each 
is as inhuman as the other'. 
In his analysis of the human history of attempted social 
change (especially in Germany), Moltmann discusses the failures, 
as he sees it, of the social revolutions of the Left and the 
Right. The Left (Marx, unionization) has not delivered the 
longed for freedom of man, and the Right (community movements, 
nationalism) has produced only anxiety and ethnocentricism. The 
bourgeoisie has destroyed itself (1974b:59-67). Man has failed 
also in his attempts at social romanticism (return to the 'good 
old past'), inward emigration (existential retreat from harsh 
reality) and unrealistic abstract utopianism (1974b:37-42). 
Failure also lies in the futility of social role-playing and 
activism (will to power, war, decision) in that, like other human 
attempts, change is attempted without proper consideration of 
man's relationship to God in Christ (1974b:86-104). 
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For Moltmann (1974b:108-109), the doctrine of creation 
includes the fact of the image of God in man. In fact, through 
this image God wishes to meet himself on earth, as man represents 
him and exercises the creation mandate. The image means that 
man, just as he is infinitely distant from God, should, however, 
have 'infinite freedom over against all finite things' 
(1974b:109). We note with interest here how the later Moltmann 
presents a more pantheistic view of man, as for example in his 
History and the Triune God (1991). Be this as it may, Moltmann 
is clear that man has failed in his task as image of God. He 
states: 'Every kind of class domination, racial discrimination, 
repression of women, imperialism and dictatorship is a perversion 
of man's designation as God's image; and it is also a perversion 
of the common human mandate to rule over the earth' (1983:5). 
So how does God look upon mankind? For Moltmann, as we have 
seen, man on the one hand is suffering and failing. Humanism has 
not turned out to be redemption. on the other hand, man is seen 
as sinful by God. Man has failed God by not living up to the 
responsibility of his being in the image of God. If a man lives 
in this world, creating and being controlled by its powers, 
without recompensing God, he is a sinner (1974b:94). According 
to Moltmann (1974a:194), all people are sinners, 'without 
distinction'. For Moltmann (1983:35) even liberators are 
sinners: 'Their zeal was not the zeal of the Lord. They did not 
disarm this divided world. They could not forgive the guilt 
because they themselves were not innocent'. This is because God 
in Christ is not allowed to be liberator (1983:36). 
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Moltmann (1974a:293) talks about the 'vicious circle of sin, 
the law and death'. Evil traps man in that (as Paul expressed 
it in Romans 7:7-11) the more he tries to obey the law, the more 
he actually sins, legalistically. This circle is the background 
behind the other vicious circles of sin mentioned earlier. There 
is no escape, humanly speaking, from these circles. For Mol tmann 
(Ibid) this 'vicious circle of sin and the law results in man's 
death'. In fact, people are trapped by the power of man-made 
structural sin over them (1991:54). Moltmann (1991:45-46) 
cautions us to maintain a balance between the Pauline doctrine 
of the universality of sin as a general condition and the 
Synoptic approach to sin as an individual act. The universal 
(solidarity) concept however, reminds us that we are all capable 
of the same crimes. 'In that case one ceases to accuse "the 
others" and oneself takes responsibility for them' ( 1991: 46) . 
Whatever the case, it is 'important for Christians to see the 
real history of injustice and violence as sin ... ' (1991:45), on 
the basis of Genesis 3 and 4. 
Man's failure to please God has caused God to presently 
judge man. This is seen in God's having 'given man over' . 
Moltmann (1974a:241-242) follows Paul's usage of paradidonai. 
He understands Paul thus: 
God's wrath over the godlessness of man is manifest in that 
he "delivers them up" to their godlessness and inhumanity. 
According to Israelite understanding, guilt and punishment 
lie in one and the same event. So too here: men who 
abandon God are abandoned by God. Godlessness and 
godforsakenness are two sides of the same event. 
(1974a:242.) 
Moltmann maintains that all are trapped by sin and are godless 
and godforsaken (perpetrators of oppression all the more so), 
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apart from entering into a liberating relationship with Christ, 
who became godforsaken for man. 
The preceding discussion has shown how Moltmann views the 
general human condition and the particular universal problem of 
evil (oppression) and the failure to effect freedom on a purely 
human level. Man, then, as a result of his condition, is 
alienated from God, himself, and nature. For Moltmann 
(1974b:ll,17), man is man and has to be man, but suffering, or 
lack of human rights, prevents men from being men. We are now 
in a position to see how Moltmann treats God, the cross and the 
resurrection in relation to the question of the sinful but 
suffering human race. 
2. THE DIVINE RESPONSE OF IDENTIFICATION 
2.1 God as Triune and Historical 
We must first note Moltmann's approach to the being of God. 
This will help us to understand how Moltmann describes the 
historical relationship between God and humanity. Moltmann 
clearly opposes the traditional theistic understanding of God. 
The trinitarian nature of God, however, is vitally important for 
Moltmann. We are to view God as a trinity, in unity, composed 
of the three real personages of Father, Son and Spirit. These 
three form a trinitarian fellowship, made possible by the action 
of the Holy Spirit (1991:58-59). Moltmann (1991:85) is unhappy 
with what he would see as the rather vague 'modes of being' 
understanding of the Trinity, held by Barth or Brunner. Also, 
Moltmann (1991:59) dislikes the over stressing of the idea of God 
as one divine subject. 
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Following the Johannine formulation of having the Father, 
Son and Spirit dwelling in each other, Holtmann (1991:86) states: 
This intimate indwelling and complete interpenetration of 
the persons in one another is expressed by the doctrine of 
the trinitarian perichoresis. It denotes that trinitarian 
unity which goes out beyond the doctrine of persons and 
their relations: by virtue of their eternal love, the 
divine persons exist so intimately with one another, for 
one another and in one another that they constitute 
themselves in their unique, incomparable and complete 
unity. 
For Holtmann (1991:85), then, the Father, Son and Spirit are all 
subjects in God in an ongoing and personal intra-trinitarian 
history. 
The earlier Holtmann (1974a:240) supports Rahner's notion 
of the identity of the economic (active) trinity with the 
immanent (ontological) trinity. By 1991 we see Holtmann 
(1991:164) promoting a clear panentheism in support of Giordano 
Bruno's organic view of God in the world. God is the spirit of 
the universe because he is its creator. Holtmann (Ibid) states: 
'"Spirit", understood as the "dynamic of self-organization" at 
the different levels of the universe, does not become divine if 
we coin a dynamic concept of God for it and call the dynamic 
"God", but only if we have a concept of God with a trinitarian 
differentiation'. 
The reason behind this brief look at Moltmann's view of God 
is to show that for Holtmann, God experiences his own 
perichoretic history in connection with an identity with human 
history. According to Moltmann one can find an image of God in 
man as a social creature. Man, as body, soul and spirit, and as 
husband, wife and child, actually reflects in his community the 
trinitarian fellowship of God (1991:62-63). God is historically 
88 
'with' humankind and this bears important relation to human 
suffering. In short, the trinitarian and even panentheistic God 
knows all about suffering, personally. This brings us to an 
issue fundamental to Moltmann: the passibility of the triune God. 
For Moltmann (1974a:214) the traditional theistic view of 
God is too abstract, too a-historical. This is because it 
rejects the idea that God can indeed suffer. According to 
Moltmann (1974a:253), God is 'poor' if he is above suffering. 
The God of ancient Judaism and traditional Christian thought 
becomes, in fact, apathetic, and therefore unable or unwilling 
to historically identify with human pain (1975:74-75). Moltmann 
(1974a:219-223) goes so far as to argue that atheism, its obvious 
problems notwithstanding, rightly opposes the theistic portrayal 
of a God who is impotent in the light of the theodicy question. 
We are called upon by Moltmann (1991:20-21,24-25) to reject the 
theistic understanding of God as Lord and Patriarch. This is 
because it portrays Yahweh as hierarchical and authoritarian, 
rather than being compassionately alongside sufferers. A 
trinitarian God obviates the indifference of theism. 
Moltmann (1975:75-78) finds the bi-polar theology of Abraham 
Heschel persuasive because it portrays God as sympathetic with, 
and responsive to, man's suffering. Man then, in turn, can 
respond back to God. The covenant (between God and humanity) 
would be constituted around this bi-polar situation. However, 
Moltmann believes that Heschel's idea must be transformed from 
a bi-polar one to a trinitarian one. Moltmann (1975:78) states: 
It must, for the sake of the crucified one, intentionally 
become a trinitarian theology. Through the crucified one, 
that dialogical God-relationship is first opened up. 
Through Christ, God himself creates the conditions 
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necessary to enter upon a relationship of pathos and 
sympathy. Through the crucified one, he creates a new 
covenant for those who cannot meet these conditions because 
they are Godless and Godforsaken. 
It follows from this that Moltmann has a problem with the 
Nicaean understanding of the hypostatic union of the divine and 
human natures in the historical (and risen) Jesus Christ. 
Moltmann (1974a:228) asserts that this doctrine allows only the 
human nature of Jesus to suffer. This is because of the 
'Platonic axiom of the essential apatheia' of God, a God not 
allowed to suffer. Moltmann (1974a:232) is unhappy with the 
formula of communicatio idiomatum in which the characteristics 
of the two Christ-natures are mutually transferable. This still 
trades on the notion of divine apatheia. The divine-historical 
Christ, as participant in the triune Godhead, must and does 
suffer. 
This triune God has a promissory history which is fulfilled 
in the historical Jesus Christ (1969:210-212). We shall observe 
Moltmann's idea of promise later, but here we wish to note that 
for Moltmann the triune God actually participates in the 
historical promise of freedom from suffering. This affects the 
very being of God. The idea of the 'Future' also comes in here: 
we must note how the concept of 'future' applies, in Moltmann's 
opinion, to God himself. 
Moltmann (1975:51) refers to Revelation 1:4 which speaks of 
God (Christ) as he who is, who was, and 'is to come'. Moltmann 
points out that 'is to come' is, in the Greek, the future of 
erchesthai, to come, rather than the future of einai, to be. 
Moltmann (1975:52) points out that God's 'future' refers to his 
'coming' and writes: 
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The future is, therefore, not a dimension of his eternity, 
but is his own movement in which he comes to us. This 
gives the future of God a preeminence over his past and his 
present in history. His actions in history in the past and 
the present are aimed at his coming and attain their 
significance from his future. 
Holtmann adds that in the present history we can only know about 
God in an 'historically provisional way'. 
Holtmann (1975:52-53) relates God's future to our 
understanding of the future in general. Rather than thinking of 
the future as events which 'will be', we must think of it as 
'that which is coming'. That is, we can anticipate the future 
even now, in the present. Thus, unlike process philosophy which 
speaks of the 'becoming God', we can speak, eschatologically, of 
the 'coming God'. As the coming God, God is the future of the 
past as well as the present (1969:210). Therefore his future is 
preceded by a 'history of promises and anticipations' (Ibid). 
Holtmann's view of God points to the identification of 
divine history with human history. God is he who speaks through 
the specific history of the exodus, he is the Covenant God who 
freed the Hebrew slaves (1974b:76). According to Holtmann 
(1974a:216-217), good theology means that one must think of God 
not only in a theological context. One must also relate the 
study of God to social life, human personality, society in 
general, politics and cosmology. World history, for Holtmann 
(1974a:218), must be understood as participating in the divine 
history, 'whose nucleus is the event of the cross'. The world 
and eschatological history are possible only in the history of 
God who 'creates from nothing and raises the crucified Christ' 
(Ibid). 
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The trinitarian history between Father, Son and Spirit at 
Calvary makes God an 'event', in the context of which people can 
relate to 'God' (1974a:247). 
states: 
In fact, Moltmann (1974a:249) 
If one conceives of the Trinity as an event of love in the 
suffering and the death of Jesus - and that is something 
which faith must do - then the Trinity is no self-contained 
group in heaven, but an eschatological process open for men 
on earth, which stems from the cross of Christ. 
We see, then, that Moltmann perceives divine history as 
penetrating into, and occurring with, human history. Moltmann 
allows for no static, indifferent, and theistic God. The coming 
triune God personally empathizes with the human condition. We 
shall come back to this when we deal with the actual cross and 
resurrection. 
2.2 God in Liberating Identity 
2.2.1 Identity in Hope and Promise 
Before we look at Moltmann's approach to the life, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ, we shall briefly outline his 
understanding of 'hope' and 'promise'. He sees the Christ-event 
as an eschatological act of hope and promise. For Moltmann 
(1967:121), the covenant is constituted of law (injunctions) and 
promise. The injunctions demand obedience whereas the promises 
stimulate hope for Israel. The commandments are the ethical 
reverse of the promise. Rather than being rigid determinants, 
the injunctions 'go along with the promise, producing history and 
transforming themselves on the path through the ages towards the 
fulfilment' (1967:122). Moltmann (1967:122-124) stresses that 
while sin can delay the fulfilment of blessing (promise), 
nevertheless promise is not ultimately dependent on human 
obedience. 
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For Moltmann (1967:124) the issue of fulfilment 
revolves around the 'gospel'. This shows that the covenantal 
injunctions are bound up with the promise of Yahweh to Israel and 
history. 
It is Abraham, even before the Law, who bears a major 
relation to promise and hope. Moltmann (1967:152) understands 
the significance of the Abrahamic promise in terms of the tension 
between the demands of the Torah and the freedom of the gospel. 
Further, Moltmann (Ibid) places the significance in the context 
of Jesus Christ's eschatological verification of the promise, 
rather than any historic development of it. Moltmann (Ibid) 
states: 'The promise finds in the gospel its eschatological 
future, while the law finds its end'. The gospel shows its 
'newness' by opposing itself to sin, death and the 'oldness' of 
the old. 
For Moltmann (Ibid) 'Paul rediscovers the promise to Abraham 
in the gospel of Christ and therfore (sic) recalls along with the 
gospel of Christ the promise to Abraham as well'. While law and 
gospel are concerned with the past, promise and gospel are 
concerned with the eschatological future. Moltmann (1967:153-
154) asserts that 'something new' happens to the Abrahamic 
promise. That is to say, the newness of the future affects the 
promise. The Christ-event is behind this. We, then, do not 
'interpret past history' or escape from it. Rather, we 'enter 
into the history that is determined by the promised and 
guaranteed eschaton, and we expect from it not only the future 
of the present but also the future of the past' (1967:154). 
93 
The knowledge of God 'as God' is also bound up with promise. 
'If God confesses to his covenant and promises in adopting, 
confirming, renewing, continuing and fulfilling them, then God 
confesses to God, then he confesses to himself' (1967:116). To 
know God must be to know his future and faithfulness in relation 
to his promises. This stimulates hope (1967:118). In 
dialectical fashion, Moltmann (1967:118-119) asserts that the 
truth of the promise is not necessarily demonstrated in immediate 
historical reality. Rather, the present reality will be in 
tension with the future which calls for 'obedient and creative 
expectation'. This allows for hope, trust and transformation of 
reality. Our hope lies in the faithfulness of the promising God 
and in eschatological fulfilment of the promises (1967:119). 
What is the nature of a promise? According to Moltmann 
(1975:49) any promise is a 'pledge that proclaims a reality which 
is not yet at hand'. A new future is pledged, and this pledge 
becomes the 'word-presence' of the future. Divine promises are 
to be understood in this way also. Here, the future derives not 
just from present reality, or present possibilities, but rather 
from 'God's creative possibilities' (Ibid). The divine promise 
itself creates something new, and trusting God means leaving the 
fulfilment of the promise up to God. Moltmann (1975:50) believes 
that the finite promises 'point beyond themselves to the 
eschatological final arrival of God himself'. Thus God himself 
becomes the means of the promises and the varying historical 
fulfilments point to the one 'final future' of the promising God. 
The divine promise is also the promise of hope. It is the 
context of, and catalyst for, the hope of freedom, whatever open 
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possibilities that may entail. The hope we have is based on the 
faithfulness of the promising God. For Moltmann (1975:47) the 
biblical message means having a belief in God which is 'harnessed 
between memory and hope'. The memory refers to God's historical 
demonstrations of faithfulness. God language is an historical 
and liberating language. Moltmann (1975:47-48) sees Abraham as 
an embodiment of true faith, when he stepped out into an 
uncertain history with God 'borne along and led solely by God's 
hope'. Hope, then, means trusting God himself. For Abraham this 
led to his own personal exodus. Hope is based on the promissory 
history of God. God's promises 'have been incarnated in the 
promissory history of Israel and in the promissory history of 
Jesus of Nazareth' (1975:45). These promissory histories make 
hope present in history. 
Only God can offer real hope. For Moltmann (1969:106), the 
notion of creatio ex nihilo leads to confidence in God and thus 
to participatio in Deo. If God can create out of nothing, then 
he deserves our hoping in him. Hope opposes nonbeing and 
nothingness. If we understand God as the God of hope, then, 
according to Moltmann (1975:50), we must see the future as 'the 
mode of God's existence with us'. God, like his kingdom, is 
present as the future coming One. Moltmann (1975:51) states: 'He 
is already present in the way in which his future in promise and 
hope empowers the present. He is, however, not yet present in 
the manner of his eternal presence'. God becomes the 'ground of 
liberation' because he is at once the coming One and the 'power 
of the future' . 
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Hope, then, is the placing of our faith and trust in the 
liberating God who is coming from his eschatological future to 
us in the present. As history (for us) is not yet finished, so 
God has not finished coming, that is, his eternal presence is 
still to be realised. While this does not obviate the problem 
of suffering it does create the basis of the hope of freedom from 
suffering. Holtmann (1975:51) says of God: as 'the power of the 
exodus, his promise causes men in hope to grow beyond 
themselves'. Power and hope are seen in 
resurrection. Actually, the theology of the 
understood as a theology of hope (1975:71-72). 
resurrection form the basis of hope (1969:212). 
2.2.2 Identity and Freedom in the Christ EVent 
the cross and 
cross is best 
The cross and 
Holtmann's understanding of man, suffering, God, hope, 
promise and future all influence his approach to the Christ-
event. For Moltmann one best understands Jesus Christ in terms 
of the divine 'option' for the oppressed. Holtmann does not 
stress the exodus-paradigm of liberation, as he rather focuses 
on the ongoing identification between divine and human history. 
By 'option', we of course mean that God is partial to the 
oppressed; he is on their side. 
that Holtmann sees all people 
We remind ourselves, however, 
as sinful, whether victim or 
perpetrator. But it is the plight of the poor or oppressed which 
causes the historical event of Jesus Christ. Holtmann (1974b:18) 
compares the historical Jewish Christ with the Greek ideal of the 
'good and beautiful man'. Jesus lived, rather, the life of the 
outcast poor, while he preached to them the gospel of the kingdom 
of God. Jesus 'embodied the secret, "God with us", "God for us", 
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on earth in such a way that he became a brother to the wretched' 
(1974b: 18). 
The concept of the 'Son of Man' is important here. Jesus' 
fellowship and ministry to the oppressed and possessed (demonic) 
indicate his being the son of Man (1974b:19). Moltmann (Ibid) 
states: 'The Son of Man is he who identifies with those who are 
below the mean of humanness, in order to call them human. 
Because he recognizes himself in the poor, the hungry and those 
in prison, he calls them the "least of my brethren" (Matt 
25:40)'. This identity, as Son of Man, with the poor, continues 
into the event of the cross and resurrection. 
Christ's 'Abba' relationship with the Father is also 
important. For Moltmann (1991:16) the Abba (my father) notion 
indicates the nearness of the kingdom to the 'poor, the abandoned 
and the bowed-down'. Moltmann (1991:35) claims that Jesus' Abba 
relationship to God reveals him to be the 'beloved messianic 
child' and 'Son of God'. Jesus grows into his pre-determined 
role and effectuates the messianic secret. Concerning the 
Messiah, Moltmann (Ibid) says: 
If we draw conclusions from Jesus' behaviour towards the 
poor, the sick, and the outcast not only about the God whom 
he reveals in this way but also about his own origin in 
God, then the love which he experienced in the Spirit of 
Abba, his beloved Father, and which he reciprocated in his 
living and dying, will have had the form of life-giving 
mercy. 
In other words, the Son, who is of the Father, is the channel 
through which the Father's mercy works for the lost and hurting. 
The chosen poverty of Jesus reveals his magnificence 
(1983:24). In fact we must look 'downwards' rather than upwards' 
at him. For Moltmann (Ibid) Jesus' glory, greatness and power 
are seen in his humility, poverty and 
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self-surrender 
respectively. The message of the kingdom, liberation and the 
forgiveness of sins for the sick and humiliated, inevitably made 
Jesus an enemy of the priests and of Rome. 
popular support for Jesus was growing 
authorities became alarmed. 
Amongst other things, 
(1983:115-116). The 
The life of Jesus can be described in terms of a dialectical 
tension between the kingdom and human poverty. 'The inner 
contradiction between Jesus' claim of anticipating God's kingdom 
and his own poverty, as well as his associations with the 
outcasts and the poor, characterizes his historical appearance 
in general' (1975:55). For Moltmann (Ibid) Jesus ended up being 
crucified because it was out of his poverty, rather than his 
glory, that he offered the kingdom. Further, it takes the 
resurrection to understand what God was doing. This Jesus was 
'condemned as a blasphemer and crucified because he practised the 
justice of grace and, thereby, violated the religious as well as 
the political law and order' (Ibid). Jesus was doing everything 
wrong. He was addressing the kingdom-gospel to the poor and 
outcast, the oppressed. In this way his life and message 
indicated God's love for the victim. 
Let us come now to the cross. We have already noted that 
for Moltmann the triune God is at once the suffering God. For 
Moltmann (1974a:246) the reality of God has to be expressed in 
trinitarian terms if one is to understand the cross as a divine 
event between Son and Father. The doctrine of the Trinity 
actually becomes a 'shorter version of the passion narrative of 
Christ'. Moltmann (Ibid) states: 
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It [trinitarianism] protects faith from both monotheism and 
atheism because it keeps believers at the cross. The 
content of the doctrine of the Trinity is the real cross of 
Christ himself. The form of the crucified Christ is the 
Trinity. 
Thus what happened on the cross could only have been a 
trinitarian event. 
Moltmann ( 1983: 23) says Jesus came to serve and not to 
conquer or rule. In this, his victory was his surrender to the 
cross-death as a 'ransom for many'. Moltmann does not expand on 
his concept of 'ransom'. This service was seen in the whole of 
Jesus' life. 'Jesus consciously and willingly walked the way of 
the cross and was not overtaken by death as by an evil, 
unfortunate fate' (1974a:243). This 'walking of the way' is seen 
dramatically in the Gethsemane ordeal of Jesus. Here, of course, 
we have the Father rejecting the Son's request of the possible 
passing of the cup. Moltmann (1983:116) sees this as the 
beginning of Christ's passion. In fact Jesus' 'true passion was 
his suffering from God'. Moltmann (1983:116-117) acknowledges 
the obvious human fear of the impending pain and suffering. 
However the real problem for the son was the impending rejection 
from the Father. For Moltmann (1983:117) Jesus was afraid not 
for his life, but for God, and for the 'Father's kingdom, whose 
joy he had proclaimed to the poor'. Jesus' real struggle with 
God, here, becomes his agony and our hope. 
The act of Jesus in surrendering to the cross was itself in 
the context of a divine 'delivering up'. Following the Pauline 
usage of paradidonai, Moltmann (1974a:243) sees Jesus as having 
given himself up to godforsakenness for men (Gal 2:20). Using 
Romans 8:31ff, 2 Corinthians 5:21 and Galatians 3:13, in which 
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Jesus is not spared, and made sinful for us and even cursed, 
Moltmann (1974a:242) says: 'Because God does not spare his Son, 
all the godless are spared. Though they are godless, they are 
not godforsaken, precisely because God has abandoned his own Son 
and has delivered him up for them'. This act becomes the ground 
for our justification, and the Father becomes the 'Father of 
those who are delivered up' (1974a:243). The Son then identifies 
with the status of sinful and oppressed men - that of being 
'given over' to judgement. 
Now this delivering up or being given over involves being 
'abandoned' as well. As man is abandoned in his alienation from 
God, so the Son becomes abandoned. For Moltmann (1974a:242) Paul 
understands the situation in terms of total 'inextricable 
abandonment of Jesus by his God and Father , Moltmann 
(1975:79) speaks of the divine humiliation in both the 
incarnation into human finitude and man's 'God-abandonedness'. 
Thus Moltmann (Ibid) states: 
In Jesus, God does not die a natural death, but rather the 
violent death of a condemned person on the cross. At 
Golgotha he dies the death of complete God-abandonedness. 
The suffering in the suffering of Jesus is the abandonment, 
and indeed condemnation, by the God whom he called Father. 
For Moltmann (1991:52), Luther was right to see Jesus' experience 
of cross-forsakenness as the experience of hell. 
All of this presupposes that the 'event at the cross is an 
event within God' (1975:81). We have already observed Moltmann's 
view of the ability of the triune God to suffer. This ability 
is at its highest when the issue is death. The cross was a 
trinitarian event. At the cross there was death in God, as over 
against the death of God (1974a:207). Moltmann (1974a:192) 
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states: 'In the death of the Son, death comes upon God himself, 
and the Father suffers the death of his Son in his love for 
forsaken man. Consequently, what happened on the cross must be 
understood as an event between God and the Son of God'. This is 
God 'acting in himself'. Moltmann (1975:80) sees this as a 
'rupture' tearing through God himself, and not just through 
Jesus. Understood in trinitarian terms, then, the cross is the 
event in which God rejects and abandons himself and also calls 
out to himself. 
Linked with the death in God is the cry of abandonment from 
the Son. For Moltmann (1983:117) the cry of 'Eloi, Eloi, lama 
sabachthani' expresses 'the most profound abandonment by the God 
on whom he had pinned all his hopes and for whom he was hanging 
on the cross' . Moltmann (1983:118) sees this as a 'terrible' 
death cry, a cry which reflected what had to happen. 'The Son 
was forsaken by the Father, rejected and cursed. He bore the 
judgement in which everyone is alone and in which no one can 
stand' (Ibid). 
Jesus' death on the cross was truly trinitarian. While the 
act of sacrifice speaks of the Spirit (1975:81), the Father and 
Son undergo their own sufferings. Moltmann (1974a:243) maintains 
that both the Father and the Son experience forsakenness and 
surrender, but in different ways. The son 'suffers dying in 
forsakenness, but not death itself', as the dead cannot suffer 
anything. Rejecting 'patripassianism' (the suffering and actual 
death of the Father) as well as the 'theopaschite' idea of the 
death of God, Moltmann writes: 
The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of the 
Son. The grief of the Father here is just as important as 
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the death of the Son. The Fatherlessness of the Son is 
matched by the Sonlessness of the Father, and if God has 
constituted himself as the Father of Jesus Christ, then he 
also suffers the death of his Fatherhood in the death of 
the Son. 
We have, then, an event of intra-trinitarian suffering which 
revolves around death within God. 
None of this, however, meant that there was a dissolution 
of the ontological trinity. The Golgotha event, for Moltmann 
{1974a:244), in fact showed community in separation and 
separation in community, and this because of the 'historical 
godforsakenness and eschatological surrender'. Moltmann 
(1975:81) states that in the cross 'Jesus and the Father are in 
the deepest sense separated in forsakenness, yet are at the same 
time most inwardly united through the Spirit of sacrifice'. In 
fact, the cross is an event which 'divides and conjoins the 
persons in their relationship to each other and portrays them in 
a specific way' {1974a:207). 
The cross also demonstrated trinitarian love. Moltmann 
(1991:52-53) states that the trinitarian persons exist in love 
and harmony with each other, and that on the cross this love is 
offered to a hostile and hurting world. Moltmann {1974a:244) 
emphasizes the importance of this love: 'He is love, that is, he 
exists in love. He constitutes his existence in the event of his 
love. He exists as love in the event of the cross'. In their 
respective sufferings, then, the Father and Son demonstrate love 
(1974a:245). In fact it is the 'unconditional and therefore 
boundless love which proceeds from the grief of the Father and 
the dying of the Son and reaches forsaken men in order to create 
in them the possibility and the force of new life' (Ibid). 
102 
Again, for Moltmann, this all is possible only because of the 
trinitarian nature of God. Community, surrender, suffering and 
love are all trinitarian functions operating in harmony for our 
benefit. 
Needless to say, the divine love is a suffering love which 
is in response to human pain and sin. This is because the 
history of human suffering becomes the history of God. The 
divine anger towards human sin is in response to the prior 
violation of the divine love (1991:50). 'God suffers injustice 
and violence as a violation of his love because and in so far as 
he maintains his love for the unjust and those who do violence' 
(Ibid) . Thus the divine love needs to rise above the divine 
wrath 'by rising above the pain which is added to it' (Ibid). 
This love manifests itself in God taking upon himself the pain, 
guilt and death of human sin. 
In so doing, 'God overcomes himself, God passes judgement 
on himself, God takes the judgement on the sin of man upon 
himself. He assigns to himself the fate that men should by 
rights endure' {1974a:193). This is to say that God took upon 
himself the 'rejection and anger that cannot be turned away ' 
(1974a:192). The death Jesus endured was a representative one 
on behalf of 'all sinners who have fallen victim to death' 
(1991:51). Jesus suffered vicariously for us (1983:119). The 
notion, in fact, of God acting 'for us' is important for 
Moltmann. The Jesus who was resurrected 'ahead of us', was the 
Christ who was crucified 'for us' (1969:214). Thus Moltmann 
(Ibid) can say 'in the one crucified "for us" and for our 
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justification, hope in freedom is not only portrayed 
paradigmatically before our eyes but is actually mediated'. 
Jesus fulfils various roles at Calvary. As the Son of Man, 
he, amongst other things, identifies with man redemptively. The 
'poor' Jesus also delivers and offers forgiveness to humanity; 
but he is also rejected by his nation (1974b:19). Moreover, the 
Son of Man is abandoned by his disciples and then rejected (as 
God) and abandoned by God on the cross. For Moltmann (Ibid) this 
means faith can say Ecce homo along with Ecce Deus. This makes 
God the 'God of the rejected, and the father of those who 
despair, and the acquitter of those who accuse themselves, but 
also the judge of those who boast in themselves' (Ibid). 
As the historical God (see earlier) who thus bears the human 
history of suffering and injustice, God becomes the 'victim among 
the victims' (1991:50). This role as representative victim, 
however, is offset by Jesus as the freeing Messiah. Moltmann 
(1969:17) sees in the 'crucified Christ the deepest abyss of God-
forsakenness and hopelessness on earth'. Yet just as God created 
the world out of chaos and nothingness, so God can do the same 
for humankind. This is because out of the 'humiliated, poor, and 
abandoned, Jesus who was crucified in disgrace, God makes his 
Messiah of the future, of freedom, and of life' (Ibid). Godless 
and evil human beings are thereby befriended and justified. 
This Messiah, is also the 'Suffering Servant of God' of 
Isaiah 53 (1991:47). As God is the victim of human evil by 
virtue of his option for the poor, so the servant must also 
suffer. He bears human suffering and the sins which cause it. 
This is to make atonement possible. It puts Jesus on the side 
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of the victims, rather than the perpetrators (1991:47), (although 
the perpetrators are also included in the atonement]. Moltmann 
(1991:48) has the suffering servant also become the Messianic 
martyr in that he 'is the divine martyr among the millions of 
unknown martyrs in the history of the suffering of Israel, 
humankind and nature'. This throws Jesus' suffering open to 
future sufferers, that is, those who will suffer and undergo 
persecution and apocalyptic suffering (Ibid). 
As already noted, Moltmann holds that world history is taken 
up into divine history, and that this includes human pain and 
sin. For Moltmann (1974a:246) all 'human history, however much 
it may be determined by guilt and death, is taken up into this 
"history of God". i.e. into the Trinity, and integrated into the 
future of the "history of God"'· Thus all suffering and death 
have become God's in and through what happened to Jesus at 
Golgotha. For Moltmann this applies to past, present and future 
history, even a future with open possibilities. The coming God 
embraces all that has taken place before him. 
This human-divine dialectic issues forth into liberating 
benefits for sinful human beings, especially those who suffer. 
While the resurrection remains important for Moltmann, he 
discusses soteriological issues more in the context of the cross. 
Thus we will follow suit and observe his discussion before we 
look at the resurrection and its benefits as such. 
Let us observe Moltmann's approach to justification. 
According to Moltmann, justification is not to be thought of in 
traditional forensic terms. Moltmann (1991:46) feels that if 
there is liberation from universal sin, through the righteous 
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activity of the Spirit, then political, economic, cultural and 
personal liberations must be included. Following Thomas Muntzer, 
Moltmann (1991:46) presents justification in this way: 
The true Reformation doctrine of justification is the 
theology of the liberation of those without rights and of 
the unjust. A one-sided restriction to the perpetrators 
and forgiveness of their active sins has made Protestantism 
blind to the suffering of the victims and their passive 
sins and to God's judging and saving "option for the poor". 
Moltmann, it appears to us, has a broad view of justification. 
Both victim and perpetrator are accountable to God for their 
actions and active sins. Nevertheless, the divine option favours 
the suffering. We have both a divine righteousness that 
justifies and a divine justice that effectuates justice as such 
(Ibid). Moltmann (Ibid) favours the idea of remunerative justice 
(Justitia Justificans) rather than distributive (forensic) 
justice (Justitia Distributiva). This means that, although we 
all have to account for our actions, God is primarily concerned 
for liberation-justice. Naturally, trinitarian action is 
involved in all of this. The events between Father and Son at 
the cross, allow the Spirit to justify the godless, fill the 
forsaken with love, and even apply this to the dead as the 'death 
in God also includes them' (1974a:244). 
We now turn to Moltmann's understanding of the atonement, 
which he discusses at length in History and the Triune God 
(1991:ch 5). It is interesting to see that Moltmann lays some 
emphasis on how the atonement affects the perpetrators of 
injustice. 
Moltmann (1991:49) begins by pointing out that violence 
(oppression) is two-sided: victim and perpetrators. The victim 
suffers, and the perpetrator becomes more inhuman. Liberation, 
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then, must begin from both sides. The perpetrator must be made 
aware of, and freed from, his own sin. The injustice of the 
past, 
bring 
of course, cannot be undone. Atonement, however, will 
'fair' justice to bear upon the situation. Moltmann 
(1991:49) maintains that atonement must be in three dimensions, 
'those of the victims, of the perpetrators, and lastly of the 
community in which victims and perpetrators live together'. The 
guilty need forgiveness as guilt becomes a burden and destroys 
their self-respect. Therefore, according to Moltmann (Ibid), 
there must be atonement for both perpetrator and victim. This 
will lead to the restoration of justice, as a result of which, 
reconciliation will take place. 
Taking his cue from the Old Testament idea of the 'scape 
goat' which bears away sin as the suffering servant, Moltmann 
( 1991: 50) makes the point that atonement is only a di vine 
possibility, not human, and issues forth in the divine bearing 
of human sin. This is the expression of divine mercy, in and 
through which God represents guilty man to God (1991:51). Of 
course, for Moltmann (Ibid) we must remember that Jesus Christ, 
as a person, died for us as people. 
Moltmann (Ibid) says the early church understood the Christ-
event to be atoning, justifying, and liberating from the power 
of sin. This caused them to recant lives of injustice and work 
for service instead. The cross was atoning because the 
historical God was in Christ, the Christ who underwent rejection 
and abandonment. Again, Moltmann (Ibid) stresses that this is 
not the work of a 'God of vengeance or a divine punitive judge'. 
The Father of Christ, the Son, would never act in this way. The 
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Son hangs 'cursed and damned' for us so we can have peace 
(1991:52). God reconciles the world by suffering contradiction 
rather than 'contradicting the contradiction, i.e. through 
judgement' (Ibid). The divine pain (of having absorbed human sin 
and suffering) is also the divine love issuing in atonement. 
Moltmann (Ibid) dismisses what he calls the 'inadequate images 
of the sacrificial theories: ransom, atoning sacrifice, 
satisfaction and so on'. Rather than objective atonement for 
objective sins, it is subjective atonement (on God's part) for 
we ourselves who have to be justified. Moltmann (Ibid) states 
that in 'the long run, Abelard was right, not Anselm'. 
For Moltmann it is always the Trinity which works on our 
behalf. Moltmann asks how atonement actually comes to 
perpetrators of injustice, and answers (1991:53): 
It comes from the mercy of the Father through the 
godforsakenness which the Son endures as a representative 
in the unburdening power of the Holy Spirit. A single 
movement of love arises out of the pain of the Father, is 
manifest in the suffering of the Son and is experienced in 
the Spirit of life. So God becomes the God of the godless. 
His justice justifies the unjust. 
Perpetrators, then, can benefit from the sacrificial liberation 
which is available because of the trinitarian commitment to 
justice. 
As all people are sinners, so all can be made righteous. 
Moltmann (1974a:194) claims that the theology of the cross 'is 
the true Christian universalism'. Moltmann (Ibid) states that 
in the light of the cross no distinction must be made between 
Christian and non-Christian, or Jew and Gentile. All people must 
acknowledge their sinful corruption, just as all people will be 
made righteous by divine grace in Christ who is for all 
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(1974a:194-195). Moltmann (1974a:225) sees the 'pie in the sky' 
approach to salvation and destiny as being idolatry. The 
crucified Christ has brought 'home' and 'freedom' to replace 
alienation and oppression (1974b:116). In an unredeemed world, 
reconciliation is the beginning of redemption, and redemption is 
the 'future of reconciliation which may be hoped for' (Ibid). 
All of this is possible because of the liberating identity of 
Jesus Christ. 
Let us now move on to Moltmann's view of the resurrection. 
According to Moltmann (1969:50) the resurrection is not 
historically verifiable in our fallen, death-tainted history. 
The resurrection, rather, is an eschatological novum. It 
qualifies 'the historical and crucified Jesus as the 
eschatological person, in whom the future God is dawning' 
(1969:51). Thus we have faith in the resurrection that is only 
eschatologically verifiable. We do not yet exist in that frame 
of reference. The resurrection, in fact, was a scandalous 
element in Christianity. This is so because it was 'not that 
some man or other was raised before anyone else, but that the one 
who was raised was this condemned, executed and forsaken man' 
( 197 4a: 17 5) • Mol tmann (Ibid) states that this unexpected element 
created the 'new righteousness of faith'. 
The question Jesus asked about why the Father forsook him 
is answered by the resurrection. Moltmann (1983:119) finds the 
resurrection to be the liberating answer for Jesus, an answer 
that is practical, rather than theoretical. The forsaking was 
to be brief. In the raising of Jesus, death was swallowed up in 
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victory ( 1 Cor 15: 55) . The resurrection gives hope to any 
tormenting human question (1983:119). 
It is the resurrection that 'interprets' or gives 
eschatological meaning to the life and death of Jesus (1969:44). 
However, the cross remains the focal point of Christian theology. 
All theological themes relate to this (1974a:204). We are not 
to think in terms of the cross and resurrection as if they were 
two distinct historical moments. The cross was historical while 
the resurrection was an eschatological event on a different 
level. Yet it was all one event dealing with the one person -
Jesus the incarnate Son. Moltmann (Ibid) puts it: 
Thus the centre [of theology) is occupied not by "cross and 
resurrection", but by the resurrection of the crucified 
Christ, ·which qualifies his death as something that 
happened for us, and the cross of the risen Christ, which 
reveals and makes accessible to those who are dying his 
resurrection from the dead. 
Moltmann (1974a:182) states that the resurrection does not 
'evacuate the cross', but gives it 'eschatology and saving 
significance'. The resurrection of the crucified Christ caused 
him to overcome death so that we who are spiritually 'dead' can 
benefit from the cross. Thus the cross 'for us' gives relevance 
to the resurrection 'before us' (1974a:183). The Christ-event 
brought death and atonement into the Godhead, but God is not 
dead. The sacrifice of Jesus is glorified (that is, its 
transcendent and liberative worth is shown) in the eschatological 
resurrection (1975:83}. This resurrection is part and parcel of 
the atonement, rather than being a mere authentication of it 
(1991:53). 
According to Moltmann (1983:125) resurrection value comes 
from the 'superabundance' of God's future. Not only do we have 
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liberation from sin, law and death, we also have a lot more. The 
added value is constituted of joy, righteousness, glory and life. 
Easter becomes the feast of freedom and liberation in which we 
can enter into the 'laughter of the redeemed, the dance of the 
liberated, and the creative play of fantasy' (1983:125). 
Following Athanasius, Moltmann (Ibid) claims that the 
resurrection makes life a perpetual feast. 
midst of suffering. The shalom meal, in 
We can hope in the 
the context of the 
eucharist, can take place because of the liberating resurrection 
(Ibid). Immortal, full and joyous life becomes present by grace 
which is effectuated by the resurrection of the crucified Jesus 
(1983:129). The raising of the outcast Jesus (the novum) brings 
new justice, unconditional grace and liberation for the hurting 
(1975:57). The cross and resurrection open up hope, freedom and 
love; the cross is itself a sign of God's hope on earth, 
displaying God's future. 
Newness, power and glory are demonstrated in the 
resurrection (1974a:192-193). A qualitatively new future has 
come involving the presence of God, ensuring the possibility of 
a transformed world (1969:33). This includes a new relationship 
with God, new creation and the new man. The new creation begins 
with the dead (Ezek 37) because the old order (symbolised in the 
dead) has now passed away. The new beginning is symbolized as 
the resurrection of the dead (1991:53). 
Jesus' resurrection set in motion the general resurrection 
of the dead (1974a:171). The resurrection of Jesus Christ is a 
conquest over the 'deadliness of death' (1967:211), over 
judgement and over the curse. A divine righteousness comes to 
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us via Christ's resurrection, which embraces 'reconciliation and 
redemption of the mortal body' and also 'forgiveness of guilt and 
annihilation of the destiny of death' (1967:206). Death, then, 
is no longer the threat of nothingness that can consume us. 
Moltmann (1973:51) states: 'Yet through his death and by virtue 
of his resurrection "death has become a mockery", as Luther was 
able to say - although, of course, death is still here'. Christ 
will raise the dead as this demonstrates the newness that has 
come in through the cross and resurrection, and the fact that it 
will be a novum ex nihilo (1969:11-12,17). This resurrection of 
bodies will occur because it will answer the theodicy question, 
especially as it relates to death, and it will vindicate the 
victory of Christ's resurrection (1969:46). That is, death 
itself will be conquered. Resurrection will show ultimate 
victory over suffering, rather than the simple rising of those 
who have avoided eternal legalistic judgement. 
The resurrection also establishes Christian responsibility 
to live the life of the kingdom. We come back to man's problem 
of desiring to 'possess' rather than 'to be'. Death and evil 
hinder our attempt at being the way God wants us to 'be'. 
However, the resurrection helps us to begin to be properly human. 
This humanity is to be worked out even now, in this world, in our 
bodies, before the eschatological consummation (1969:55-57). The 
new creation is not merely an 'opium from beyond'. Resurrection 
hope causes us to love and act in the light of the coming 
kingdom, no matter what opposition or pain this may imply 
(1969:58). It applies to the body we are, rather than the body 
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we have. New hope is created for participation in the new 
creation (1969:37). 
The resurrection was also a 'future' event. God began the 
future there (1975:55-56). In the Christ-event we find the 
anticipation 'of the future in history in the midst of history' 
(1969:212). In other words, the future is here proleptically. 
The Christ-event was an incarnation of God's future. Moltmann 
(1969:213) feels that one must look from the future of God to the 
present of Christ and that in this we find the real incarnation 
of the 'Son of God'. As said earlier, the cross was 'for us', 
the resurrection was 'ahead of us'. The two, however, must be 
linked in order to be of any existential significance for those 
who suffer (1969:214). While the resurrection provided the 
future, the cross provided the identity of Christ with the poor. 
Faith is required, along with the recognition that the future 
will bring verification or vindication of our present liberating 
activity. The fact that suffering still continues demands this 
kind of faith (1969:214, 1974a:l72). 
Final judgement and forgiveness of sin took place in the 
cross and resurrection. This is because, according to Moltmann 
(1974a:168-169), Jesus rose into the 'final judgement of God' and 
into the 'coming glory of God'. The title of 'firstfruits' that 
was given to Christ pictures the future of God and the kingdom: 
That means that the crucified Christ was understood in the 
light of his resurrection and that his resurrection was 
understood in the light of his future in the coming God and 
his glory. Therefore his historical crucifixion was 
understood as the eschatological event of judgement and his 
resurrection as a hidden anticipation of the eschatological 
kingdom of glory in which the dead will be raised. 
(1974a:163.) 
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Again, we are to remember that the future freedom of God will 
overcome the present suffering and alienation of man. This makes 
Christ the historical ground of hope (1969:214). 
3. THE FUTURE HOPE OF TRANSFORMATION 
3.1 Newness 
We have already been referring to Holtmann's concept of 
newness in the course of our discussion. Here we wish to briefly 
emphasize this as a point in its own right, especially in terms 
of covenant and creation. The Sinai covenant was one of freedom, 
instituted by the liberating God (1983:40). The exodus had an 
'external political side', that of liberation. 
'inward, spiritual . side', that of the means 
personal existence in covenant with Yahweh (Ibid). 
It also had an 
of a positive 
Whoever loved 
God then loved freedom. For Holtmann (Ibid) these 'sides' of the 
exodus can be found in today's revolutions. The Jews, however, 
failed to abide by the Covenant precisely because they failed to 
transform their own attitudes (1974a:40-41). 
God had to abandon those who had abandoned him, and thus 
established the New Covenant (Jer 31:31-33). According to 
Holtmann (1974a:42) the New Covenant will be characterized by 
willing obedience. It will be better than the Old Covenant. 
This New covenant will offer a 'double liberation' in which one 
can be freed and liberated 
guilt. Jesus inaugurates 
from the imprisonment of sin and 
and brings gentiles into the New 
Covenant (1974a:43). As over against the Old Covenant, the New 
Covenant incorporates the eschatological judgement and future 
brought in by the resurrection. Forgiveness of sin and guilt is 
here now. The New Covenant is still coming in, 
continuing existence of the church and its 
witness. 
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as seen by the 
eschatological 
The New Covenant, or New Age, bears relation to creation 
itself. Creation is 'sorrowful' (Rom 8:22) because of the curse. 
Honour given to Christ, however, who is the 'divine mystery' of 
the world, is honour given to creation (1991:72-73). That is, 
Christ, who participated in the creation of the world is 
reflected and even mediated in that very creation. We see 
Moltmann's panentheism coming in here. The New Age becomes the 
eternal sabbath rest for God, in which the Spirit indwells and 
brings harmony to creation (1991:75). Thus the resurrection 
affects more than just mankind. Actually, the 'church' must 
extend to include the cosmos and its own pain. God, via the 
immanent Spirit, suffers with, and preserves creation while it 
awaits final eschatological redemption (1991:75-76). The Spirit, 
then, works to help bring about the new creation of all things, 
and, according to Moltmann (Ibid) the resurrection becomes the 
first day of the New Creation. Thus for Moltmann (1991:77) the 
resurrection occurs in both human history and creation itself. 
The resurrection, therefore, opens up the eschatological process 
of the New Creation. 
3.2 The Problem of suffering 
Despite all that the Trinity and the Christ-event have 
accomplished, mankind is still faced with the ongoing presence 
of suffering. This does not prevent the Trinity from inviting 
us to participate in its history. our liberation means we can 
be one with God (1991:87). Christ is the brother of those who 
suffer; he has solidarity with them (1991:40-41). 
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The Father 
suffers with us, and through the Spirit invites us to freedom and 
friendship (1991:24-25). In fact, as he suffers, the Father woos 
us into his freedom (1983:10). The incarnation is the true 
revelation of God, it shows God willing to enter a state of 
humiliation, and endure pain within himself for us (1974a:205). 
Part of this pain was the Son's cry of forsakenness. Men who are 
forsaken, then, can identify with Jesus as the Godforsaken One 
(1983:18). In fact, it is those who suffer who really know Jesus 
as liberator (1975:155). God, as the Coming one, the 'power of 
the future', and as the 'ground of liberation', can lift man out 
of and liberate him from suffering society (1975:51). Th~t is, 
in suffering, man has hope to rise above his circumstances. The 
victim finds his own humanity in the suffering Jesus ( 1974b: 113). 
Moltmann (1974b:20) claims a universalism in the cross in that 
the crucified Jesus offers himself to all classes, races and 
nations. 
To be sure, the problem of suffering still persists. The 
victory and righteousness of God, though, can still work for us 
through the hope engendered by the cross and resurrection. 
Moltmann (1969:46-47) sees Paul as breaking away from the old 
apocalypticism in applying the consummation of God's 
righteousness to the present as well as the future. Further, the 
general resurrection is primarily for the purpose of entering 
eternal freedom, rather than having to face an apocalyptic 
judgement. Paul, according to Moltmann (1969:47), deals with the 
theodicy question by emphasizing the 'creative righteousness of 
God' and calling for 'faith pointing toward hope in conscious 
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solidarity' with our groaning creation, which itself 'longs' for 
freedom (Rom 8: 2 2) . The future which incorporates the new 
creation of God, helps us in our attempts to transform the 
present (1969:60). 
Auschwitz, where God himself suffered (1975:73), and 
Hiroshima, are for Moltmann (1991:29) events which silence any 
theodicy or anthropodicy. To ask about God is to ask about 
injustice; it is to ask about God in Auschwitz. Even there, 
though, 'the suffering God gave comfort where humanly there was 
nothing to hope for in that hell' (Ibid) . Theoretical, or 
metaphysical answers to the problem of evil and suffering are 
inadequate. Sufferers can, however, accept the mystical answer 
that God suffers our pain in himself. The crucified Christ 
brings his comforting love into human pain (1991:30). For God, 
the poor have rights (1991:48). Moltmann (1969:204-207), in 
stressing the failure of traditional theodicy, feels that the 
question of human identity is important. Man questions himself 
properly when he addresses the issue of injustice. Theology must 
understand that the future of history and man are bound up in the 
future of God. As man searches for 'humanity' ,he will experience 
suffering, but the promise of becoming a 'new man',in Christ, 
gives hope. 
Moltmann is quite clear on the unavoidability of redemptive 
suffering. For Moltmann (1974a:64-65) a Christian stands at the 
'intersection' of the four following points of suffering: a) 
resistance to false religion, and demonism; b) martyrdom; c) 
the 'suffering of love' for the oppressed; and d) the general 
sufferings of this age and the enslaved creation. One cannot 
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bypass this intersection. Also, the hope of the radically new 
creation makes things more problematic than ever. This is seen 
in that the promise of freedom, life, love and hope heighten the 
present pain 
(1969:61-62). 
of slavery, death, suffering and transiency 
Moltmann (1969:62) maintains that we will find 
'certainty only in complete uncertainty'. It is the victim, 
however, who best helps other victims (1983:119). God is with 
us in our search for freedom. 'In our existence we sense God's 
existence; in our suffering we feel his pain; in our happiness 
we meet the assent of his bliss' (1983:134). Moltmann (1983:115) 
opines that we need to overcome our fear of passion and 
suffering, in order to serve the cause of hope. 
3.3 The Church, Reality, and the Future 
In the past, the church and society yearned for the 'good 
old past'. Moltmann (1969:20) sees this as heresy. America 
displayed progress by looking for the 'new world', and eventually 
the 'future' was being sought by nation, church and culture 
(1969:25-27). The 'future' is the goal of our present history 
'now' and of the 'present' history experienced in the past. Our 
present history now creates a new place for the 'present' of the 
Future which is reaching back to us (1969:28). History is 
experienced in the difference between future and reality, hope 
and experience, exodus and arrival (Ibid). The open future of 
true, final freedom is still to be realized; but our suffering 
in our struggle against evil produces a realistic conception of 
the future (1969:29-30). 
While anticipations of truth are found in the past history 
of man, history itself is proceeding dialectically (Bloch). If 
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the human dream is turned forward, instead of looking back, we 
have 'provolution', instead of revolution (1969:32). Hope in the 
coming God leads to a messianic understanding of reality, that 
is, a new reality out of open creative possibilities is being 
worked out (1969:216). Moltmann is arguing that we must abandon 
a romantic return to the past. We are to realize that it is the 
future which forms the basis of reality. This future reality is 
gradually impacting the various avenues we might choose to take 
now. Reality, then, is an historical process in which the all-
embracing eschatological reality forms a dialectic (or influence) 
with partial historical realities (1969:216-217). The 
resurrected Christ has inaugurated the future eschatological 
reality. There are many plural pasts, but survival ultimately 
means one common single future (1969:201). This will be a future 
reality without suffering. The divine-human journey out of 
suffering will have finished. 
The liberating work of the Trinity will lead to the 
eschatological consummation, where love may be all in all, life 
triumphs over death, and righteousness over previous earthly 
hells (1974a:255). Christ's humanity becomes the primal 
sacrament, or liberating channel, making way for the 
eschatological new creation (1991:119). In our history, God is 
history; he was · in the exodus but he is also at the end 
(1969:211). God is present historically, but not in the form of 
his eternal presence. 'The dialectic between his being and his 
being-not-yet is the pain and power of history' (1969:209). 
Again we see Moltmann bringing together human and divine history. 
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For the believer, faith is important. Faith allows 
creativity for freedom and love. It remembers the non-
authoritarian Lord, who brings release and the future to the 
alienated (1974b:57). Faith knows of the future of God as the 
'distant home of identity' and as present grace. 
the Infinite is both a promise and a demand. 
For Christians, 
They live in 
tension between faith and hope (1974b:58). Faith recognises 
God's grace and justification of the poor, the ugly and the 
mourning. Therefore the 'hope of faith points to full 
participation in the glory of God' (1973:61). Hope, with faith, 
persuades man to 'stay' and fight evil, the consequences 
notwithstanding (1974b:116). Hope is nurtured by the memory of 
the resurrection of the crucified Son of Man, while it creates 
'hope in our hopelessness' (1974b: 117). This hope is of the 
'feast of the coming Lord of Glory', and it involves not the 
glory of victory over enemies, but rather victory over enmity 
(1983:22). The new man, or, our true humanity, is found in the 
future-mediating, reconciling and liberating Jesus Christ. 
Consequently, believers will not flee (from human pain) into 
themselves, or to the 'good old days', or into the humanistic 
dream that man can create a free society without any help from 
God (1974b:115). 
For Moltmann the needed historical revolution must transform 
the foundations of systemic structures, and history becomes the 
history of revolutionary conflict between the future and the past 
(1969:131-132). Eschatological hope creates the 'new' faith in 
the revolutionary present. In other words, it is fine, even 
expected, for Christians to participate in God's revolution. 
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Christians would do it in the spirit of joy, festivity, dancing 
and non-vengeance. They would be aware of the revolution within 
the revolution (1969:145-147), that is, doing God's 'thing' in 
God's way. Reconciliation and hope would be spread by concrete, 
personal and social love. This love does not allow selfishness 
or injustice even for the sake of peace. Rather, peace and 
righteousness will 'only kiss and be one when the new person is 
born, and God the Lord, who has created all things, arrives at 
his just rights in his creation' (1983:36). 
Who are the agents in all of this? Obviously the Trinity 
is the prime mover here. The process and gift of liberation has 
come from God. Historically, God works in and through the agency 
of man, especially the victims. Let us consider the poor 
briefly. Moltmann (1969:18) maintains that the 'poor, the 
abandoned, and the dying' are closer to God than any militant 
revolutionary hero. The rich and powerful must work for the 
poor, but they must also remember it is the very same poor who 
represent them. God will work through the poor. Moltmann 
(1991:121) sees the universal kingdom of God as being particular 
for the poor. 
that it is 
Christianity, 
Now, the earlier Moltmann (1969:104) maintained 
the latent kingdom, rather than anonymous 
which stimulates social transformation. Later 
(1991:121-122), Moltmann says that the kingdom, in its 
particularity for the poor, actually creates anonymous 
Christians. Moltmann (1991:122) claims that the poor, hungry, 
thirsty, sick and imprisoned (Matthew 25) are Christ's brothers 
and sisters 'whether they are Christians or not'. The kingdom 
includes them 'whether they believe or not'. 
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The church is of course a vital historical agent. As the 
messianic community, the church is the representative of, and 
vanguard for, the new mankind (1969:215). Further, the church 
is an exodus church, one which is at once confessing, liberating, 
and prophetic (1983: 163-166). The church must participate in and 
exemplify the kingdom. We give here a lengthy quote from 
Theology and Joy (1973) which best summarizes Moltmann's view of 
the church: 
The church therefore must not regard itself as just a means 
to an end, but it must demonstrate already in its present 
existence this free and redeemed being-with-others which it 
seeks to serve. In this sense - and only in this sense -
the church is already an end in itself, not as a church 
complete with hierarchy and bureaucracy but as the 
congregation of the liberated. In that sense the church's 
function reaches beyond rendering assistance to a troubled 
world; it does already possess its own demonstrative value 
of being. In the remembered and hoped-for liberty of 
Christ the church serves the liberation of men by 
demonstrating human freedom in its own life and by 
manifesting its rejoicing in that freedom. (1973:86-87.) 
Holtmann (1983:12-18) discusses the incident of Moses' calling 
to serve Yahweh in the exodus-liberation. Moses tried to 'get 
out of it' because of fear and the daunting task. Yahweh 
eventually made his point and Moses was used. Holtmann (1983:18) 
says we can identify with Moses, but, like Moses, we must 
eventually focus on the Lord and the task. God's power will fuel 
the 'weak' ones. We have the 'staying-power of hope'. 
The kingdom of God is not the political world (1991:55). 
It comes to those who labour. In this context, social revolution 
is the 'immanent reverse side of the transcendent resurrection-
hope' . This kingdom coming is based on Christ's resurrection out 
of humiliation, and also on this basis, 'God himself comes to 
mankind'. Thus Jesus 'forgives sin as only God can forgive' 
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(1969:103-105). This kingdom, of course, is not the same as any 
humanistic utopia. Moltmann (1974b:42-44) is not against 
realistic concrete (or historically practical) utopias, but man 
must remember all that is involved in being human. Of course 
true humanity is only found in the crucified Christ. For 
Moltmann (1969:40-41) God works in and through the New Creation 
and this leads to a practical utopia by the liberation of the 
poor from economic, political and racial oppression. Hope 
prevails over disappointments and religion becomes 'proligion', 
that is, 'the joining of faith in God with hope in the liberation 
of man on a new earth and under a new heaven'. Actually, the 
victim becomes God's Utopia in this world (1974b:l17). That is, 
it is the liberating of the victim from suffering which concerns 
God the most. Freedom for the victim is God's main goal for 
human history. 
Moltmann (1973:45) believes that just as creation is aimed 
at history, so also history is aimed at the new creation. 
Therefore freedom needs to be both realized and celebrated. It 
is in the 'new things' of the Old and New Testaments where one 
finds an eschatological messianism. Moltmann ( 1969: 137-138) 
maintains that the New Future enters history in 'waves of 
anticipation'. That is, Jesus Christ created the gospel in which 
the sinner is forgiven, the Godless are justified and the 
humiliated are given hope. Further, the new community of Christ 
is mandated with a liberating mission which leads to a new 
obedience of believers. This in turn leads to the New heaven and 
earth. Future oriented faith joins up the new future, God's 
presence and the freedom of creation. Moltmann (1969:139) goes 
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on to say that in expecting divine transformation, we transform 
ourselves and our conditions into the likeness of the new 
creation. This is realized in repentance, conversion, new birth 
to hope, and life. Thus a messianic stream of renewal runs 
through history from the cross and the resurrection. Christ, 
after all, was raised into the 'coming new world'. 
Ultimately, Christ is to hand all things over to the Father. 
Christ's work is provisional and a messianic realization of the 
ultimate Lordship of the Father (1969:213). Moltmann (1975:84) 
states: 'When he [Christ) brings his history to completion (1 Cor 
15:28), his suffering will be transformed into joy, and thereby 
our suffering as well'. God's righteousness is creative jnstice 
which leads to shared peace, that is, Shalom (1991:55). The 
Final Age is already here, proleptically. The eschatological New 
Creation is here in the church and the Spirit, and the pilgrim 
church will change its form as the New Creation is fully realized 
(1991:96). In the end, the victim and the executioner will not 
triumph over each other - the one who triumphs will be the One 
who died and rose for them both (1974a:178). 
We shall close off by noting Moltmann's idea of the 
Christian expectation, as he outlined it in Theology of Hope 
(1967). While the Son is to hand over to the Father, what 
nevertheless remains is 'the fulfilment of the promised 
righteousness of God in all things, the fulfilment of the 
resurrection of the dead that is promised in his resurrection, 
(and] the fulfilment of the lordship of the crucified one over 
all things that is promised in his exaltation' (1967:229). The 
New Age or Creation, then, will be this eschatological utopia. 
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To use Moltmann's terms, it will be the fulfilment of the 
negation of all negations. The Coming God will be eternally 
present in his eschatological kingdom. 
4. SUMMARY 
We need now to bring together the different aspects of this 
chapter. A summary of Moltmann is, of course, a very ambitious 
idea, as he writes about so much, with many variations of a 
theme. Nevertheless, let us attempt a summary of the main themes 
of our discussion. 
Mankind stands alienated and godforsaken before God and is 
also estranged from nature and himself. Sin has done this, and 
mankind, especially the victim, experiences various types of 
oppression, resulting in the historical problem of suffering. 
This is all the more serious in that man is in the image of God. 
Man has failed in all his humanistic attempts to improve his lot. 
Creation is cursed, and itself groans for cosmic liberation. Man 
and creation need redemption together. 
God responds to this. By nature, he is trinitarian, with 
his own active intra-trinitarian history. However, God is also 
historical; he is with human history, including the history of 
human pain. Divine history incorporates human history. This is 
not process theology, or pure pantheism, but neither is it 
traditional monotheism. God is panentheistic. The trinitarian 
God can suffer, and actually suffers with the victim. This means 
God is partial towards the victim, although his redemption is for 
all. Exodus, scripture, and Christ all indicate the divine 
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option for the poor. God is the Coming God, meeting us from his 
future. 
In this context, God promises redemption-liberation for man. 
Jesus was the incarnation of the Future God. The divine being 
is manifested by the divine working in history. Jesus was with 
man historically. As such, he identified with human pain and 
this pain was absorbed into God. Jesus became the representative 
victim. In physical and divine agony, Jesus went to Golgotha. 
Here, he was rejected, abandoned, and judged. This was in the 
context of atonement for both victim and perpetrators. Jesus 
also died, in his totality. This was also a justifying death -
but not in the forensic sense. It was, rather, liberative. 
Further, it was 'for us'. The Father also suffered, suffering 
the death of the Son who died as the Son of Man, the liberating 
Messiah. 
The cross and resurrection qualify each other. From the 
point of view of the future, Jesus was Crucified as the 
Resurrected One and Resurrected as the Crucified One. The 
resurrection benefits are mediated to man by the crucifixion. 
In the resurrection, Jesus: a) overcame death (the worst human 
want); b) set up a messianic eschatological stream of 
liberation, or freedom; c) brought in the New Creation; and d) 
glorified his historical self-sacrifice. 
The Final Age has come, proleptically, and will be 
consummated at the Eschaton. In all of this, the Spirit 
effectuates justification and fellowship, and he energizes the 
church. The poor themselves are used by God in the process of 
liberation, and the church is to be nomadic, liberating, and 
126 
exemplary of a free human community in harmony with God, nature 
and the neighbour. 
Christ will ultimately hand over his finished task to the 
Father. Promise and Hope are indicated and substantiated in the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The victim can 
grasp this hope, and in faith participate in the divine-human 
dialectic of liberation. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CRITIQUE OF GUTIERREZ, CONE AND MOLTMANN 
In this chapter we will be subjecting the views of 
Gutierrez, cone and Moltmann (as presented in the first three 
chapters) to critical evaluation. We will be concentrating on 
the cross and resurrection in relation to human suffering, and 
on issues relating directly to this. Our approach will be to 
observe where the three authors agree or differ on various points 
and then to respond accordingly. 1 Our response will indicate 
some areas where we agree with our authors, but it will also 
point out issues or problems that we see. In chapter five we 
will indicate further where we would agree with the authors and, 
of course, express our own understanding on the various pertinent 
issues that will have come up. 
We will spend some time on what our authors say about sin, 
the Abrahamic Promise, the exodus, and the life of Christ, before 
we look at the actual cross and resurrection. This approach will 
help us to see how our authors perceive the reason for the 
Christ-event. 
Freedom of the oppressed from oppression and injustice is 
the primary goal of our authors. Therefore we have chosen 
freedom as the central theme in order to focus our discussion. 
Accordingly we will look at the need for freedom, the basis of 
freedom, and the character or application of freedom. 
1. THE NEED FOR FREEDOM 
1.1 Sin and oppression 
128 
The previous chapters have pointed out how Gutierrez, cone 
and Moltmann agree about the existence of, and are concerned 
with, man's inhumanity. This inhumanity (or human injustice) is 
seen in various modes of oppression or what can be called 
historical contradictions. Gutierrez (1974:174) speaks primarily 
of the rich - vs - poor situation, Cone (1986a:24) speaks of 
racial oppression of blacks by whites, and Moltmann (1974a:300-
331) speaks of the powerful - vs - weak, and of universal 
disharmony. All three authors are concerned about all types of 
oppression and are not in doubt as to the cause of oppression and 
suffering, namely, sin. Sin is understood to be alienation 
between God and man and man and man (Gutierrez 1974:35, 
1990b:l37; Cone 1975:237, 1986b:41; Moltmann 1991:45-46). 
Obviously our authors hail from different points of 
departure and will emphasize different issues or express them in 
their own ways. Gutierrez writes on behalf of the oppressed of 
Peru as well as Latin America generally. He exposes class 
struggle as it is expressed in the social, economic, and 
political types of oppression pertaining there. From this point 
of departure he extrapolates his thinking to all the suffering 
of history. He speaks of oppressive sin as a 'breach of 
friendship with God and others' (1974:35). For cone, however, 
the primary issue is one of racial oppression of blacks. He is 
looking at black man (and later black woman too!). Cone has 
strongly argued (1975:237) that racial oppression (in fact any 
oppression) is sinful. Social sin is virtually synonymous with 
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white power-structures (Cone 1986a:106-108). Interestingly, Cone 
(as over against Gutierrez or Holtmann) speaks of a special guilt 
common to many oppressed blacks. For cone (1979a:354, 1985b:105-
106), blacks sin when they deny or forget that authentic 
existence requires the affirmation of God as liberator, and when 
they ignore their role as agents for freedom. 
We saw in chapter three Holtmann's (1974a:3J0-332) 
understanding of human sinfulness which he describes in terms of 
'vicious circles' of oppression. This description includes 
Holtmann's concern with man's irresponsibility in relation to 
creation and the environment. Holtmann (1969:54-57, 1974b:J7-
42,59-67,86-l04, 1975:71) talks more of man as a whole, in his 
sinfulness, apathy and possessiveness. Along with this is man's 
failure to improve his lot or transform himself through 
humanistic endeavours and philosophies. Rather than starting 
from a specific type of oppression, as Gutierrez and Cone do, 
Holtmann seems to focus on oppression and despair as a general 
human problem. His actual reflection, then, is not as praxis 
oriented as Gutierrez or Cone. Gutierrez and Cone would 
certainly not deny the solidarity of human sin, in which victims 
as well as perpetrators stand 'vertically' and 'horizontally' 
guilty before God. Moltmann (1991:45-46), however, seems to 
emphasize it more, and likes to speak of the 'godforsakenness' 
of both victim and perpetrator. Anyone who abandons God is 
abandoned by God and becomes godless and godforsaken (Moltmann 
1974a: 242). 
We certainly have no problem with our authors' understanding 
of oppression as sinful. Also, we understand that they do 
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distinguish between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
sin. That is to say, a distinction is made between sin as a 
state of being and sin as it is manifested in social 
consequences, such as oppression. As this thesis is primarily 
concerned with the Christ-event and social suffering, we will not 
address our authors' views on sin at length. We will simply make 
one or two observations here. 
Firstly, our authors are primarily concerned with the theme 
of suffering and the goal of freedom from it. Thus their 
discussion focuses on the oppressive horizontal effects of sin 
and the resultant hope of liberation. our discussion of 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann in chapters one to three has already 
shown this. While we realize that our authors are theologizing 
in order to articulate their views on liberation, we would have 
liked to have seen more discussion on the vertical dimension of 
sin. It seems to us that Moltmann, because he is writing on a 
more general level, gives more time to the notion of humanity, 
as humanity, being alienated from God. Concerning all three 
authors, however, we would have liked to see discussion on the 
relationship between a) the ultimate (eschatological) destinies 
of individual victims and perpetrators and b) the historical 
problem of sin-caused suffering. 
Secondly, ongoing discussion is needed on oppression between 
victim and victim and perpetrator and perpetrator, in order to 
more clearly work through the tension between 'salvation' and 
'liberation'. To be sure, Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann refer to 
oppression or sin-acts perpetrated by the oppressed amongst 
themselves. We believe, however, that our authors need to 
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reflect more on the relationship between the solidarity of human 
sin in general, and the 'divine option for the poor', as a social 
grouping. 
Now we might be accused of being unfair in raising these 
questions of our authors. As we have already stated, they 
acknowledge the existence of the multidimensionality of sin. We 
suggest, however, that if liberation is to be multidimensional 
(Gutierrez 1983:144-145; Moltmann 1991:49) then equal emphasis 
must be given to all aspects of man-as-sinful. Be this as it 
may, we wholeheartedly concur with Moltmann that man has failed 
to save or liberate himself from sin, suffering and apathy. 
Liberation, or freedom from sin and its consequences, is a self-
evident need - one does not choose to be a victim. 
We wish to mention the role of the biblical Satan here. 
Cone (1975:232), and Moltmann (1974a:293) deprecate the belief 
in a real Satan. For us, however, Satan is a participant in the 
historical drama of human sin, alienation, and suffering. 2 His 
ongoing encounter with Jesus, recorded in the temptation accounts 
and elsewhere, was, we believe, an attempt to thwart the latter's 
messianic mission. 
1.2 Ideas of Freedom 
We have seen what our authors think of sin and oppression. 
This leads us, now, to see what each of our authors understand 
freedom to be. 
For Gutierrez (1974:176), freedom is understood to be 
passing from 'death' to 'life'. Death is the result of 
political, economic and social oppression. Life, then, is 
freedom from these oppressions. Put somewhat differently, life 
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or freedom is redemption from sin and its consequences (Gutierrez 
1983: 63). Freedom means one can realistically hope for the 
emergence of a free society which would be characterized by the 
absence of oppression on personal, interpersonal and systemic 
levels (Gutierrez 1974:151-152). Interestingly, Gutierrez 
(1990b:l22) emphasizes that social freedom, or liberation, is 
valueless unless there is also personal freedom from sin, and 
communion with God. Of course, it is the cross and resurrection 
of the life-giving Christ that have made freedom possible and 
inevitable. While Gutierrez (1974:166-168) looks for a 
comprehensive liberation in all dimensions of existence he, like 
Cone, concentrates on the oppressed themselves. We will recall 
that Gutierrez and Cone call for perpetrators to repent and enter 
into solidarity with the oppressed (victims). However, their 
theologies focus on those who suffer. 
Cone, obviously, is looking for the eradication of racial 
prejudice. Freedom implies that whites would have shed their 
superiority complex and oppressive tendencies. Blacks would be 
proud of their 'blackness' and know that Christ is f.or them (Cone 
1973:56). Again, the cross and resurrection of the 'black' 
Christ have created or made possible the existence of racial 
harmony (Cone 1986a:ll9-120). Ostensibly, the absence or decline 
of racial prejudice will lead to economic and sociopolitical 
freedom. As we have mentioned earlier, Cone (1975:141-
142,223,239) stresses the intrinsic connection between objective 
and subjective reconciliation. Objective reconciliation is none 
other than Christ's freedom for the poor (blacks, in the first 
instance) made possible by the cross and resurrection. 
133 
Subjective reconciliation would imply personal commitment to the 
struggle for freedom. 
Moltmann, of course, has a more general approach to human 
suffering and failure. Obviously, he is looking for freedom or 
liberation from the 'vicious circles of oppression' which we 
discussed in chapter three. Further, he addresses himself 
(1991:49) equally to victim and perpetrator. Ultimately, he is 
looking (1974a:216-218, 1991:164) for a universal harmony between 
man, history, God and creation, in which there would be no 
jarring oppression, alienation, and environmental mismanagement. 
Freedom, then, includes this overall harmony. He relates his 
idea of harmony to the very nature of God himself. Gutierrez and 
Cone also look for the restoration of creation, with Gutierrez 
(1974:151-152) speaking of the transformation of the universe. 
As we suggested in chapter three, Moltmann's view of God is 
crucial to his theology of hope and harmony. We remember that 
Moltmann (1991:86, 164) favours a perichoretic view of the Trinity 
as well as a panentheistic approach to the presence of God in 
'history'. While the Trinity has its own internal history, it 
also takes in the history of human guilt and pain. It thus 
behooves man to be in harmony with himself and his trinitarian 
God. God the liberator wants a dynamic relationship with a 
liberated human history. Concerning creation, Moltmann would 
call it 'free' or liberated when cosmic (environmental) unity is 
restored between Creator, creation, and creature (man). 
To add to the above, Moltmann (1975:51-53) speaks of God as 
the Coming One, wherein which the combined future of both God and 
man impinges on the present. In chapter three we ref erred to 
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Moltmann's stress on the new creation which was inaugurated with 
the resurrection, and which will be fully realized when God is 
'universally present', that is, in a fully restored relationship 
with a liberated creation and mankind. Put somewhat differently, 
the freedom of the future is coming to us now because God and his 
future are coming to us now (Moltmann 1975:52). 
Confining ourselves to the area of suffering and freedom, 
we are in agreement with our authors' intentions or desires for 
freedom. We are especially in agreement with Moltmann's concept 
of the dynamic interaction between trinitarian and human history 
(via Jesus Christ). Our main problem with Moltmann is with his 
panentheistic view of God. This does not mean we are down-
playing the immanence of God in 'history' , or the working of the 
Holy Spirit in the affairs of non-Christians (Jn 16:8-11) and 
Christians. No doubt Moltmann's (1974a:214,228, 1975:78) concern 
with traditional theism, in that it down-plays the passibility 
of God, leads him (Moltmann) to emphasize God's experience of our 
(suffering) history. To be sure, God's identity with human 
suffering is behind the possibility of human freedom. 
2. THE BASIS OF FREEDOM 
2.1 The Divine Option 
our authors find the concept of the 'divine option' to be 
fundamental to their theologies. Here, of course, we are 
referring to the idea that God has opted or chosen to be on the 
side of the oppressed. For Gutierrez (1990b:l19) it is God on 
the side of the socially weak; for Cone (1982:115, 1985:67, 
1986a:75) it is God first of all on the side of oppressed Blacks 
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(and then any oppressed group); and for Holtmann (1974b:18) it 
is God on the side of the weak or poor. Under the idea of God's 
option, then, we will consider briefly the issues of the 
Abrahamic Promise, the exodus, and the 'poor' Christ. 
2.1.1 The Ahrahamic Promise 
For our authors, the divine option for the 'poor' was first 
revealed in the Abrahamic Covenant. Thus for Gutierrez 
(1984:95), Cone (1975:119) and Holtmann (1967:119-154, 1975:47-
48) the promise was one of liberation, or freedom, especially for 
those who are victims of oppression. Gutierrez (1974:160-161) 
and Holtmann (1967:121) speak of the covenantal aspect of the 
promise (Gen 12:1-3). For Gutierrez (1974:158) especially, the 
history of Israel (including the exodus) is paradigmatic 
demonstrating the outworking of the promise. Of course, for our 
authors the promise expands to apply to all people, especially 
victims. For Moltmann the promise involves the influence of the 
future upon the present as well. 
We have one basic question here. Is not the promise related 
to the Christ-event before it is related to the exodus? The 
idea, surely, is that Jesus, as Messiah, or Abrahamic Seed, will 
be a 'blessing' to the world. We do not rule the need for 
liberation out of the promise-content, but we maintain that the 
'blessing' cannot be restricted to liberation. The concept of 
divine option was indeed demonstrated as the Hebrews benefited 
from God's hearing their cry in Egypt. However, as Paul says, 
the Promise was four hundred and thirty years before the exodus 
(Gal 3:17). If Gutierrez and Moltmann are correct in viewing the 
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promise as eschatologically affecting all history, then it (the 
promise) must apply to all human problems including and alongside 
the option which is demonstrated in the exodus-event. 
In reaction to Gutierrez, we question the idea that the 
Promise, which is fulfilled in Jesus, and as it is seen in the 
New Covenant, is fundamentally one of historically progressive 
liberation. The notion of an eschatological progression towards 
an end is not being questioned. However, we think that Abraham 
is to be seen as the example of faith simply in his acceptance 
of being the founder of the line of Messiah and of a 'great' 
nation, and in his obedience to Yahweh. The promise to Abraham 
was that Yahweh would definitely bring his plans to fruition (Gen 
15:1-21). However, there is no direct implication that this 
refers to ongoing liberation. In fact, Abraham was warned about 
a future oppression of the Israelites (Gen 15:12-14). Now if 
Abraham is the father of believers (Gal 3:6-29), then who are 
these 'believers'? 
It could be answered that believers are those committed to 
the liberation gospel, both oppressor (as he repents) and 
oppressed. We recall Gutierrez's position of multidimensional 
salvation, in which he calls for personal commitment to the 
liberation process (The First Act) . This includes commitment to 
Yahweh himself. Now if one can be saved (or at least linked with 
salvation) by participating in the 'saving process' unknowingly -
even as a non-Christian (Gutierrez 1974:151) - then how in this 
instance can one be termed a believer, exercising personal faith 
in Abraham's liberating God? This difficulty aside, however, we 
wonder if being of the 'issue of Abraham' was ever meant to free 
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one from social suffering this side of the eschaton. Christian 
and non-Christian victims alike experience the same historical 
conditions (whether we talk about the rich and the poor, or black 
and white, or powerful and weak). This state of affairs 
continues to persist despite the victory and hope brought about 
by the cross and resurrection. 
2.1.2 The Exodus-Event 
Gutierrez (1983:7-11), cone (1986a:117), and Moltmann 
(1974b:l8-19) concur with the notion that oppression and the need 
for freedom became the occasion for divine action in history. 
In other words, we are talking of the revelation of and by a God 
who is intrinsically against suffering and for those who suffer, 
and who therefore liberates. The exodus, especially for 
Gutierrez (1990b:119) and Cone (1975:65) is an historical 
demonstration, or paradigm of this. Verbal confirmation of this 
is seen in the prophetic movement, in which the people of Israel 
are called upon to remember the Liberator God of the exodus-event 
and to cease the oppression within their nation (Jer 7:12-26; 
Ezek 20:1-12; Amos 2:6-16, 4:10, 9:7-8. 
that idolatry and oppression are of 
prophets) • 3 
It is pertinent to note 
equal concern to the 
In chapter one (p 11-12) we pointed out how Gutierrez 
(1974:158) follows Neher in his understanding of the exodus, 
wherein God, in his desire to liberate, and the oppressed in 
their desire for freedom, cooperate with each other. Also, this 
implies a 'double belonging' (Gutierrez 1983:9), in which Yahweh 
was their liberating God while they were to be his liberated and 
liberating people. We ask Gutierrez, however, what the 
Israelites actually did for their 'exodus'? 
necessarily implied in double belonging? 
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Is reciprocal action 
While the oppressed 
Hebrews obviously desired freedom, they could do precious little 
to bring it about, and even Moses was initially reluctant. Was 
not the exodus rather a 'mighty act of Yahweh'? These questions, 
of course, do not work against the idea of the divine option for 
the poor. If anything, they support it all the more because it 
was God working for the poor. 
We have an interesting question here: Why has God not 
liberatively intervened in history in a way similar to the exodus 
again? Gutierrez and Cone could reply by saying that God does 
not need to - Jesus Christ did it at Calvary. But then would not 
the exodus lose its paradigmatic value? We recall that Gutierrez 
(1991:119) said the exodus event itself was non-repeatable, but 
that its message - that God, where necessary, historically 
intervenes to liberate - is permanently valid. our question, 
perhaps, should be modified to why Christ has not historically 
intervened since Calvary. 
One could state, of course, that cases of social freedom 
since Calvary (eg: South Africa, East Germany) are examples of 
God having liberatively intervened in history. This assertion 
could be based on the idea that 'Christ as Liberator' is the 
hermeneutical key for understanding scripture and historical 
reality. (See Cone 1975:81, 1986a:118.) We wonder, however, if 
this way of interpreting historical events is empirically or 
historically verifiable. If it is not verifiable now, that is, 
if prior to the eschaton one cannot prove that God has intervened 
in an 'exodus' way, then perhaps claims of divine intervention 
139 
can be no more than faith-claims. One might argue that this is 
true also of the historical Mosaic exodus; but the exodus is 
already a recognized and recorded event of the past. 
Can non-verifiable faith-claims of future physical 
liberation really be used to assuage the fears of today's 
victims? Are we not in danger of engendering a false hope? The 
case for 'permanently valid' intervention by God has to answer 
to such historical tragedies as the holocaust, or Bosnia-
Herzigovena or the Sharpville massacre in South Africa. Here, 
one can just as easily ask, 'If God is ipso facto on the side of 
the poor and oppressed and thus seeks to liberate them, why does 
he allow such historical injustice in the first place'? The 
theodicy issue, we feel, makes it rather premature to assert that 
Gutierrez is demonstrably correct. Of course, this is not to 
take anything away from the rejoicing of South African blacks now 
that Mandela is in power. 
We realise our discussion neither proves nor disproves that 
God has in fact intervened in some way or other since Calvary. 
It at least indicates, however, that one cannot verifiably 
maintain the case for ongoing and God-caused historical partial 
liberations. One might argue that we are creating a 'straw man' 
here, as faith is not amenable to historical-empirical 
verification in the first place, at least until the object of 
hope of that faith actually materializes. Our authors, of 
course, do not claim to have empirical proof for their case, as 
they would ultimately conclude and tell us that the victim must 
place faith in, and exercise hope through, 'Jesus Christ as 
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Liberator'. This faith and hope is to be lived out in the midst 
of present historical suffering. 
Are we really building a straw man, however, if we insist 
that victims would need to demonstrably see that God actually is 
liberating people from oppression? Liberation (at least on the 
physical level) is not a nebulous thing - if it happens, it is 
at once a recognizable historical phenomenon. This is not to 
down-play faith and hope, but merely to assert that liberation 
needs to be seen to be happening if the message of liberation and 
black theology is to be taken seriously by the victim. We will 
return to the issues of faith and hope later. 
We recall that for Gutierrez (1974:238-239), Cone (1975:207, 
1986a:l30-132) andMoltmann (1969:215, 1973:86-87, 1983:163-166), 
the church is to identify and co-operate with God's liberating 
interventions. This is because of the purported paradigmatic 
value of the exodus. That the exodus demonstrated God's 
preference for the poor is not being questioned here; what is at 
issue here is whether or not the exodus is in fact paradigmatic 
for divine action in 'history'. Did Yahweh simply act because 
he 'heard the cry of the Israelites'? It could be argued that 
he acted primarily because the oppressed people just happened to 
be his covenant (Abrahamic) people, and that there were already 
existing laws for taking care of the poor anyway. We are aware 
that differing scholarly opinions as to when and how the Law was 
given exist. However, whatever view is held on the Abrahamic 
covenant and the Mosaic legislation, we still concur with Cone 
and Gutierrez (who are aware of the covenant aspect) that the 
exodus, in and of itself, demonstrated Yahweh's concern for the 
oppressed. 
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The existence of laws for the poor would preclude 
Yahweh from turning a blind eye to oppression. 
We remain unsure, however, that the exodus is paradigmatic. 
In Gutierrez (the perception of Christ as Liberator 
notwithstanding), a potential confusion exists. To be sure, 
Gutierrez talks about the liberating presence of Christ amongst 
the poor on the basis of the cross and resurrection. However, 
what about the actual process of liberation? Is it the 'way of 
the exodus' (permanent validity) or the 'way of the cross'? To 
be sure, Gutierrez (1974:155,158, 1990b:126) links creation, the 
exodus and the cross together in an ongoing historical 'flow of 
liberation'. Furthermore, he would insist that the resurrection 
brought eschatological freedom, and that a response is called 
for. This very argument, however, could be used to assert that 
the exodus and the exodus 'way' of doing things is over with. 
The cross and resurrection are now the key to freedom and God is 
not necessarily bound to intervene as he did with the exodus-
Jews. 
Cone (1975:80), we feel, is clearer when he speaks of a 
discontinuity between the Old and New Testaments on social 
freedom. He maintains that the Christ-event produced a freedom 
that transcends the freedom obtained in the exodus because it 
rises above sociopolitical limitations. Cone's idea would not 
necessarily be rejected by Gutierrez, but the latter still 
stresses the paradigmatic nature of the exodus more. Moltmann, 
as we have seen in chapter three, would focus his programme for 
freedom on the relation between the cross and resurrection and 
the intra-trinitarian history. 
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The future of God is more 
important for Holtmann than the exodus. 
2.1.3 The Poor Christ 
The divine option, of course, can be seen in the very life 
of Jesus Christ. Gutierrez (1983:13), Cone (1986a:115,117) and 
Holtmann (1975:55) refer to Jesus' 'poverty' in that he refused 
wealth, social status ('whiteness') and power. God the Son, as 
Jesus Christ, in reality, was identifying with the poor. Jesus, 
as the poor victim, was creating the necessary conditions to 
bring about the only possible resolution to the problem of the 
poor -liberation. 
The notion of revelation applies to the concept of the 
divine option. We have earlier stated that our authors saw the 
historical problem of oppression as the stimulus for divine 
intervention in history. This intervention was behind the 
exodus-event, and was at the same time an historical revelation 
of God's preference for the poor. In a similar vein, the 
historical life of Jesus Christ was also a mode of divine 
revelation - revelation that God was for the oppressed and thus 
against oppression. 
We observed in chapter two that cone (1975:98, 1979c:391) 
places great importance on the social context. cone (1979c:391) 
demonstrates a Barthian tendency in centring revelation and 
liberation in Jesus Christ. 4 The point of departure for Cone is 
the black experience or story, and he sees the black situation 
as a type of 'covenant' between God and the black victim 
( 1986a: 56) . However, this does not mean that he restricts 
revelation to the black story, and he certainly does not see 
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black history as the ultimate source for black theologizing. It 
remains, however, that for Cone, Jesus Christ demonstrates or 
works out the divine option for the black oppressed. 
Moltmann, as we saw in chapter three, strongly emphasizes 
an identity between Trinitarian history and the history of human 
suffering. Here, it seems to us, Moltmann could be described as 
'Barthian' (perhaps even more so than Cone) in his Christo-
centric approach to human suffering. Just as in Cone, liberation 
and revelation focus in Christ, so also for Moltmann. For 
Moltmann (1969:17, 1991:50) Jesus Christ was the focal point, the 
event in which the very nature of the compassionate God is 
revealed. Moltmann (1974b:19, 1991:16,35) also believes that the 
Trinity's passionate and messianic identification with suffering 
man was revealed in Jesus Christ as the Son of Man and in his 
'Abba' relationship with the Father. Again, for Moltmann, the 
divine option is lived out in Jesus Christ 
We basically agree with the notion that the historical Jesus 
Christ was revealing the divine option in that he was 'for the 
poor'. However, we wish to point out that Jesus also seemed to 
minister to the upper classes, or powerful, or the hated, in that 
he gave them as much chance as the poor (Matt 17:24-27, 19:16-26; 
Mk 5:35-43; Lk 7:1-10, 11:37-38, 13:1-5,10-17, 18:9-14, 19:1-10; 
Jn 3:1-21, 4:43-54). It is clear, though, that Jesus lived a 
life of material poverty and homelessness, although he does not 
seem to have laid down ethical ground-rules for a programme of 
systemic transformation. There has been much written on this 
very issue, and we do not need to explore it here. We wish to 
advocate, though, a modification of the notion 'Jesus was for the 
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poor and therefore against the unjust' to 'Jesus was for justice, 
or pro-justice', to use Sider's terminology. It just so happens, 
of course, that the bulk of injustice is perpetrated on the poor, 
weak, blacks and women. The divine 'option', then, is for 
justice, as justice. We realize that Gutierrez or Cone might 
respond by saying we are becoming too abstract, like Moltmann. 
Nevertheless, we raise this as a point of consideration, and are 
not down-playing the mandate for social justice on behalf of the 
oppressed. 
Under the notion of option, then, we have considered the 
Abrahamic Promise, the exodus, and the poor Christ. It seems to 
us that these three are linked as far as the revelation of divine 
concern for man is concerned. At this point, however, we wish 
to question Gutierrez and especially Cone's (1986a:45) notion 
that revelation occurs primarily in the context of oppression and 
freedom. We feel that the human 'question' cannot be reduced to 
the death-dealing problem of human suffering. To be sure, God 
has revealed his option for justice because of oppression, 
reflecting the fact that he himself is just. Yet is it not true 
that the complex problem of the relationship between God and man 
gives rise to many questions and issues? There is a lot more 
pertaining to this relationship than the albeit devastating issue 
of human evil, and for which we need God's revelation. To be 
sure, we see God's concern for justice in the birth, life, and 
death of Jesus. We do not think, however, that this narrows the 
meaning of the cross to liberation (as if it replaces any idea 
of forensic judgement), or, more specifically, a definite 
historical programme of 
multidimensional it may be. 
2.2 The Cross and Freedom 
liberation, 
2.2.1 The cross as the Focus of History 
no matter 
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how 
In our three authors we find the linking together of 
creation, history (including the exodus), and Jesus Christ. This 
linkage is proposed in order to talk about liberation or freedom. 
Gutierrez (1974:154-160), Cone (l986a:64) and Moltmann (1969:17) 
see creation itself as being a part of redemption. Gutierrez 
(1974:154-160) sees man as the crown of creation, but also as the 
creature called upon to carry on God's creative activity. He 
asserts that the exodus, as liberation, illustrates the divine 
creative act (Gutierrez 1974:155). Man, then, should be 
demonstrating a propensity towards freedom, rather than evil and 
suffering. 
cone (1975:139,175) links the exodus with liberation in 
terms of Jesus Christ being the Suffering Servant. Gutierrez and 
Cone lay stronger emphasis than Moltmann on the exodus theme 
here. The exodus demonstrated the divine option and liberative 
nature of Yahweh; the cross is the culmination of this. As said 
earlier, Moltmann does not ignore the value of the exodus; it is 
just that for him the categories of Future and Promise (hope) are 
more important. The Trinity has its promissory (Abrahamic) 
history which is fulfilled in Jesus Christ (Moltmann 1969:210-
212). For our three theologians, however, the linking of 
creation, the exodus, and the cross is possible because of a 
liberating, historical and messianic outworking of the Abrahamic 
promise (Gutierrez 1974:153, 1990b:97,126; Cone 1986a:64; 
Moltmann 1967:154, 1969:139). 
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In fact the fulfilling of the 
promise is part and parcel of a liberative historical 'flow'. 
We agree with the idea of linking creation, the Abrahamic 
promise, and freedom with the Christ-event. Also, the exodus 
most certainly demonstrated that Yahweh desires that people 
should be free. Our main concern, however, is with the usage of 
the concept of history as a liberative 'flow'. We will reserve 
our comments on this until we discuss the resurrection and the 
idea of the 'future', especially as it is understood by Moltmann. 
2.2.2 The cross and Identity 
The whole point of the incarnation, for our theologians, is 
that God, through Jesus Christ, was doing something about the 
human condition. Jesus Christ, having been sent by the Father, 
was identifying with human pain and at the same time bringing 
about liberation from it. In this section we will observe the 
theme of identity as it is expressed in the victimization, 
rejection and suffering of Jesus. 
As we saw in the earlier chapters, Gutierrez (1983:96), Cone 
(1975:80,175) and Moltmann (1991:50) agree that Jesus Christ went 
to the cross as a victim, a substitutionary victim. For 
Gutierrez (1974:231, 1983:61, 1984:50) Jesus became the victim 
of social, religious and political oppression. cone (1975:119-
120,134) emphasized that Jesus was a Jew, and, as such, was 
automatically a victim of Roman oppression. But this was not 
all. Jesus, in his alliance with the poor and 'sinners', 
qualified himself to be a 'black'. He drew Jewish political and 
religious opposition to him. Thus, in one sense, Jesus was a 
double victim. Cone is stating that Jesus was treated as a Black 
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would be treated today. Thus blacks will feel a liberating 
identity with Jesus (Cone 1986a:75). Moltmann (1974b:18) 
stresses Jesus' concern for the victims of his day, and his 
opposition to Roman and religious power. (However, we wonder 
what Moltmann would do with 'Render to Caesar that which is 
Caesar's' [Mk 12:17).) All three authors would see Jesus Christ 
as victimized and crucified for being a subversive. 
We would submit that the victimization of Jesus was because 
of the prior divine option for the poor, thus in one sense it can 
be called voluntary. We are using the word 'voluntary' in the 
sense that God the Son knew very well why he became human through 
the incarnation. Human victims, of course, do not volunteer for 
suffering. It is, after all, a situation of suffering. The 
voluntariness of Jesus, then, was unique - it demonstrated his 
identity with those who suffer, that is, the divine option. One 
might ask if Jesus was actually a victim in spite of allowing 
himself to be victimized. Being a victim implies powerlessness. 
Would the Son of God ever allow himself to be caught up in this 
state of affairs? We would reply, in agreement with our authors, 
that Jesus was identifying with the human problem of suffering. 
Full identity, here, means taking on human powerlessness. 
Nevertheless, God's power was in reality still in control; power 
through and over weakness. This especially applies if we see the 
cross and resurrection as a unified event. 
We ask, however, whether Jesus' role as victim-for-other 
victims describes the primary purpose of his death? This 
question would especially apply to Cone as for him divine 
revelation and atonement relate not just to the human question, 
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but in the first instance to the black human question. Cone 
(1982:115), as we noted in chapter two, does not deny other types 
of victimization, but for blacks themselves, Jesus was the 
'victim for them'. However, how does the victimized Jesus relate 
to black victims who victimize other blacks, or black victims who 
reject even a 'black' Christ? 
These questions are applicable to any situation of 
oppression. Our concern here is that the concept of 'victim' can 
become abused or meaningless. Even in Moltmann's (1969:17) 
scheme of Christ as the Abandoned and Forsaken One, 'for us', the 
questions pertain. If the Trinity has absorbed human suffering 
into its own history, what does this do for unwilling victims? 
That Jesus Christ was a victim, and amongst other things died for 
victims, is not being questioned. In fact our understanding of 
the Christ-event's relationship to human suffering revolves 
around that very theme. We feel, however, that if one 
centralizes the idea of atonement in this, it may not do justice 
to other aspects that relate to the atonement, such as the 
solidarity of human sin. 
Our theologians might argue that Jesus died 
liberation from sin, as alienation from God, and 
to bring 
from the 
consequences of sin, seen especially in oppression. In our view, 
however, this approach treats the notion of guilt too lightly. 
To say that Jesus came to liberate both perpetrator and victim 
is all very well. But what about the guilt of mankind, what 
about the fact that God's holiness and righteousness have been 
violated? These are divine standards that have been broken, 
rebelliously, thus God is obliged to judge. Let us recall that 
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Gutierrez, Cone and Holtmann hold to the universality of sin. 
Now if unrepentant perpetrators and even victims must account for 
their sinfulness, then we submit that a legal or penal element 
in the atonement is implied. Jesus' death, then, involves more 
than 'a victim dying for victims'. As important as liberation 
is, judgement of individuals, for individual sins, cannot be 
down-played. 
As far as human suffering is concerned, justice may be 
defined in terms of liberation from oppression, and both the 
victim and perpetrator can benefit. However, as Cone rightly 
says, it will be the victims who will have the deeper and more 
appreciative understanding of freedom. Where does the 
perpetrator of injustice or sin-caused suffering fit in? 
Gutierrez (1990b: 138), to be sure, calls for perpetrators to 
repent and enter into solidarity with the oppressed. so does 
Cone, (1975:151) although he barely holds out any hope for 
whites. Holtmann (1974a:l95-196) is forceful in calling for 
acknowledgement of sin by both perpetrator and victim. We would 
support our theologians, here, especially Holtmann. 
The question may be asked: 'if Jesus was a voluntary victim, 
why would perpetrators be accountable, let alone the victims?' 
We would reply firstly by pointing out that if the atonement was 
liberative, rather than penal, then the question would pose a 
problem, as accountability presupposes a forensic structure 
somewhere along the line. Secondly, we would emphasize the 
notion of identity, where Jesus identifies with the victim. This 
very identity, through which God participates in human suffering, 
allows God to demand accountability of either perpetrator or 
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victim. It further vindicates his judgement especially on sin-
caused oppression. So then, Jesus, even as a voluntary victim, 
and victims themselves, have a key role to play in bringing 
freedom and judgement. 
Let us move briefly to the rejection and death of Jesus 
Christ. Jesus Christ's life of liberative suffering led him to 
the cross. Cone (1975:135,174-175) and Moltmann (1991:47-48) 
agree that Jesus suffered for the oppressed as the Suffering 
Servant of Yahweh. This suffering culminated in the crucifixion. 
On the cross, then, God the son as Jesus Christ experienced both 
physical pain and divine rejection. Moltmann (1983:117-118) 
stresses the rejection more forcefully than Cone. What was being 
rejected? It was the phenomenon of oppression, the concrete 
consequences of sin, as Gutierrez (1974:300) puts it. This was 
being personified in Jesus, the substitute for the victims of 
society. Jesus was identifying and entering into solidarity with 
their suffering (Gutierrez 1983:90; Cone 1986a:115; Moltmann 
1974b:l9). Not only did Jesus experience the 'death' of 
oppression in his life and crucifixion; he also endured the death 
of divine judgement - for the 'poor'. 
We will recall from chapter 
( 1974a: 214, 228, 1975: 78) stresses the 
three how 
passibility 
Moltmann 
Of the 
Trinitarian God, as historically seen in Jesus Christ, and 
rejects traditional theism because it dismisses the idea that God 
can suffer. While both Gutierrez (1974:300) and Cone (1973:135) 
would agree with the idea of divine suffering, it is Moltmann who 
more strongly centres his theology on the issue. The cross 
becomes the supreme example of God's suffering with and for the 
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oppressed of the world. Moltmann (1974a:243) stresses that Jesus 
was 'given over' (paradidonai) for man. Jesus became the 
Abandoned One. Also, Moltmann (1974a:l92,207) struggles more 
than Gutierrez and Cone with the problem of death within the 
Godhead, arguing for the identifying and liberative significance 
of the mystery. Historical meaning must relate to the 
resurrection of the condemned and crucified One (Moltmann 
1974a:l75-204). 
Moltmann (1991:86) links this with the perichoresis view of 
the Trinity, in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are intimately 
associated with each other and share an ongoing intra-trinitarian 
history. This history of God takes into itself the history of 
the world, while the nucleus of this process 'is the event of the 
cross' (Moltmann 1974a:218). The Trinity thus becomes an 'event' 
in which God absorbs human pain and is open for people (Moltmann 
1974a:249). Again, while Gutierrez and Cone support the notion 
of divine intervention within history and of God identifying with 
human pain, it is Moltmann (1969: 211) who gives it special 
emphasis when he says that: 'In our history, God is history'. 
The cross is the mechanism in which human history is absorbed 
into God's own history so that God actually suffers human 
suffering then and now. For Moltmann (1974a:l83, 1974b:18) it 
is the cross, the place of suffering, where God's liberating 
identity with man along with the benefits of the resurrection 
actually become related to human suffering. Jesus was 'for us' 
at Calvary. Moltmann thus emphasizes the intra-trinitarian 
suffering at the cross. Jesus' abandonment and forsakenness, 
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during the event of the cross, which was for man, affected both 
him and the Father (Moltmann 1974a:243). 
We concur with our authors in their understanding of the 
identifying suffering and dying of Jesus who in this way was 
working for the freedom of the oppressed. To our mind, to have 
a God who cannot identify and suffer with human pain, is not to 
have a God at all. We appreciate Moltmann's emphasis on the 
dynamic encounter of trinitarian history (through Jesus Christ) 
with human suffering. Our only caution is that we do not reduce 
the primary purpose of the cross-event to God's way of dealing 
with the problem of suffering. We will discuss the atonement, 
in relation to suffering, after we have looked at the 
resurrection. 
2.3 The Resurrection and Freedom 
2.3.1 The Victory of Christ 
Gutierrez (1984:68), Cone {1986b:6) and Moltmann {1983:119) 
agree in that the resurrection evidences a personal victory for 
Jesus Christ, a victory over the consequences of sin-caused 
oppression which had beleaguered him. Most dramatically, it was 
a victory for Jesus over death. Jesus the victim became 
'Christus Victor•, victorious over the circumstances that had led 
to his death. For Gutierrez (1983:96) there was a transformation 
within Jesus Christ in that he moved from death to life, that is, 
from being oppressed to being free. 
Of course, for Moltmann (1983:119), the resurrected Christ 
is now no longer the Abandoned One. Moltmann (1967:152) 
especially, and Gutierrez ( 1990b: 97) see the historic resurrected 
Christ as the divine consummation of the Abrahamic promise, 
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although historically the promise is still being realized even 
today. Moltmann (1974a:43) and Gutierrez (1983:15) also view the 
resurrected Christ as the fulfilment of the New covenant in that 
the Abrahamic promise of liberation becomes relevant to all 
people. Christ, then, is victorious in having conquered sin and 
death, and in having effectuated the Abrahamic and New Covenants. 
Let us now see how the victorious resurrected Christ relates to 
the future. 
2.3.2 The Future and Newness 
Moltmann stresses the idea of the Crucified One. The 
resurrection, then, is not simply the resurrection. It is the 
rising of God who had suffered and died for us (Moltmann 
1974a:204). The resurrection gives liberative and eschatological 
meaning to the cross (Moltmann 1974a:l82). It is the raising of 
the outcast Jesus (the novum) which brings newness and justice 
(Moltmann 1975:57). For Moltmann (1983:125), however, there is 
an eschatological dimension, in that the resurrection is the 
means through which the Future of the Coming God affects history. 
Christ draws the Future itself into the present (Moltmann 
1975:55-56). Moltmann (1969:33, 1974a:l92-193) stresses the idea 
of Newness including New Creation, New Man, and transformation, 
all due to the resurrection. This is the eschatological New Age. 
Prior anticipations of it and especially the resurrection are 
responsible for this. Moltmann (1975:49) links the future of God 
to the openness of God's creative possibilities. 
Gutierrez (1974:218) and Cone (1975:140, 1986a:l40), while 
being sensitive to the liberative importance of the 
eschatological future, view this differently because of their 
praxis-orientated points of departure. For them, 
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the 
resurrection must be seen to be relevant to present historical 
transformation {which for Cone [1975:192] motivates black power, 
and for Gutierrez [1984:120] motivates poor-power). The future 
is not a factor which can be substantially applied to the present 
as if freedom is coming only from the future. Rather, the 
resurrected Christ transacts freedom from the present as well as 
the future. 
The above views of the authors and, in fact their very 
theologies of liberation and hope, are predicated on the idea of 
a liberative flow of history. At this point, then, we shall 
consider this notion of 'historical flow', especially as it is 
presented by Holtmann. Obviously the idea of the Future will be 
part of the discussion. 
We and our three theologians have constantly used the term 
history. Freedom is spoken of in terms of history. We are 
familiar with concepts such as historie (recordable sequential 
events), geschichte (existential history), and heilsgeschichte 
(sacred history within history). Whatever concept we work with, 
however, is it not true that we treat history substantially, as 
if it is its own entity? We talk easily about God in history, 
or absorbing human history (Holtmann) or adopting a particular 
(black) history (Cone), or simply influencing history. We say 
that the cross and resurrection affected or transformed history. 
Yet to talk in this way presupposes that there is something 
tangible to be transformed or adapted in the first instance. 
The incarnation of the Son of God is fundamental to our 
theological understanding. It cannot be said, though, that the 
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Son incarnated into a tangible 'something' alongside the human 
story. Talking instead about personal or group story, is, we 
think, less problematic. The concept of human solidarity seems 
viable to us, just as is the call to enter into solidarity with 
the oppressed. We would advocate, then, that the Son entered 
humanity or humanness (rather than 'history' as such) in order 
to experience and identify with human suffering first hand. In 
the incarnation, then, the human story became God's story, and 
'history', especially the story of suffering could then be 
described as His-story. This culminated in the cross ana 
resurrection. 
None of this is to deny that we have our historie or 
geschichte. It is just to question how we conceive of them. 
This especially affects how we look at Moltmann's view of Future. 
For Moltmann (1975:50-51), as we saw, God is coming to us from 
his future, and the eschatological future of humanity, and is 
reaching into and influencing the present historical 
possibilities of transformation. Furthermore, this is possible 
because of the historical cross and resurrection which set up 
this eschatological scenario (Moltmann 1969:33,212). 
We have two questions here. The first has to do with the 
concept of the future. If we look at it temporally, then we are 
thinking in terms of 'when'. However, if we look at it 
descriptively, we are thinking in terms of 'state-of-affairs'. 
In reality, we usually look at the future in both modes 
simultaneously. We believe this to be true even of Moltmann. 
Moltmann (1967:154), however, asks us to accept that the 
'future', as we presently anticipate it, influences our present 
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and the past. That is, the reality of the future dialectically 
influences the many past and present realities, including the 
struggle against evil. Also, 'history' becomes the relationship 
between both the process and the goal of the future (1969:28-30). 
Now for this to work conceptually and practically, the 
future as state-of-affairs must already exist. Yet if we accept 
that history does not exist as an entity in its own right, how 
can we say the future, and even the future of God, 'reaches' into 
the present (Holtmann 1967:118-119, 1975:50-51; Gutierrez 
1974:218; cone 1975:140) as if they are coming back down the 
messianic historical 'flow'? Also, thinking linearly, we find 
it difficult to conceive of how the future as state-of-affairs 
can already exist. our discussion does not mean that we are 
ignoring the dialectical tension between the 'now' and the 'not 
yet'. In our view, however, this tension should apply to the 
already established promise-fulfilment scheme (culminating in the 
New Age) that God has ordained for the human story. 
Would Holtmann not be guilty of a sort of eschatological 
determinism, despite his talk of 'open possibilities' and present 
'anticipations' of the future? To be sure, Holtmann (1975:49) 
talks of the future reality being 'word-present' in the promise 
of it, that is, the future is not meant to replace the present. 
Nevertheless, Holtmann still argues for the future exerting an 
historically transforming influence on the present and the past. 
Again, since our 'history' is taken up into God's, the 
coming future is therefore the coming God (1975:50). Now we 
wonder how any set of events, in and of themselves, can influence 
another set of events - especially from the future (not yet) to 
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the present? Is it not true that it is our personal 
appropriation of, or reaction to, an event or person that 
actually influences us? Our present hope of, and commitment to, 
a specific future can, of course, affect us now. This comes 
closer to the meaning of geschichte. Moltmann, of course, speaks 
of the future of God himself with the qualification that we do 
not think of this temporally, or, as if God is 'becoming', as in 
process theology. According to Moltmann, God has his future 
because, trinitarianly (that is through divine participation in 
human affairs and through the cross), he combines our story, 
especially the story of pain, with his. 
our second question (for Moltmann) then, is how is it 
conceptually possible for God to be experiencing history with us 
while at the same time be coming to us from his own future? To 
be sure, God's reality is not co-extensive with ours, and his 
being certainly precedes ours. Nevertheless, our question still 
holds, we feel, if it is maintained that the human story of pain 
is eschatologically included in the divine story. We are simply 
not in our own future yet. Of course, Moltmann could reply by 
saying that God is coming to us from both his and our futures. 
This still does not overcome what we feel is a conceptual 
contradiction - how can God experience open possibilities with 
us now while at the same time be coming to us from the future? 
Similarly, how can Moltmann call for repentance and 
transformation now, and for it to be especially exhibited in the 
church (Moltmann 1973:86-87), if the eschatological future is 
coming to us anyway? Moltmann, it seems to us, speaks as if the 
'not yet' is already a reality. The question is exacerbated by 
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Moltmann's description of the future as something new, present 
'historical' anticipations of it notwithstanding. We think this 
weakens the idea of an eschatological 'flow' of history, because 
any such flow should surely have an implicit beginning and end. 
In the light of the above discussion we think it is less 
problematic to talk of God as Person, coming to us, rather than 
to talk of an abstract historical future influencing the present. 
God, as an ontological Being, can obviously influence any set of 
events and, at the same time, not be subject to temporal 
limitations. 
cone also speaks of the future reaching into the present, 
but his point of departure is not Moltmann's. To be sure, Cone 
believes in a future eschatological 'whiteless' (non-racial) 
society, but this does not stop the call to activity now. For 
him, the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the hope of a certain 
future victory still means that present transformation is 
predicated on the present need (Cone 1986a: 140, 1986b: 127) . 
Gutierrez (1974:161, 1990b:126), of course, wants all history to 
be liberated or free, which freedom will arise out of the Christ-
impacted liberation movement in history. Gutierrez follows 
Moltmann in attributing the working out of the Abrahamic promise 
to the so-called historical flow. However, if history is not its 
own entity, does not the actualization of any particular 
liberation come back to how God is in relation to any human event 
at any time? This is not to deny a 'history' of human ideas or 
actions in and of themselves, nor is it to deny God a programme 
or eschatological design for humanity. As we said earlier, we 
affirm the idea of the promise-fulfilment scheme of God's plans. 
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Now no part of our discussion necessarily denies any linkage 
between creation, the Abrahamic Promise, the exodus, and the 
cross. We are proposing that whatever linkages do exist are God-
mediated rather than being the result of a mysterious 'flow of 
history'. The cross and resurrection affects the intra-
trinitarian history, to be sure. On the basis of this the 
Trinity relates to humanity in its suffering. Thus while we 
would query Moltmann's concepts of 'future', we would affirm, in 
a general way, his idea of the Trinity deeply absorbing human 
pain, guilt and judgement. 
This is not to say that we support the virtual panentheism 
of the later Moltmann, a position he admits to. We agree with 
his rejection of the process-theology view of God (that is, God 
is 'becoming') although we have questioned his exposition of the 
coming future of God, especially as it relates to 'history'. In 
chapter three, and in the present discussion, we have had to 
inquire (albeit briefly) into Moltmann's understanding of God, 
as Moltmann especially relates the nature of God as Future and 
as trinitarian to the resolution of the problem of human evil. 
Gutierrez and Cone also do this, but from varying points of 
departure, and they do not take it as far as Moltmann. 
2.4 The Atonement and Freedom 
We are now going to look at what our theologians have said 
about the atonement, primarily in its relation to freedom. 
Certain aspects of the atonement, such as the Abrahamic promise-
fulfilment idea, the New Covenant and the opening up of the 
future have already been brought up. Now, however, we will 
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observe in more detail the implications of the atonement in its 
relationship to the cross and resurrection. 
We can begin by noting the love of God that was displayed 
in the atonement. The cross shows justice-love (Cone 1986a:72-
73) and even the violation of this love (Moltmann 1991:50). We 
will recall that Moltmann sees God as vulnerable, able to suffer, 
because of his love for us and especially those who are victims. 
The suffering love of God makes possible our redemption. 
This redemption is total in that it embraces all dimensions 
of human existence: that is, both personal and systemic, 
oppressor and oppressed (Gutierrez 1974: 151-152, 166-168; Moltmann 
1991:49). For Gutierrez (1974:300), cone (1975:232) and Moltmann 
(1974b: 116) the cross and resurrection brought the kind of 
redemption that can be described as freedom from sin, guilt, and 
oppression. Freedom is seen to be the primary purpose of the 
atonement. Gutierrez (1974:300), cone (1975:175) and especially 
Moltmann (1974a:218) understand Jesus' suffering on the cross to 
mean that God was taking into himself (absorbing) the pain of 
humankind. When the Son experienced the abandonment and 
judgement of the Father, and then resurrected, he brought 
justice, or freedom (Gutierrez 1983:14; Cone 1975:236; Moltmann 
1975:57). Christ's personal victory thus ushers in victory, 
freedom and life for those who suffer. This is made possible 
through the work of the Holy Spirit, even among non-Christians 
(Gutierrez 1974:151,158,193-194, 1984:66-68; Moltmann 1991:24-
25,53,75). 
It follows, then, that this results in reconciliation, or 
the possibility thereof, with God and neighbour (Gutierrez 
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1990b:138; Moltmann 1974b:116). It is important to observe the 
approach to justification and reconciliation in Gutierrez, Cone 
and Moltmann. The terms 'justice' and 'reconciliation' are used 
slightly differently at times. Mo1tmann (1991:49,52) has more to 
say on justification of perpetrators and clearly opposes any idea 
of objective atonement or reconciliation (as over against cone 
who clearly supports both objective and subjective reconciliation 
[Cone 1975:141-142,232-233,238]). Moltmann (1991:51-52) 
advocates that legal punishment is not God's intention in the 
atonement; rather one should be looking for subjective 
justification. For Moltmann (1991:53) God's 'justice justifies 
the unjust', that is, God is effecting freedom from sinfulness 
and failure rather than cold punishment. God's justice, of 
course, can be applied to both perpetrators and victims. 
Ultimately, Moltmann (1991:49,51), Gutierrez (1983:14) and Cone 
(1975:236) concur in that justification, far from being forensic 
or penal (salvation from hell-punishment) is liberation or 
freedom from oppression. This freedom includes the possibility 
of communion with God. 
Now our basic question in this area is: What degree of 
freedom does one need to be convinced that one is justified? Is 
a less-oppressed victim more justified than a victim who is being 
tortured in an oppressor's prison cell? Would it not in fact be 
unjust for a repentant perpetrator to be declared justified as 
over against a victim (even a Christian victim ) who continues 
to experience oppression? We realize that we may be accused of 
raising irrelevant, or at best, artificial questions here, as it 
appears that we are trying to quantify justification and freedom. 
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That is not our intention. Our concern is with the appropriation 
of freedom from suffering. If the cross and resurrection set up 
a 'flow' of freedom, then surely the acquiring of it publicly 
verifies the existence of it. 
The victim becomes the key here. To be sure, our authors 
are not advocating that justification is measured by an amount 
of freedom. However, the tortured prisoner's first existential 
question will be, 'what has the atonement done for my suffering 
now'? Ongoing oppression of non-Christian victims, who know 
nothing of any atonement for justification or freedom, makes our 
concern (the appropriation of freedom) all the more pertinent. 
It must be understood that we are talking with reference to 
persistent sin-caused evil or oppression, rather than the 
somewhat different situation of 'redemptive' suffering. 
Christians, whether victims or not are called upon to 
exercise faith. If 'faith' means commitment to the struggle for 
freedom (as Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann argue), then the actual 
experience of justice-freedom for the victim can only be 
psychological or proleptic. As we saw, cone (1975:80) argues 
anyway for a freedom that transcends one's immediate 
circumstances, until actual historical freedom is attained. Why, 
however, should this be the case? If justification is freedom 
and if one is justified now, should he not also be free now from 
actual oppression, at least to a reasonably high degree? We are 
speaking primarily for the victim at this point, even though we 
understand that a commitment to social justice implies redemptive 
suffering. The victim in the prison cell, however, is the one 
who counts in this issue. 
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In the light of this discussion, we find it somewhat 
incongruous that Gutierrez and Cone can be frustrated with 
Moltmann who, inter alia, advocates the coming future kingdom of 
freedom in connection with the coming God! It is unclear as to 
when actual reconciliation begins; is it during the process of 
bringing in justice, or is it only after total justice is 
achieved? Of course, if one uses the terms justice and 
reconciliation synonymously, the question falls away. 
What about the other areas of sin that exist in history? 
If the cross and resurrection have relation primarily to 
liberation, what about the other alienations inherent within the 
human condition? our question indicates that we do not regard 
all sin (spiritual or social) as oppression. We can think, for 
example, of idolatry or immorality. Would not the atonement bear 
relation to these in a different way? Our questions, of course, 
are not meant to imply that Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann ignore 
other sins. Rather, we are merely investigating what our authors 
deem to be the main import of the atonement - freedom from 
understands the atonement in a purely oppression. If one 
forensic sense (Anselm, traditional evangelicalism) then sin, as 
sin, becomes the main problem. However, if one looks at 
atonement in a primarily deliverance sense (as do Gutierrez 
(1974:300, 1983:63], Cone (1975:135,138,157] and Moltmann 
(1991:51-52]) then oppression as a concrete consequence of sin 
is the issue. The first looks more at legal judgement with 
ultimate freedom only really in the 'next life'; the second looks 
more at freedom from suffering now and in the future, as a matter 
164 
of historical course. We would suggest that both approaches form 
the boundaries of what is possible. 
Just what was Jesus Christ being crucified (and rejected by 
the Father) for? Was it for the concrete sin of oppression (or 
any other concrete sin, for that matter), or was it for humanity 
qua humanity? If it was the former, is this not reducing the 
meaning of the death of Jesus too much? We wonder if the truth 
is not that it is both, that is, man-as-guilty (therefore 
alienated) as well as particular consequences of sin. We fear 
that even describing the primary purpose of the atonement as 
multidimensional or integral liberation from oppression, 
(Moltmann 1991:49; Gutierrez 1983:144-145), will run the risk of 
not doing justice (pun not intended!) to the comprehensive nature 
of sin. If sin is described in terms of 'state-of-being' as well 
as 'act', which our authors maintain, then the atonement must 
pertain equally to both dimensions. Both levels of being and act 
would be integral and universal. It is important to note that 
we are not saying that our authors ignore the vertical (personal) 
dimension regarding the atonement. Our concern is on where the 
emphasis is laid. 
Suffering is the focus of this thesis, however. The 
forensic approach, we feel, does not properly deal with social 
injustice, whereas the deliverance approach does not treat 
properly the full extent of human sin and guilt. The 
eschatological judgement of man is important here. We remember 
that for Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann the cross was the scene for 
ultimate eschatological judgement. For Gutierrez (1974:196-203) 
the parable of the sheep and goats speaks to his cause. Ultimate 
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personal judgement is based on one's 'justice' performance. 
Here, though, we raise what for us is a perplexing question. 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann are looking for an eschatological 
utopia, and Moltmann is expecting the realization of the Future 
coming kingdom. Now Gutierrez, for example, still looks for 
future judgement. However, if God is working, albeit 
dialectically, with the poor, will he not succeed in his own 
goals? 
This question would apply especially if, as for Moltmann, 
the coming God is bringing the coming kingdom with him. In our 
view there is a possible incongruity in the idea that God helps 
to bring in a utopia - but then finds himself having to judge 
eschatologically. Moltmann (1975:84, 1991:55) does not really 
deal with future judgement in his concept of the End, or, Shalom. 
Yet the ultimate fate of unrepentant perpetrators, for example, 
must be accounted for. At any rate, if all history is to be 
liberated, through an historical movement towards that very end, 
then why do Jesus Christ and the Apocalyptist emphasize a radical 
and universal future judgement (Matt 24-25; Rev 20-22)? If 
Moltmann and Gutierrez are correct in their liberative approach 
to history, should there not be an eventual harmonization of God, 
man and history (a la Hegel) without the need for 'final' 
judgement? 
If judgement at the cross is understood in terms of our 
ultimat.e liberation, rather than legal punishment, how does the 
judgement implied in the sheep and goats parable (Matt 25:31-46) 
and in the Apocalypse (Rev 20:11-15) fit in? Could it not be 
that judgement is at once legal and liberating? Is it not 
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possible in the light of the questions we are asking, that the 
cross and resurrection point to something other than a 
progressive liberation? This is not to down-play the call to do 
justice - in fact it is the opposite. We would submit (with more 
emphasis than our authors) that as the Son took on humanness, so 
he died and rose for humanity, with all its ramifications, rather 
than exclusively for concrete freedom-on-the-way. Of course 
freedom from suffering still remains a crucial issue. 
3. THE APPLICATION OF FREEDOM 
3.1 The Liberating Presence of Christ 
For our authors, the accessibility of freedom through Christ 
is important. They present this issue by talking about the 
'liberating presence of Christ' (Christo-presence), as well as 
the personal element involved in appropriating the freedom-
benefit of the atonement. In this short section we will observe 
the former. 
According to our authors, the resurrection put the Son of 
God in the position to be historically present with the 
oppressed. For Gutierrez (1974:176), Cone (1986a:119-120) and 
Moltmann (1974b:l15, 1983:22), the resurrected Christ is now the 
Freer, Liberator, or New Man, able to offer victory, hope and 
freedom to all people, but with a priority for the oppressed. 
This is the goal of the divine identification with them. We 
mentioned above the idea of the Spirit ushering in Christ's 
victory amongst people. Along with this action of the Spirit, 
then, is the liberating presence of Christ with the poor or 
suffering (Gutierrez 1974:151-153; Cone 1986a:l18,123; Moltmann 
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1974a:246). This Christo-presence indicates the ongoingness of 
the resurrected Christ's option for, and identification with, the 
oppressed. 
It needs to be pointed out that, for Gutierrez (1984:67) and 
Cone (1986a:64), all three members of the Trinity are involved 
in the process of liberation. Again, for Moltmann (1974a:249, 
1975:78), the reality of man's pain and the gift of freedom from 
it, are linked with the trinitarian identification with human 
history. Gutierrez (1974:193) tells us that the resurrected 
Christ, as the Abrahamic heir and as the New Covenant, 
universalized Yahweh's liberating presence from Israel to all 
people. Peculiar to Gutierrez (1974:262-264, 1983:107) is the 
idea that the eucharist celebrates the liberating work of Jesus 
Christ and transmits the victorious life of the resurrected 
Christ to the participants in the ceremony·, especially the 
oppressed. In our view, though, Christian sufferers who take 
communion (a la Gutierrez), with its link to the presence of 
Christ, would have an advantage over 'anonymous' Christian 
sufferers who know nothing of the rite. 
We concur with the notion that there is a presence of the 
resurrected Christ with the poor and oppressed. Indeed, this 
Christ is against oppression and indifference to human suffering. 
The sheep and goats parable clearly alludes to this, and 
Gutierrez (1974:196-203) so agrees. The parable makes the 
important point of the resurrected Christ's empathy (identity) 
with human suffering, especially that of the oppressed. We agree 
with Gutierrez (Ibid) that the 'little brethren' refer to any 
that are hurting. 
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our question for our three theologians, however, is simply 
this: 'Is the presence of the resurrected Christ actually 
liberating'? We ask this in the light of the fact that we have 
already alluded to the problem of ongoing, actual suffering in 
our discussion on the exodus and the atonement. Christ, 
furthermore, is not just present with the oppressed (not that our 
authors are saying that), he is also present with all people, 
providentially and creatively. The resurrected Christ, through 
the convicting work of the Spirit, is present with and addressing 
the 'perpetrators of the world'. But is this address necessarily 
resulting in the liberation of the oppressed? We remain 
unconvinced that it is. Again, this is not to down-play the call 
to 'do justice'. We are brought now to the vertical (personal) 
dimension of liberation. 
3.2 The Personal Element 
Can freedom be forced on a victim whether s/he wants it or 
not? We are sure that our authors would agree that 
conscientization is often needed to alert victims to the fact 
that their suffering is unnecessary. Cone's (1974a:354, 
1986a:105-106) idea that blacks sin when they neglect the message 
and responsibility of their own liberation, comes to mind. So 
doesMoltmann's (1969:54-57, 1974b:37-42,59-67,86-104) discussion 
of human apathy and failure in relation to self-liberation. 
Now if Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann look for an integral 
liberation, then this implies the personal element. Gutierrez 
(1990b:56), as we saw, calls for personal conversion, although 
not in the evangelical-pietist sense. It is conversion into 
solidarity with the oppressed (Gutierrez 1983:20). The oppressed 
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themselves are to (or at least should) seek a kind of mystical 
union with Christ in his cross and resurrection (Gutierrez 
1983: 148) . Gutierrez ( 1990b: 138) emphasizes that liberation 
implies a responsible personal communion on the part of the 
victim (and repentant perpetrator) with God as liberator and with 
others. Again, Holtmann (1969:33, 1974a:l94-194) calls for 
personal relationship to Christ in a similar way to Gutierrez. 
Of course in Holtmann (1974a:246) human history has been 
integrated into di vine history. Therefore an intimate link (even 
if it is not perceived by the individual) is established between 
God and man. Cone (1975:112), we recall, speaks of the 
transcendent ability of suffering blacks to enter into unity with 
the black Christ. 
The above points mean that the atonement, in relation to 
suffering, demands personal accountability. Now Holtmann 
(1991:122) and Gutierrez (1974:151,158,193-194) boldly state that 
the oppressed are God's own, whether they know it or not. 
Therefore, we pose the following question, similar to that in our 
earlier discussion of the concept of the 'victim': How can 
justice, or liberation, or freedom, work for the poor who either 
knowingly reject, or are ignorant of, the Christian option? Can 
the medicine work if the patient does not take it? We understand 
well the difference between faith and ethics, or justification 
before God and justification before men. However, even if the 
issue of personal salvation is put entirely aside (which 
Gutierrez, cone and Mal tmann would disallow anyway) , how can 
liberation or freedom be effective in transforming social evil 
if personal acquiescence to God (be it from perpetrator or 
170 
victim) is necessarily part and parcel of it working in the first 
place? 
We do not deny that God can use non-believers in his 
purposes; for example God used Cyrus in freeing the Jews from 
Babylonian captivity. However, we wonder how Moltmann (1991:122) 
can talk of the poor being anonymous Christians if freedom 
entails acknowledgement of Christ? If God has indeed inaugurated 
an historical programme of liberation ('project of freedom' as 
Cone (1975:138,157] calls it) how is it going to happen? If it 
is replied that the people of the liberated future will comprise 
only those who have personally acquiesced anyway, the question 
still remains. The 'anonymous Christian' element would still 
present a problem to that reply. 
Apart from this, the reply would also imply a selective 
process of liberation, that is, only those who personally want 
freedom will actually get it. Yet Gutierrez ( 1979: 151-152, 
1983: 61) talks of a unitary historical liberation and of all 
things being 'saved' by virtue of their being created. It seems 
as if our authors wish us to agree that the Christ-event can 
affect people corporately as well as individually. However, the 
problems mentioned above, along with the ongoing presence of evil 
and oppression, cause us to find Gutierrez's, Cone's and 
Moltmann's approaches to be problematic at this point. We would 
agree with them, of course, when they maintain that the personal 
element entails personal responsibility. 
3.3 The Call to 'Fight' 
According to our authors, the Christ-event not only offers 
freedom, it also demands participation in that very freedom. In 
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this section we shall look at various aspects of this 
'participation' or 'fight' for freedom. 
The cross and resurrection, as well as inaugurating 
eschatological freedom, also issue a challenge to the oppressed. 
For the oppressed, freedom is at the same time a call to suffer, 
or participate in the process of freedom. Thus the actual 
experience of suffering would not necessarily stop. They have 
been freed to fight for freedom (Gutierrez 1974:158, 1979:81,151; 
Moltmann 1969:131-132,145-147). A dialectic is established. God 
promises and works for liberation, but this is to be brought 
about through the agency of the oppressed, who become the 
interlocutors of their own liberation (Gutierrez 1984:30; Cone 
1979b:540, 1986a:l37; Moltmann 1983:18). Of course, those who 
participate in this historic liberation could be believers or 
non-believers. Faith, then, becomes the act of identifying with 
the liberative task, believing in the hope of victory or freedom 
from present suffering (Gutierrez 1976:66, 1979:16; Cone 
1986a:48, 1986b:90,126; Moltmann 1973:61, 1974b:58,116-117). 
Faith brings about belief that the historical contradictions 
caused by injustice will be eradicated. We wonder what the 
object (as over against the goal) of faith for anonymous 
Christians could be. 
Gutier,rez, as we saw in chapter one, calls for the poor and 
their friends to participate in a liberating evangelism. This 
involves a process of conscientization, denunciation (challenging 
the status quo) and annunciation (the proclamation of Christ as 
Liberator). It is an active, praxis-call to transform society, 
in dialectical cooperation with Christ. For Gutierrez (1976:66, 
1983:20), faith becomes a 
participate in the struggle 
liberating praxis, a call 
for justice. The cross 
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to 
and 
resurrection have demanded this call. Gutierrez wants action 
now. We recall from chapter one how Gutierrez accuses Moltmann 
of replacing a Christianity of the Beyond with a Christianity of 
the Future (Gutierrez 1974:218). Like Cone, Gutierrez feels that 
Moltmann, theologizing as a European political theologian, is not 
successfully addressing the needs of those who suffer. 
Responsibility, for Gutierrez, is informed by the actual praxis 
of suffering, as well as ordinary reflection. 
Moltmann, however, calls for a social revolution in which 
the circles of oppression are systematically worked against. 
This involves the abandoning of the futile promises of humanism, 
and godless inhuman utopias (Moltmann 1969:40-41, 1974b:115,42-
44). One must work for a harmony between man, creation, and the 
saviour who frees. The later Moltmann seems to call for a kind 
of cosmic unity. Present possibilities (of what the future might 
be) are open, so we must act in the power of the resurrection and 
in the hope of the future, a future which includes an 
eschatologically restored creation. Thus for Moltmann this is 
not simply a programme of liberation of the oppressed in its own 
right - it is the appropriation of future eschatological freedom 
into the present in order to overcome evil. 
Though Moltmann may formulate his programme for change in 
different terms from those of Gutierrez and Cone, we think they 
unjustifiably charge Moltmann with irrelevance. 5 Moltmann still 
calls for active responsibility in liberation, just as much as 
do Gutierrez or Cone. In fact, Moltmann (1969:131-132,145-147) 
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argues for the need of Christians to be joyously involved in 
social revolution in the way in which God would want them to be. 
Religion becomes 'proligion', that is, the working together of 
faith, hope and liberation (Moltmann 1969:40-41). 
Cone {1986a:l40), for that matter, follows Moltmann in the 
idea of the future breaking into the present. Of course Cone 
does not emphasize it like Moltmann. Blacks themselves, 
therefore, are called to transcend their circumstances and unite 
with the Liberator, the Black Christ, in his cross and 
resurrection, and in his goal to see white oppression ended (Cone 
1986a:56, 1986b:127). 
It is not only individual victims who must participate in 
their own freedom, or individual oppressors who must repent 
(Gutierrez 1990b:138; Cone 1973:55, 1986a:124; Moltmann 
1974a: 194-195) and enter into solidarity with the oppressed. 
According to our theologians, the church also, after first 
liberating itself from its own internal oppression, is obliged 
to fulfil its liberating mission in society. This involves 
proclaiming the news of Christ's provision of freedom as well as 
actually participating in and publicly living out the process of 
eschatological liberation (Cone 1973:238-239,262-264; Moltmann 
1969:215, 1973:86-87, 1983:163-166). 
As we have earlier mentioned, the call to fight for freedom 
is based on hope. For Moltmann {1983:125) and Gutierrez 
(1984:30) those who appropriate the gift of freedom from God pass 
from 'death' to 'life'. There is an eschatological perspective, 
based on the resurrection of Christ and the hope of a victorious 
future, and this makes the struggle worthwhile (Gutierrez 
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1984: 22; Cone 1984b: 140; Moltmann 1967: 154, 1975: 50), despite the 
problem of theodicy which still persists. Disappointments are 
to be expected (Gutierrez 1983:81), and man will understand more 
about his nature and need of God in the process of liberation 
(Moltmann 1969:204-207, 1991:29-30). 
Moltmann ( 1969: 166, 1975: 50-51) calls for hope in the future 
of the Coming God, who has already shown his competence by 
creating ex-nihilo. People, and especially the oppressed, can 
rightfully hope and expect the fulfilment of the promise of 
eschatological righteousness (freedom), the resurrection of the 
dead, and the Lordship of the Crucified One (Moltmann 1967:229). 
In fact the final 'arrival' of God himself is expectantly awaited 
(Moltmann 1975:50). Of course, for our theologians, it is the 
oppressed who are the primary beneficiaries of the liberative 
hope. Cone {1986a:87) and Moltmann (1991:121), for example, 
maintain that the kingdom is in the first instance for the poor 
(oppressed) who are the agents {participants, catalysts) for it 
in the first place. 
The victim is reminded that suffering is part and parcel of 
the process of liberation, in spite of the encouragement of hope. 
What else, when good opposes evil? There is, then, the reality 
of redemptive suffering. In agreement with Gutierrez and 
Moltmann, Cone (1975:239, 1986a:97,101) affirms that liberation 
will be conflictive, and calls for a commitment to redemptive 
suffering, even death. Furthermore, Cone (1975:170-171, 
1986a:56) sees the theodicy question being reasonably addressed 
in the redemptive suffering of the oppressed, especially the 
black oppressed whose very suffering qualifies them to be God's 
agents. 
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Gutierrez (1983:20) claims that 'believing' is to 
proclaim the kingdom from the midst of struggle. Moltmann 
{1974a:64-65) outlines certain areas of unavoidable redemptive 
suffering (seep 116 of chapter 3). Ultimate freedom is certain, 
however. 
We have already mentioned that our authors look for a 
freedom for all humanity. The call to fight for this freedom 
and, if necessary, endure redemptive suffering, is part and 
parcel of one's conversion. For Moltmann (1974a:194), Cone 
(1982:113) and Gutierrez (1974:153), God desires a universal 
freedom. Individuals will only be truly free when all history 
and creation is free. For Gutierrez (1974:238, 1983:81) and 
Moltmann (1969:40-41, 1974b:42-44), the divine-human dialectic, 
wherein God and man work together to bring in liberation, will 
lead to a future oppression-free utopia. For our authors this 
is a reasonable hope. Interestingly, both Gutierrez (1990b:41) 
and Holtmann (1969:213, 1975:84) refer to Christ the Liberator 
eventually handing over the free kingdom to the Father. This 
will be the ultimate act. The liberating presence of Christ 
would no longer be needed. Our response to this section on the 
'call to fight' will be incorporated in the next section which 
will be a general response to Gutierrez, cone and Holtmann. 
4. GENERAL RESPONSE 
We wish to make some general comments, now, on the common 
ideas as put forward by our three theologians. Let us start by 
summarizing their basic message. The central event behind 
freedom and its related issues is the cross and resurrection. 
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We are told that the cross is the place where God in Christ 
consummately identifies with human victimization and where 
eschatological judgement is exacted on sin in its primary 
concretization as oppression or injustice. It is the cross where 
Jesus Christ becomes the substitutionary victim. Of course, on 
the cross, Jesus Christ is abandoned and rejected by the Father 
and experiences a justice-death for us. The cross was also the 
meeting place of creation, exodus and God, the place where God, 
in Jesus Christ, took in the pain of the world to create a 
liberation or freedom for it. 
The resurrection was the positive resolution to all human 
suffering. This took place because the substitute sufferer, the 
Suffering Servant, rose from his double death - the death of his 
substitute suffering as an oppressed victim, and the death of the 
divine eschatological judgement on oppression. It was the 
resurrection which qualified the cross, while the cross made 
relevant the point of the resurrection - freedom from oppressive 
suffering. In the resurrection, there was victory over death, 
the inauguration of the New Age, or New creation, and the witness 
of the eschatological future. The resurrection brought the 
eschatological transformation, at least proleptically, into 
'history'. As a result, Christ as Liberator is now present with 
the poor or hurting. A call for responsible solidarity with the 
poor has been issued, and the poor themselves are to appropriate 
the victory or freedom that is now theirs. This does not obviate 
the harsh reality of redemptive suffering liberative 
responsibility means conflict with evil. The resurrection, 
however, gives a freeing and motivating faith, buoyed by 
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eschatological hope. Ultimately, a free and open society will 
exist. The New Creation will be fully realized. 
Our basic question to the above understanding of the cross 
and resurrection is simply this: 'What has the Christ-event 
actually done to relieve physical human suffering'? The basic 
format in Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann is first, to state the 
problem (oppression); then to offer the solution (liberating work 
of the Trinity); and then to call for a response. That is, the 
victim and repentant perpetrator are to appropriate the 'victory' 
personally and then suffer redemptively while participating in 
the struggle for freedom. Now, Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann do 
not really explain the basic mechanism of how the Trinity and the 
cross and resurrection, in and of themselves, do all the things 
they are purported to do. For example, how do the cross and 
resurrection of the past create freedom, especially physical 
freedom, for the victim today? The closest explanation we are 
given is that it is the Spirit of God who brings about the 
resurrection freedom (for example, Moltmann 1991:53). We are to 
accept this in faith and act accordingly. This is not to doubt 
the possibility of inner freedom or liberation. our concern, 
however, is that the victim remains with the existential burden 
of reconciling the message of freedom with ongoing suffering, 
despite the hope of the eventual vindication of good over evil. 
We ask our question in the light of a further consideration 
wherein the 'how' question ends up as the 'where' question. Put 
simply, it has been close on two thousand years since the Christ-
event. Human scientific and intellectual progress has been 
incredible. However, the evolution (or devolution) of spiritual, 
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psychological and physical evil and oppression has been 
especially notable. There certainly have been dramatic 
historical changes, such as have taken place in the former Soviet 
Union and satellite states, East Germany, and South Africa. 
However, these freedoms have brought increased suffering also. 
The two world wars, the brutality of 'ethnic-cleansing' in 
Bosnia-Herzigovena, the racism and ethnocentricism in the new 
Germany, the Angolan civil war, the recent genocide in Rwanda, 
and such like illustrate only too well the point we are making -
that sin and human evil (which necessitated the Christ-event) 
are as prevalent as ever. 
This state of affairs, of course, has given rise to 
movements such as the social gospel of Rauschenbusch, the Death 
of God theology of Altizer and Hamilton, the liberation 
theologies of Gutierrez and Cone, the hope theology of Holtmann 
and Pannenburg, the Black theology movement in south Africa 
(Maimela, Mofokeng, Mosala et al) and general Third World 
theologies of freedom. Why all these theologies? Is it not 
because of the ongoing universal presence of human evil and 
suffering? Where is it verifiably clear that Christ, in 
dialectical cooperation with responsive victims (even with the 
Holy Spirit), is effectuating a progressive liberation? We are 
thinking of liberation that is supposedly the result of a 
liberative historical flow which includes the cross and 
resurrection. Is not Cone, in his emphasis on struggle with not 
much visible victory, (a belief for which he has been 
criticized), actually quite realistic? 
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Two things must be stressed at this point. Firstly, we 
state yet again that our comments are not meant to down-play the 
call for freedom and justice. On the contrary, the cross and 
resurrection demand this call. Secondly, Gutierrez, Cone and 
Moltmann readily admit to the ongoing presence of human 
suffering. Gutierrez (1983:81,191) says we are to expect interim 
failures and he deplores the pessimists (like us!). He remains 
conf.ident of ultimate freedom, given enough time. The dialectic 
of God and man in liberative adventure together, will end with 
eschatological utopia. Cone (1975:165,191-192, 1986b:90) admits 
to ongoing struggle and the persistence of the theodicy issue, 
even though he claims that Christ himself is the Final Answer to 
black suffering. Moltmann (1969:46-47,60, 1974a:64-65, 1975:73) 
precludes any theoretical answers to the problem of God and evil. 
He advocates, rather, that human suffering results in increased 
self-understanding (as mentioned earlier), and can lead to an 
encounter with the Trinity who also suffers pain through the 
saviour. The hope and promise of the victorious future, and the 
future of God, enable victims to endure the mystery of suffering. 
Unfortunately, while we affirm the notion of redemptive 
suffering, we remain unconvinced that actual suffering 
(redemptive or oppressive) is decreasing. 
Moreover, let us return to the example of the prisoner being 
tortured because, perhaps, he spoke out for political freedom. 
What is the point of telling him about an 'historical flow of 
liberation' and that Jesus Christ is freeing him just as he is 
about to be electrocuted? To be sure, the prisoner could 
understand that all is not lost, that suffering will eventually 
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cease, and that resurrection will conquer death. But telling him 
about redemptive suffering will not relieve the actual suffering. 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann could reply by insisting on faith 
and hope. True, a faith in Christ, in the way that Gutierrez, 
Cone and Moltmann understand it, can enable one to endure 
suffering. It may also embolden one to actively fight for and 
even die for the cause of freedom. We still ask, however, why, 
after so long, suffering is so extant in the world today? Is God 
so slow? 
We have indicated our concern with the authors' possible 
over-usage of the exodus event, as well as the stark fact of 
ongoing evil in the human experience. We have agreed that, inter 
alia, Jesus died and rose in response to the problem of 
oppression. However, have the cross and resurrection 
historically alleviated (even progressively) the pain and 
suffering which strongly characterize human existence? If the 
atonement had procured freedom, and if this is part and parcel 
of our 'historical liberative flow', why is freedom so slow in 
coming? Would the Trinity have made the freedom-benefit of the 
atonement so dependent on human participation? 
our questions, here, are referring to the issue of social 
suffering, 
general. 
not to the broader issue of human sinfulness in 
Is the eschaton meant to be a mopping up operation 
after the main liberating event of the atonement in conjunction 
with human participation (Cone), or is it to be a time of 
ultimate judgement? We mean, here, a judgement on perpetrators 
(be they oppressor or oppressed) who did not heed the call to do 
justice. We agree that Jesus Christ, in his capacity of 
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'substitute victim', underwent judgement and freedom. But, we 
ask again, has this really produced freedom (as understood by our 
authors) or even the strong possibility thereof for today's 
victims? Perhaps the persistence of evil and suffering since the 
Christ-event fits in with Jesus' predictions of great distress, 
persecution, betrayal, wars and rumours of wars (Matt 24:3-22). 
Some of the preceding may not be instances of direct oppression, 
but it certainly mitigates against the idea of freedom as a 
progressive movement, and it implies a 'kingdom' of evil. There 
can still be faith and hope, though, whether or not there is a 
divine programme of liberation in action. 
We still affirm a call to urgent, responsible action towards 
freedom now. Along with this, however, is it not better to speak 
of a future divine vindication of eschatological judgement on 
perpetrators (based on the cross and resurrection), than to 
assure victims of an ongoing historical flow of liberation? We 
are most definitely not advocating the indifferent approach of 
a slave-master pietism here. What we are saying is that Jesus 
Christ identified with human suffering, underwent the Father's 
rejection on the cross, and died, for us. The resurrection 
indicated victory over evil and death. Thus Christ can now 
demand justice, and judge those who fail to perform, especially 
as he continues to suffer with us today. The preceding expresses 
the kernel of our thesis and we will be concerning ourselves with 
this in chapter five. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. It would be just as well at this point to remind the reader 
that we are concerned primarily with social suffering in relation 
to the Christ-event. The larger issue of theological 
epistemology or hermeneutic, which is part and parcel of Latin 
American liberation methodology has not been discussed in detai.l 
in this thesis. Cone, and especially Gutierrez, would despair 
of Moltmann's approach in that he (Moltmann) does not emphasize 
praxis methodology. He would be seen as a European political-
hope theologian who 'applies' his theology (and Scripture) to the 
issue at hand. We are concerning ourselves, however, with their 
situational and conceptual differences and similarities in 
relation to suffering. 
2. We appreciate that in some quarters it is deemed naive, or 
non-intellectual to actually believe in the existence of Satan. 
To our mind, this very attitude falls into the hands of Satan. 
Obviously this is not the place for a defense for our belief in 
Satan. If praxis is the key to finding 'truth', then praxis 
tells us that the world of Satan and the occult is real. We have 
personally encountered the demonic and no amount of 
'sophisticated' rationalizing can alter that. For us, the world 
of evil is guided by Satan who functions in the cosmic and human 
dimensions. Obviously, we are not advocating a medieval figure 
bearing horns and a pitchfork! Neither are we advocating an 
eternal dualism of good and evil beings or kingdoms, such as in 
Persian Zoroastrianism. What we do advocate is a literal fallen 
supernatural being who embodies evil. 
3. Although not being fundamentalist, we are taking the view that 
scripture is authoritative here. Many would not see scripture 
as normative and would thus question our usage of it. We 
observe, however, that scripture is freely used by theologians 
when it comes to sourcing their belief in the exodus, promise, 
prophetic condemnation, and the Christ-event. While we affirm 
the progressive momentum of theology, we also affirm the 
stability of the biblical contribution. Naturally this is not 
the place for an apologetic for biblical trustworthiness. 
4. Cone's 'Barthianism' bothers Deotis Roberts (another North 
American Black theologian) , especially in the areas of revelation 
and ethical strategy for liberation. Roberts (1974:20) prefers 
a broad universal and historic view of divine revelation, which 
is measured by the incarnation as the supreme revelation. The 
Christo-centric approach of Cone is for Roberts (ibid) 'a most 
inadequate position'. This is because it makes any dialogue with 
the pan-African context unrealistic. (See also Roberts 1986:41.) 
We wonder why, however, if the incarnation is important for 
Roberts, he would lessen the revelatory value and uniqueness of 
Jesus Christ. Is there not a logical incongruity here? 
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5. Cone feels that Moltmann's theology actually does not answer 
human need. He (Cone) follows Bonino and other Latin American 
liberation theologians by insisting that Moltmann errs in 
individualizing or privatizing human suffering, rather than 
strategizing for systemic change. cone (1982:109} feels that 
Moltmann's 'idea of God's sufferings and Jesus' cross become mere 
intellectual, theological concepts completely unrelated to the 
actual material conditions of the poor'. cone makes his 
assertion over against the fact that Roberts accuses Cone himself 
of being irrelevant. For Roberts (1974:123) Cone's Barthian idea 
of the 'Kerygmatic Christ' is 'accessible only by a leap of 
faith', that is, it does not directly address the immediate need 
of blacks. Roberts (ibid) says 'the real problem in Cone is the 
lack of direction from his Christology to his ethics'. According 
to Roberts (1974:181-183) Cone has no real programme of social 
change and offers little chance of much liberative success in 
this age. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE VINDICATION OF JESUS CHRIST 
This chapter is devoted to a presentation of our own 
understanding of the relationship between Jesus Christ and the 
evil of social suffering. Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann are quite 
-right in highlighting the problem and sinfulness of oppression 
and suffering. Yet there still remains the existence and burden 
of suffering. To be sure, our authors do not advocate any kind 
of instantaneous or consistently paced eradication of evil and 
suffering, even though their theological positions embrace the 
idea of an ongoing flow or programme of historical liberation. 
If liberation is happening, though, why do we hear the call that 
we should be prepared for a drawn out struggle, or why does the 
theodicy issue remain so strident? 
Various options concerning the ongoing existence of 
oppressive suffering present themselves. 1 The option we will be 
advocating in this chapter is that Jesus fully identified with 
human suffering, as a victim, and thus has the right to call us 
to do justice. If we fail, Christ is then vindicated in his 
eschatological judgement upon us. The cross and resurrection 
vindicate Jesus Christ in his words and deeds because of his 
existential identity with humanity. our option does not include 
or necessitate the notion that God has set up an ongoing project 
of liberation. Rather, in accordance with our thesis, we will 
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be looking simply at how Jesus, through the cross and 
resurrection, identified with the existence of, judgement of, and 
victory over oppressive suffering. We will further observe how 
the cross and resurrection form the historical basis for the call 
to 'do justice', irrespective of any so-called 'flow of 
liberation' . 
1. IDENTITY WITH THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING 
1.1 The Significance of Evil and Suffering 
We are not intending to enter into a lengthy discussion of 
theodicy at this point. Our immediate concern is with the 
perception of evil and suffering as it is experienced by victims 
of oppression. 2 
In our opinion 'evil' can be explained as that which is 
diametrically opposed to 'good'. It is not simply the absence 
of good; it is that which works against God and the well-being 
of mankind and creation. We do not want evil to 'happen' to us, 
although we as humans might willingly bring about evil upon 
others. We would agree with Peterson (1982:11) who says that one 
'of the deepest human impulses is the resistance to evil'. 
Accordingly we are always trying to overcome that which hurts us. 
Victims of evil want freedom from the pain and existential 
limitations brought upon them. To be sure, victims of evil may 
end up in despair because of the power of evil against them, and 
become apathetic (Gutierrez, Moltmann). Then, of course, 
conscientization about suffering and freedom is in order. It 
still remains, however, that those who suffer would rather not. 
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We can classify evil (and thus the resultant suffering) into 
natural, moral and occultic (Satanic) dimensions. Gutierrez, 
Cone and Moltmann would affirm the existence of moral evil as it 
is manifested in the various types of oppression. 
course, we are implying that moral evil can be 
Here, of 
properly 
represented by the word sin. We have even seen how Moltmann 
(1974a:331, 1974b:26, 1979:112) speaks against the sinfulness 
(vicious circle) of how we mismanage the world which God has 
given to humankind. This mismanagement could be described in 
terms of natural (physical) and moral evil. However we classify 
the various dimensions of evil, we ultimately commit moral evil 
against ourselves and God. It is God's created world, not ours; 
but it is we who have sinfully alienated ourselves from God (Rom 
1-3) . 
We would submit, therefore, that suffering which is caused 
by evil cannot be called normal. If it was part and parcel of 
the ongoing evolution of the human race, God would not have 
indicated his opposition to sin or evil. There would be no cause 
to believe that the Christ-event has anything to do with evil and 
oppression. In fact there would have been no need for the cross 
and resurrection. We are going to explore, however, the idea 
that the cross and resurrection have very much to do with the 
overcoming of evil and suffering. Both oppressive and redemptive 
suffering indicate that the relationship between God and man is 
not as it should be. Alienation is the enemy of unity, and unity 
in both horizontal and vertical dimensions is surely what God 
wants for us. By 'unity' we mean a situation of righteousness 
(justice), harmony, and creative freedom. When these things are 
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not in existence, we have a situation of evil (especially moral 
evil), often resulting in oppressive suffering. 
The victim who hears about the freedom of Christ will want 
to know that trusting in him is actually the answer to his 
suffering. Similarly, the perpetrator needs to know about 
incurred judgement because of his or her acts of oppression. 
When we talk about 'suffering' it should be remembered that we 
are referring in the first instance to oppressive or sin-caused 
suffering. 
(redemptive 
We can, of course, suffer for the sake of freedom 
suffering), or, bring suffering upon ourselves 
because of our own sin. It is unjust suffering, however, that 
attracts our present attention. We need to see now how the 
problem of evil and suffering relate to the Trinity and 
especially to Jesus. 
1.2 The Incarnation 
By the term 'incarnation', we refer to the event of the Son 
of God assuming the form of human being and experiences (Ph 2:5-
11; Heb 2:14), 3 including human death. Indeed, it is his death 
which underlines the fact that the son of God did not only assume 
humanness, but also became a man. Baillie (1961:87) reminds us 
that we should not make the mistake of seeing Jesus' humanity on 
a purely abstract level. For Jesus was fully God and fully man, 
who found expression in a particular man, Jesus of Nazareth. 4 
The incarnation embraces the event of the birth of Jesus and 
culminates in his cross and resurrection. We wish to further 
unpack the implications of Jesus' incarnation by noting the 
following points. 
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Firstly, the incarnation speaks to us of the divine option 
for mankind. Let us call this the first option. We have already 
seen in preceding chapters how Gutierrez, Cone and Mol tmann speak 
of the divine option for the 'poor'. In our view, however, there 
is even a prior option - the fact that God is doing something for 
man in the first place. If mankind is alienated, sinful, unjust, 
ungodly, 'given over', why would God want to respond to the human 
cry for freedom and life? Many answers could be advanced, but 
we would rather agree with Gutierrez, Cone and especially 
Moltmann when they say that it is fundamentally the love of God 
that brings about his overtures to humanity. God so loved the 
world (Jn 3:16) that he gave his Son in response to the human 
predicament. It was a love which was vulnerable to rejection and 
abuse by mankind (Moltmann 1991:50). 
Love, then, was the driving force behind God's prior option 
for man, and this love caused God to act graciously to us. The 
very fact that humanity continues to exist is because of God's 
grace. While fallen mankind can still freely do good (justice) 
or evil (injustice), the very existence of good and hope derive 
from the grace of God. We are reminded of Baillie's (1961:114-
117) notion of the 'paradox of grace'. For Baillie (1961:116), 
the 'grace of God is prevenient', that is, the 'good was His 
before it was ours'. Jesus, as God incarnate, was showing that 
true humanity is reflected only when we are in proper union with 
God. Our contention, then, is that God's love and grace portray 
his prior option for humanity qua humanity. 
A second crucial implication of the incarnation is the 
identity of God with human suffering. If God incarnates into 
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humanity, he therefore incarnates into the human predicament -
except that he does not acquire a sinful nature. The 
consequences of sin {Gutierrez), however, surely affect him. It 
follows that the life and death of Jesus also demonstrate a more 
specific option than that discussed above. The second option, 
then, the one that Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann refer to is the 
divine option for the poor. We agree with Sider {1984:76) when 
he points out that God's option for the poor does not indicate 
divine bias as such. Rather, God 'is on the side of the poor 
just because he is not biased, for he is a God of impartial 
justice'. We prefer to call it an 'option for justice', because 
God is pro-justice. Whatever we call it, though, it still 
remains that the poor and weak need justice which can be 
translated into freedom. We wholeheartedly agree with cone 
{1986a:66-74) that the revealed love of God was characterized by 
righteousness which motivated God to act against oppression. 
In the incarnation, then, Jesus met with evil. Not that God 
had never encountered evil before. The historical Jesus, 
however, confronted evil and suffering as experienced by man. 
How far does this identity go? We will recall from the preceding 
chapters how Moltmann speaks of God's absorbing human history 
into his own. It is a trinitarian action in which Father, Son 
and Spirit participate, making it possible for God to actually 
experience human history, a history which includes the story of 
human pain and suffering. However, if oppressive suffering is 
sinful and an expression of moral evil, and if God takes upon 
himself suffering, does this mean that he also takes upon himself 
evil qua evil? Our question here relates more to God's identity 
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with man, rather than to God's bearing the consequences of sin 
on the cross. When Moltmann speaks of the relationship between 
God and man he speaks of 'identity' and 'absorbing'. So would 
we. The question, though, is this: 'is identity synonymous with 
absorbing'? 
A husband may be able to understand the pain that his wife 
experiences when giving birth, but he could never identify with 
it existentially. He could never absorb his wife's pain into his 
own experience. With a 'like-pain' situation, say two people 
having a broken collar bone, the one may identify with the 
similar pain of the other. However, they could still never 
absorb each other's pain. On this mundane level, then, identity 
is not automatically synonymous with absorbing, because one 
individual remains separate from the other. 
With the incarnation, however, we have a totally different 
scenario, because in the historic Jesus, God became both external 
and internal to humanity. One might argue that God was in one 
man, Jesus, not all men. However, this objection misses the 
point of representation in which Jesus, as victim and scape-goat, 
represented humanity, and not the least, those who suffer. When 
we say that God became internal to humanity, we do not therefore 
mean that all people have God 'in them', in a semi-pantheistic 
way, but wish to suggest that God now knows man experientially 
through Jesus Christ. Thus our story is taken into (absorbed) 
God's story, and yet without dissolving the ontological 
distinction between the Creator and the creature. 
Our discussion on the incarnation shows us that God is 
certainly not indifferent to human suffering. If we, as humans, 
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inherently resist oppressive suffering, then God in Jesus was 
equally resisting, his voluntary victimization notwithstanding. 
We concur with Erickson (1991:608) who says that 'God does indeed 
choose to permit evil to occur and continue, but that he does so 
with full knowledge of its consequences, for he himself is 
victimized by the force of evil'. 
It is all very well to postulate the existence of evil and 
suffering and that God, in Jesus, has and still does confront 
evil. The divine response goes further, however. The purpose 
of the divine encounter with evil was to bring freedom and hope. 
We now proceed to explore the role of Jesus in the cause of 
freedom from suffering. 
1.3 The Mission of Jesus 
The purpose or mission of the incarnate Jesus is summarised 
by Luke (Lk 4:18-19) who has Jesus saying: 
The Spirit of the Lord is on me,because he has 
anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has 
sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and 
recovery of sight for the blind to release the 
oppressed, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favour. 
We have seen how Gutierrez (1974:166-168, 1983:14), for 
example, understands this messianic mission from a literal point 
of view, rather than from a spiritualizing approach. Of course, 
for Gutierrez 'literal' does not mean unspiritual; rather he 
advocates a holistic approach in which both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions are addressed. Gutierrez, Cone and 
Moltmann are correct in adopting a multidimensional approach to 
the stated mission of Jesus, although we might differ on matters 
of detail. Hanks (1983: 110-111) agrees with a holistic approach, 
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but also points out how the 'poor' are to be found in the four 
stated categories, that is the poor, the captives, the oppressed 
and the blind. We concur with Hanks (1983:112) when he states: 
Some Christians wish to preach a gospel of socio-political 
liberation to the poor, whereas others want to offer 
forgiveness of sins to the rich. But Jesus does not offer 
us the luxury of two gospels, one for the rich, and one for 
the poor. He proclaims one liberating-forgiving gospel 
that is good news for the poor. 
For those who support a holistic or even a fully literalist 
interpretation, there is a problem, a problem which does not 
affect spiritualistic interpreters. Jesus claimed that he was 
to bring freedom from social suffering, and he made his claim in 
terms of the Year of Jubilee (Lev 25:8-54). In Old Testament 
terms, Yahweh was looking for a real freedom from the social 
bondages of the day. In New Testament terms the same applies. 
If we are correct in our holistic interpretation, then the goals 
of Luke 4:18-19 should have begun at calvary and be unfolding 
before our eyes. That is, it should be clear that Christ is now 
bringing in liberation. In chapter 4, however, we advocated that 
the sheer volume of suffering in the world makes it difficult for 
us to accept that this is actually happening. We have already 
seen how Gutierrez (1983:81,191) and cone (1975:165,191-192, 
1986ba:90) realize that historical evidence for liberation 
(especially in the sense of a liberative flow of history) is not 
abundant. Now those who are only looking for 'spiritual' freedom 
bypass the problem so to speak; they are not really expecting a 
progressive eradication of evil and suffering before the 
eschaton. 
If we were to hold to an historical flow of liberation, the 
problem can be addressed by calling for patience and commitment 
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to the struggle for freedom, as do Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann. 
We have suggested in chapter four, however, that the cross and 
resurrection set up a platform for divine judgement on oppression 
rather than a programme of liberation as such. Of course, Jesus 
said a lot more about his mission than what we find in the Lukan 
passage. But our concern is with regard to what Christ has 
accomplished for the sake of social freedom. Perhaps Luke 4:18-
19 will be better understood as we proceed with our discussion 
on the cross and resurrection. The theme of identity remains all 
important here. 
2. IDENTITY WITH THE JUDGEMENT OF SUFFERING (THE CROSS) 
2.1 The status of Jesus 
Jesus' existential identity with the problem of suffering 
became the basis for divine judgement on suffering. In fact, 
Jesus played out various roles (or states) in order to facilitate 
the judgement. Let us briefly observe these roles. 
2.1.1 Jesus as Suffering Servant 
The Suffering Servant is a theme which both Cone 
(1975:135,174-175) and Moltmann (1991:47-48) highlight. There 
is, of course, the ongoing debate regarding the identity of the 
Servant in the Servant songs of Isaiah (including the Fourth 
Song) which is directly relevant to our thesis. We would follow 
the thinking of Hanks here. He (1983:86) disagrees with the 
progression concept (Delitsch and Noth) in which the Servant in 
Isaiah 42 is Israel, in Isaiah 49 is the faithful remnant, in 
Isaiah 50 is the prophet and finally in Isaiah 53 is a future 
person. Rather, Hanks (Ibid) follows Rowley who advocates a 
'pendulum movement' 
swings from being 
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in which the Servant of the Fourth Song 
a corporate personality {Israel) to an 
individual. The Servant, then, in its individual connotation, 
would refer to Jesus whose life and death are described in Isaiah 
53. 
How is the Servant treated? Isaiah 53 uses the language of 
suffering. The Servant identifies with the sicknesses and pains 
of the people (v 4). He suffers oppression both from the hands 
of the people (vv 5,7,8) and Yahweh (vv 4,10). Yahweh, here, 
allows his oppression and also judges him in our place. Jesus, 
in his life, was the victim of oppression, who was ultimately led 
away like a lamb to the slaughter and did not resist. Just as 
the Servant is despised and rejected (vv 2-3), so was Jesus. 
Jesus, then, endured the evil or suffering that came upon him due 
to sin and its consequences {Gutierrez) and the enmity of Satan. 
2.1.2 Jesus as the sacrificial Lamb 
The lamb of the cross is linked to the Servant image of 
Isaiah 53:7. Driver {1986:95-96) argues that the lamb of John 
1:29 (the lamb who takes away the sin of the world) is probably 
best understood in terms of the Isaianic origin of the 'suffering 
lamb'. The Johannine Gospel refers to the fact that Jesus was 
crucified simultaneously with the killing of the Passover lamb 
(Jn 19:14,36). Driver (1986:97) reminds us that the Passover 
lamb was a commemorative sacrifice, commemorating the exodus 
liberation. For Driver (Ibid), 'Christ's Passion is described 
literally as an exodus (Lk 9:31) and the life of the messianic 
community was understood in terms of exodus liberation (1 Cor 
10:1-4; Heb 3:6-19)'. 
As the lamb, then, 
9:11-28 underlines the 
Jesus was also a sacrifice. 
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Hebrews 
sacrificial motif 
including the shedding of blood for 'many'. 
of the atonement, 
Paul and Peter also 
refer to the sacrificial dimensions of the death of Jesus. We 
agree with Driver (1986:139) who links together the themes of the 
suffering Servant, the vicarious suffering of Jesus Christ and 
the sacrificial motif. While stressing the voluntariness of the 
death, Driver regrettably down-plays the 'victim' aspect of the 
event. We think, however, that if Jesus is indeed a substitute, 
vicarious sufferer, and atoning lamb, he must therefore be a 
victim. If human sufferers, especially, are victims, then the 
incarnate Jesus must also be a victim, however voluntarily he 
died for us. We agree with cone (1975:80, 135, 174-175) who 
portrays Jesus' death as one of the Suffering Servant, stricken 
lamb, and victim who died in solidarity with and on behalf of 
human victims. 
2.1.3 Jesus as Sµbstitute 
We want to emphasize the vicarious or substitutionary nature 
of Jesus on the cross, which leads us back to the Fourth song of 
Isaiah. Isaiah 53:5-6 speaks of the Servant who was wounded, 
crushed and punished for us and because of human sin. In verse 
10, the Servant is described as a guilt offering. Hanks 
(1983:80-81) interprets this in terms of penal substitution and 
draws support from Westermann who talks of the servant bearing 
our punishment. The substitutionary element is underscored by 
the notion that the Servant bore the sins of many (Is 53:11-12). 
Gutierrez and Holtmann, their antipathy to penal or forensic 
substitution notwithstanding, strongly affirm the substitutionary 
element, by portraying Jesus as a victim. 
193, 1991:51-52) further points out 
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Moltmann (1974a:192-
that Jesus took the 
punishment that sinful humans could not bear. Therefore, we find 
God was judging God for man through the event of Jesus' cross. 
Following Hooker and Dunn, Driver (1986:108-109) adds an 
interesting variation to the theme of substitution by maintaining 
that Jesus was not merely a substitute, but was actually 
Representative Man. Thus believers are those who die their 
death in the death of Jesus, in order to have life (Rom 7:24-25; 
2 Cor 4:10-12; Col 1:24). In so doing, they participate in the 
death and new life of Jesus. The basis for our participation is 
the fact that Jesus did not merely die on behalf of humans, he 
died as a human. As our substitute or representative, then, 
Jesus was judged for us. (We take note of Pannenberg's 
(1994:429-436] caution that the representativeness of Jesus does 
not suppress or eliminate our own individuality. We are still 
individually accountable to God.) 
2.2 The Judgement on suffering 
2.2.1 The Suffering of Christ's Judgement 
It goes without saying that the physicality of the trials 
and crucifixion brought great bodily pain to Jesus. To our mind, 
Jesus suffered even greater pain when he became the Abandoned 
One. Simone Weil (1951:79) speaks about the difference between 
affliction and suffering. For her, suffering is primarily the 
immediate physical pain one might experience. When that 
suffering affects the soul, and ongoing and usually unconquerable 
mental anguish develops, the suffering has evolved into 
affliction. Weil (Ibid) maintains that Jesus was under 
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affliction in Gethsemane and on the cross, believing he was 
forsaken by the Father. According to Weil (1951:82-86) there is 
an ontological 'distance' between Creator and creation, although 
love between God and person can occur over any 'distance'. Joy 
and affliction (by virtue of creaturehood) are channels through 
which one can confront and even love God. Now Jesus exhibited 
the infinite distance. As Weil (1951:82-83) puts it: 'This 
infinite distance between God and God, this supreme tearing 
apart, this agony beyond all others, this marvel of love, is the 
crucifixion. Nothing can be further from God than that which has 
been made accursed'. 
Jesus suffers and is afflicted because he is the Judged One, 
the Holy One who became sin for us. We agree with Moltmann's 
(1975:80) terminology when he speaks of a 'rupture' in the 
Godhead or Trinity. Similarly, we see the distance of which Weil 
speaks when Moltmann discusses the abandonment of the Son. For 
Moltmann (1974a:243), as we mentioned previously, there was a 
brief period of time when the Father experienced Sonlessness, and 
the Son experienced Fatherlessness. Jesus' suffering culminated 
in his death, and we support Moltmann (1974a:l92,207) who would 
advocate that the death, somehow, penetrated or affected the 
deity of the son just for a brief period. God, in Jesus, came 
to identify, suffer with, and die for us. Obviously, we are not 
talking of ontological annihilation of the Deity - but the Son's 
identity was total. Jesus suffered in the way we have been 
describing because he was identifying with suffering man and 
bearing the divine judgement on sin-caused evil or oppression. 
2.2.2 The Nature of Christ's Judgement 
Having looked at Jesus' suffering on the cross, 
briefly consider the judgement itself in relation 
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let us 
to the 
suffering of oppression. We must remember that the incarnate Son 
of God lived his life in direct confrontation with evil powers. 5 
It was moral evil (and Satan) that generated opposition to 
Jesus. 6 While the Christ-event was preordained by the Trinity 
(Ac 2:23-27), the evil that necessitated it was not. If the 
identifying Son of God absorbed human pain into his story, then 
the Father was motivated to judge the evil and sinfulness behind 
human suffering. We have noted in preceding chapters that 
Gutierrez (1983:14), Cone (1975:236) and Moltmann (1991:49,51) 
do not support the notion of penal judgement as far as the 
atonement is concerned. We disagreed with them on the basis of 
individual accountability and the solidarity of human sinfulness. 
However, we agree with them as far as God's judgement on 
oppression is concerned. We agree with Moltmann that Jesus 
assumed our own godforsakenness and abandonment, even though he 
was sinless. That is, Jesus assumed our godforsakenness (Rom 
1:24-28) and abandonment and thereby became godforsaken and 
abandoned by the Father. In other words, Jesus was not only the 
lamb of God who 'takes away the sin of the world', but was also 
the scapegoat, bearing rejection. 
In our view, Satan and the powers were also judged. This 
judgement was not final though, because the Apocalypse speaks of 
the great white throne judgement at which believers, Satan, 
unbelievers and even death itself are judged (Rev 20:11-15), when 
the new order of things is ushered in. Coming back to the cross, 
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however, we suggest that if evil and sin were judged, then the 
perpetrators of them (Satan and unbelievers, including 
oppressors) had also to be judged. This follows because evil or 
sin or oppression are not conscious agents in themselves. Satan 
and the evil powers were addressed by God at the cross as the 
conscious perpetrators of evil, 7 human guilt notwithstanding. 
The judgement at the cross involved death. The lamb, after 
all, had to shed its blood 'for the remission of sins'. A 
question presents itself, however. If the biblical testimony is 
accurate, Jesus said 'it is finished' (tetelestai) before he died 
John 10:30). For obvious reasons, the divine transaction (be it 
expiation, propitiation or liberation) on the cross had to be 
completed before the bodily death of Jesus. So has the death any 
significance after all? 
It seems to us that the notion of sacrifice is important 
here. Also, the vicarious or substitutionary element is 
important for us because it gives concrete expression to the 
notion of God's identity with humanity, when the Son underwent 
rejection from the Father on our behalf. As we said above, the 
shedding of blood is part and parcel of the Christ-event. The 
writer to the Hebrews makes it quite clear that Jesus' blood is 
redemptively efficacious, whereas the blood of bulls and goats 
was not (Heb 9:12, 10:4). It might be said that the rupture 
within the Trinity precipitated the actual dying of Jesus, 
especially if we include the deity of Jesus in the death. 
Hendrickson (1954:435) suggests that the impending death and 
burial was so certain in Jesus' mind that he could speak of it 
as if it had already happened. Jesus also said that he was 
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committing his spirit to the Father (Jn 10:30). In connection 
with this, Michaels (1984:329) reminds us of the voluntary nature 
of the death: 'In the end, every attempt of the religious 
authorities to kill him had failed. No one took his life, but 
of his own free will he gave it back to the Father who had sent 
him (10:18; cf also Luke 13:46)'. The above discussion, then, 
indicates that the physical death of Jesus Christ was of great 
significance. Besides, the significance of the resurrection of 
Jesus is predicated upon the real death of Jesus. 
2.3 The Achievement of the cross 
2.3.1 The Defeat of Satan and the Powers 
As a result of the judgement on evil and suffering, Satan 
and the powers were defeated. Jesus always spoke of and 
demonstrated his opposition and victory over unclean spirits 
(Matt 12:38; Lk 11:20) and Satan (Mk 3:13-16; Lk 11:18). Jesus 
connected his impending crucifixion to the defeat of Satan (Jn 
12:31-33). Paul speaks of Jesus' disarming of, and triumphing 
over, the powers (Col 2:14-15; cf Heb 2:14-15). We have to 
acknowledge that, though defeated, Satan and the demonic powers 
still exercise influence and evil over humanity and against 
believers (Rom 8:38-39; Eph 6:12; 1 Pet 5:8). Nevertheless we 
would concur with O'Brien (1984:140) who states: 'It is not as 
though the principalities and powers continue just as they were 
prior to Christ's victory at the cross. Their defeat though 
hidden is no less real for all that. They have no other 
expectation than final ruin'. 
The def eat of the cosmic powers at the cross has ensured 
that systematic oppression (human powers) will not last forever. 
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Of course, the nagging question persists: 'if Jesus triumphed at 
the cross, let alone the resurrection, why do Satan, evil and 
suffering, and thus oppression, still exist'? We cannot overcome 
the theodicy posed in this question, but we can suggest two 
answers here. sinful people still exist, and therefore sinful 
human structures will coexist with them. Also, God (after the 
cross and resurrection) does say through Paul (Rom 1:18) that he 
is 'pouring out his wrath' on humanity which has been 'given 
over' to itself. That is, God is allowing mankind to incur the 
consequences of sin. We submit that only a radical 
eschatological renewal, in the eschaton, can change this state 
of affairs. Meanwhile, evil and oppression must still be 
opposed. 
2.3.2 A comprehensive Salvation 
We suggest that the cross is the place of suffering whereas 
the resurrection is the place of expressed freedom and victory. 
If we adhere to the idea of divine identification with suffering 
humanity and the need for justice (freedom), then we would see 
the cross and resurrection as a unified event. What was 
'achieved', then, depended on the life, death and resurrection 
of Jesus. In this context we wish to quote from Hanks (1983:91) 
who, with deep insight, writes: 
situating the fourth song in its context, the salvation 
proclaimed there is an integral, multi-faceted liberation 
that embraces justification from the guilt of sin; healing 
of sickness; liberation from oppression; prosperity instead 
of poverty; peace instead of class struggle; fellowship and 
koinonia instead of loneliness and scorn; demographic 
growth instead of barrenness and the extermination of the 
nation; eternal life in paradise and (possibly) 
resurrection of the body instead of death; the return to 
the land instead of exile and oppression; and a new, 
fertile land instead of an ecological wasteland. 
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Hanks argues that Jesus, as the Suffering Servant, displayed the 
power of God as attested to in Isaiah 53. In the weakness of the 
crucifixion, God, in Jesus, was at his most powerful. In 
realization of that power, we are called upon to work with Yahweh 
in bringing freedom in (Hanks 1983:93,95). 
We agree with Hanks in his exegetical interpretation of the 
Fourth Song, especially if we link the song with Luke 4:18-19; 
cf Isaiah 58:6, 61:1-2. The stated mission of the lamb parallels 
the stated mission of the Suffering Servant with reference to 
liberation, freedom and healing. To be sure, the ongoing weight 
of evil and suffering in the human story would seem to dampen the 
'achievements', as enumerated by Hanks above. But it still 
remains that the cross became both the basis and the mode of 
God's identity with human suffering, and that judgement on it did 
take place. A fully realized victory over evil and suffering is 
to be expected only at the eschaton. Jesus, as the Servant and 
the Lamb, fully and successfully completed his mission. 
Moltmann, Cone and Gutierrez interpret the cross in 
eschatological terms. For example, both Moltmann (1974a:43) and 
Gutierrez (1983:15) see Jesus at the cross as the fulfilment of 
the New Covenant. Moltmann (1974a:83, 1974b:18) advocates that 
the future and the benefits of the resurrection are mediated to 
us (especially those who suffer) through the event of the cross. 
We do not deny the eschatological element of the cross and 
resurrection, but we see the second coming of Christ as the 
ultimate eschatological event of judgement and freedom. 
3. IDENTITY WITH VICTORY OVER SUFFERING (THE RESURRECTION) 
3.1 The Resurrection and victory 
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For Jesus the resurrection" brought about his victory over 
death. To begin, Jesus overcame physical death in and of itself. 
If death is the end of life, then it becomes the greatest enemy 
of life. Certainly Paul sees physical death as something to be 
overcome (1 Cor 15:16-26) and emphasizes the life of the new 
resurrected body, pointing out that Jesus himself overcame 
physical death and became our firstfruits. Finger (1985:353) 
adds an interesting point here: 'The Son really was abandoned to 
all the finality and horror of death. consequently, theology 
cannot, properly speaking, include his resurrection under "the 
work of Jesus Christ"'. Finger reminds us that it was the Father 
who raised the Son through the agency of the life-giving Spirit. 
Following the Christus Victor model, Finger (Ibid) notes 
that Jesus (as God incarnate) lived out a sinless human life, 
resisting even the demonic, and rose 'into full communion with 
God'. The identifying act of Jesus, then, demonstrated or 
'fleshed out' perfect humanness, by overcoming the threat of non-
being and death. In our view, physical death is, inter alia, 
part of the •wages of sin' (Rom 3:23). Jesus' life, death and 
resurrection encompassed all the factors of fallen and redeemed 
human being. 
As Guthrie (1981:390) reminds us, the resurrection was a 
display of God's divine power, indicating the life-giving 
significance of the resurrection. As Guthrie (Ibid) puts it: 'It 
is the act by which the ceaseless round of death and corruption 
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in human life has been checked. God has provided a way out of 
death into life, by raising his own Son from death to life'. 
We submit that Jesus not only overcame human physical death 
but also conquered psychological death. This idea is in line 
with Gutierrez's view of oppression as 'death' and of freedom as 
'life'. To be sure, the sheer existential weight of suffering 
that victims might experience could lead victims into a condition 
of total despair and apathy (Moltmann) . The resurrection of 
Jesus, however, augurs for victory over these things in the life 
of the victim. 
The victory of Jesus over death also means the overcoming 
of moral evil and suffering. As we indicated earlier, moral evil 
is expressed through personal agents such as Satan or humanity. 
Therefore Jesus not only experienced direct opposition from Satan 
and sinful humans but also overcame the agents of evil and their 
intentions. 
We are reminded by Finger (1985:351) that Jesus was 
condemned as a false Messiah and subversive, and his crucifixion 
appears initially to be a defeat of Yahweh. As Finger (Ibid) 
puts it: 'Seen from the most profound theological perspective, 
death and the Devil had attacked God and won. Jesus' death 
confirmed and vindicated their status as the real Lords of the 
cosmos'. We agree with Finger (1985:352) when he states that the 
resurrection reversed the verdict passed on Jesus by the powers. 
The resurrection, in fact, 'was the victory and the revelation 
of God's righteousness' (Ibid). We concur with Finger that God's 
righteousness could only be fully realized when the resurrection 
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displayed his victory over evil and sin, because it is in this 
way that God vindicates his people. 
For Finger (1985:358), the incarnation 'revealed the truth 
about human and demonic forces'. That is, the prevailing 
religious and social institutions, wittingly or not, were 
actually opposed to God and his kingdom of righteousness. The 
resurrection showed that God had been opposed, and proved to be 
victorious over his opponents, while at the same time showing 
them what true righteousness should be. In this sense, the 
resurrection vindicated the suffering of Jesus, as the Suffering 
Servant. Jesus thus became the paradigmatic martyr (Osborne 
1993:76; cf Moltmann 1991:48) who represents the martyred saints. 
The resurrection reveals the divine victory over suffering and 
death for Jesus and, ultimately, for us. 
3.2 The Resurrection and Newness 
The concept of 'newness' is found in Gutierrez and cone, but 
especially in Moltmann. We concur with Gutierrez that Christ is 
the personal fulfilment of the New covenant and with Moltmann's 
emphasis on the New Covenant as the means of newness. Further, 
we find ourselves in agreement with Moltmann's (1969:50-51, 
1974a:175) notion that Jesus was not merely raised; he was raised 
as the One who had been abandoned and cast out, the Crucified 
One. The Suffering Servant and the Lamb have given way to the 
High Priest of the New covenant. 
In relation to the theme of freedom from suffering, we must 
raise the question: 'What is the content of the alleged newness 
that the resurrection has achieved'? Put simply: is there really 
anything new for those who still suffer? Of course, what is 
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'new' for humanity as a whole, is also what is new for the group 
who suffer evil. The notion of freedom, though, is not 
immediately meaningful to those who are oppressed. 
We can state without equivocation, that the first thing that 
is new is the resurrected saviour himself. The resurrection 
itself is not verifiable on an historical-empirical level. 
However the resurrected Jesus Christ was very visible and active. 
Prior to the death on the cross, Jesus was the suffering and 
seemingly defeated victim. After his burial and resurrection, 
he appeared as the one who had reversed all the odds against him. 
Christ did not appear merely in relation to himself as the Risen 
One; he appeared in relation to humanity, the Risen One for 
humanity. For those who suffered then and who suffer now, the 
resurrected Christ is also present. 
The Old Covenant (Mosaic) was characterized by repeatable 
sacrifices, blood-shedding, and representation by the high priest 
on behalf of both himself and the nations of Israel (Heb 9:7, 
10:1-4). The New covenant was set up on the basis of a once-for-
all sacrifice to God by the Son himself (Heb 9:26, 10:10,12). 
Further, it was only the shedding of Jesus' blood which 
ultimately atoned for the sinfulness of humanity (Heb 9:11-15, 
10:5-10). The sacrificed Son, the God-Man, rose from the dead 
never to be sacrificed again. In fact, his sacrificial death has 
eternal significance, because Christ is now the priest forever 
after the order of Melchizedek. 
For those who suffer, then, Jesus is the One who has 
suffered before in order to help them confront the reality of 
their own suffering. The resurrection signals the fact that 
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Jesus Christ totally overcame the power of suffering in himself. 
Thus Christ can never be overcome by evil or suffering, nor can 
he be judged again on behalf of those who are victims or 
perpetrators. The saviour, then, has done what had to be done, 
as far as the atonement in relation to evil and suffering is 
concerned. When the Suffering Servant said 'it is finished', he 
was expressing an ontological reality. Therefore, the 
resurrection speaks of this 'new' reality which, in the first 
instance, was fleshed out in Jesus Christ himself. The truth of 
this, of course, brings no physical relief to those who still 
suffer oppression, but it can remove the element of 'affliction'. 
The new situation is that the Risen Christ is the one who had 
absorbed (and still does) human pain into his own story. 
Sufferers are not alone because Christ accompanies them in their 
suffering, giving them succour, and hope that they too will 
overcome. 
If human history and its concomitant pain were taken into 
the Trinity, then the risen Christ is presently empathizing with 
the human predicament of evil and suffering, as the Victor, the 
One who has judged and conquered. It must be stressed, though, 
that Christ's presence is not necessarily a physically liberating 
one, despite the fact that one might argue that it has inspired 
individual Christians to work towards the abolishment of slavery, 
child labour and such like. 
Secondly, the newness resulting from the establishment of 
the New Covenant also includes the element of direct 
accessibility. Under the Old Covenant one could approach the 
presence of Yahweh only via the priestly mediatorship, because 
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one could never enter the Holy of Holies in the Temple. Jesus' 
death and judgement, however, opened up the way for direct 
communion with the Godhead (Heb 10:19-20). We agree with Bruce 
(1964:247-249) that it was the human life of Jesus which was the 
'veil that was rent' for the entry into the 'heavenlies'. The 
writer of Hebrews thus urges us to boldly approach the throne of 
grace on the basis of the One who had known human life, death, 
and victory over Satan and alienation (Heb 2:14-18, 10:19-20). 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann can, indeed, rightly argue for a 
possible mutual identification between victim and Victor. 
Thirdly, substantial forgiveness, (i.e. forgiveness based 
on a completed atonement) is now available. As Robertson 
(1980:284) says: 'The new factor of forgiveness anticipated on 
the New covenant is the once-for-all accomplishment of that 
forgiveness'. In our view, the resurrection indicates the new 
situation of direct access to direct forgiveness. Both victim 
and perpetrator can relate to this in the senses of either 
immediate forgiveness or future judgement. 
Fourthly, a vital aspect of the newness brought in by the 
New Covenant is the coming in of the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom 
of God has of course been the subject of vast debate and instead 
of reproducing arguments in that debate, we will make a few 
observations that bear relevance to our thesis. As Gutierrez 
{1974:168-178) carefully points out, the Kingdom is not human 
history as such, although liberation contributes to its building 
up, and the future kingdom will take into itself past and partial 
victories of human liberations. 
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We believe that the Kingdom is both present (that is, has 
come in with Jesus) and future. The kingdom parables (Matt 13) 
describe the Kingdom in its present growth and in its future 
dimension of coming eschatological judgement. There is a 
dialectical tension between the 'now' and the 'not yet' of the 
Kingdom, a tension which is understood by Ladd (1974:93) to be 
the 'mystery' of the Kingdom, when he writes: 'The mystery of the 
kingdom is the coming of the Kingdom into history in advance of 
its apocalyptic manifestation. It is, in short, "Fulfilment 
without consummation"'. Leon Morris (1986:129) notes: 'In a very 
meaningful sense the kingdom has come because Jesus has come. 
But in an equally meaningful sense the kingdom will come when 
Jesus comes. It is present. It is future'. Jesus is the 
initiator and champion of the kingdom.• 
Moltmann (1975:50-51) speaks of the coming Kingdom in 
connection with the 'coming God'. Against Moltmann, we hold that 
the future, including the future Kingdom and God himself, do not 
come to us via the so-called historical flow, even though we 
agree that the Kingdom has been inaugurated by the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. We agree with Gutierrez, Cone and Mol tmann that 
it is God who brings the Kingdom, not man. As Ladd (1974:103) 
rightly points out: 'Man can sow the seed, but the Kingdom itself 
is God's deed'. Men can reject, receive, enter, serve and do 
much more in relation to the Kingdom, but the Kingdom itself is 
super-natural, and it is God who brings it and offers it. 
Now what does the above discussion mean for the oppressed 
victim? Jesus stated that the Kingdom was in the midst of his 
hearers (Matt 12:28,13), and Paul spoke of the Kingdom as being 
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righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit (Rom 14:17), 
rather than the bickering over what to eat and drink. On the 
vertical level, the Kingdom is for the believers who comprise the 
community or faith, or body of Christ. On the horizontal level, 
one can say that the Kingdom includes or is seen in the 
overcoming of evil and suffering, and the ultimate eschatological 
judgement of them. In our view both the victim and the 
perpetrator must deal with both levels of the kingdom. 
Indeed, the resurrection signalled the inauguration of the 
Kingdom, and this constitutes a situation of newness. But 
something that is not new continues to persist - evil and 
suffering. This is in contradiction to the new situation 
reflected in the risen and victorious Saviour who disarmed the 
powers of evil at the cross. God has judged sin and its 
consequences at the cross. Yet the victim, at least on the 
physical level, still has to say 'the Christ-event has been 
proven powerless to relieve me of my victimization'. The 
objective situation of victory and newness, brought in by the 
resurrection, conflicts with the age-old subjective experience 
of existential evil and suffering. Put simply, the victory seems 
to be asynchronous with reality. 
Yet it remains that the Son of God fully identified with and 
still identifies with the pain of human suffering. This 
identifying Son of God is also the champion, initiator, mediator 
and revealer of the Kingdom of God. However, if the Kingdom of 
God is to be reflected in righteousness and justice, then these 
last two must be expressed in ways other than an historical flow 
of progressive liberation. The victory of the resurrection does 
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not preclude the incarnate suffering of the son nor the present 
suffering of the community of faith and victims in general. This 
suffering occurs because of the ongoing conflict between good and 
evil and it is within this conflict that the kingdom (of 
righteousness and justice) is 'growing up'. 
We find our assertions reflected in Eduard Schweizer' s 
interpretation of Mark 11:12 (the Kingdom being ushered in with 
violence). Schweizer (1975:262) suggests that the 'presence of 
the Kingdom, which was expected to bring victory and triumph and 
the solution to every problem, stands itself under the sign of 
the cross; it means oppression, harassment, suffering'. This 
disquieting view seems to us to fit reality quite well. The 
•violence' of the Kingdom was perpetrated on Jesus himself, and 
his followers will not escape it either. 
For those who unjustly suffer, be they Christian or not, the 
presence of the risen Christ must mean something other than an 
immediate, guaranteed freedom. This is not to say that the 
Christ-event has not created a new situation of freedom, but we 
suggest that freedom might be better understood in terms of 
deliverance from 'affliction' (as Weil understands it) rather 
than immediate physical suffering. This would be in line with 
Konig, who, in Journal of Theology for Southern Africa (nd:55-57) 
talks about a 'theology of comfort'. That is to say, victims can 
draw comfort in the fact that evil and oppression, while 
immediately affecting mankind, do not have the last laugh. Their 
defeat by Jesus will be fully realized, perhaps partially now, 
but fully in the eschaton. The present mediatorial work of the 
resurrected Christ will ensure that. 
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We are not suggesting that historical freedoms, such as 
south Africa's newly-gained liberation, are meaningless. We 
indeed rejoice with black South Africa. However, it remains true 
that blood and violence were part and parcel of removing the 
blood and violence of the previous regime; (this is reminiscent 
of Helda Camara' s 'spiral of violence') . Would God directly 
sanction or work through the very things that the Kingdom stands 
against? It could be argued by non-Christians or non-
religionists that the South African liberation is the result of 
mere human social forces. Whether Christ as 'liberator' is 
behind the South African freedom or not, the stark and stubborn 
reality of suffering in South Africa and elsewhere remains. 
However, the persistence of suffering does not nullify the power 
and significance of the resurrection and the kingdom. 
The situation of newness, fifthly, is seen in the impact of 
the cross and resurrection on the interrelationship between 
creation, history, and the Abrahamic Promise. We have seen in 
earlier chapters how this interrelationship is important for 
Gutierrez and especially for Moltmann, as it directly affects the 
story of human suffering. We concur with Gutierrez and Moltmann 
in these concerns. 
In our view, the cross and resurrection become the focal 
point at which God provides redemption for humanity and creation. 
Paul (Rom 8: 19-23) makes a link between the eschatological 
restoration of creation and the final transformation of the 
believer. 10 We affirm with Kraus that the act of creation has 
never ceased, and it is especially with humankind that God is 
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continually creating his image in humanity. As Kraus (1987:158) 
puts it: 
The incarnation culminating in the cross and resurrection 
reveals to us the way in which God is at work finishing his 
creation. In the face of human failure and evil it is the 
process of vicarious death and resurrection ...• a process 
of re-creation, that is, of reforming the deviant and 
restoring that which has been prostituted by sin. It is 
not a process of discarding the imperfect and beginning 
each time de novo. 
The relationship between Christ and creation is powerful. 
As Quoist (1971:36) says: 'Creation, therefore, is an integral 
part of the Mystery of Christ. Nothing escapes the impact of the 
Event'. We agree with Quoist when he points to the role of 
Christ as Creator (Jn 1:3; Acts 17:28; Col 1:15-17) and, 
especially, to the present creative role of the resurrected 
Christ. Humanity must cooperate with Christ in the ongoing act 
of creation. It is part of being in the image of God. 11 
In our opinion, the cross and resurrection constitute God's 
identity with the human predicament and his creative offer of new 
life. As Finger (1989:409) puts it: 'Thus while the Old 
Testament affirms creation ex-nihilo, the New proclaims that God 
has entered into and arisen from the annihilating nothingness of 
evil and death. It therefore gives greater depth to the 
assertion that "nothing lies beyond God's creative power"' . 12 
The cross and resurrection, together, turned the human story of 
hopelessness and negation into hope and being. 
The full realization of hope and being implies a future 
state, that is, we are not yet rid of conflict and injustice. 
Nevertheless, God's creative power (for the bringing in of 
freedom) works right into the future. The cross and 
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resurrection, by inaugurating the newness of the Kingdom, have 
also established the basis for the future eschatological acting 
and speaking of God. We do not hold that the cross and 
resurrection were catalysts or events through which the future, 
as the future, influences the present, as Moltmann insists. We 
are moving towards the future, but the future is not moving 
'backwards' to us. 
We are of course not denying the notion of our living in a 
dialectical tension between the 'now' and the 'not yet' of the 
future. The future can be said to be here partially or 
proleptically, if we think of it in terms of the Kingdom of God 
which was inaugurated by Jesus Christ. But as we pointed out in 
chapter four, if the future is supposedly influencing the 
present, then, logically, it cannot be an open system based upon 
the 'universal possibilities' of the present. God, of course, 
can be already in the future as he is not subject to time and 
space - although in the incarnation he certainly took upon 
himself human time and space. The cross and resurrection reveal 
the future as they picture future judgement and victory. 
The future we look to is linked to the Abrahamic Promise of 
the past. We understand the Abrahamic promise to foreshadow the 
'proto-evangelium' of Gen 3: 15 and to be fulfilled in the Christ-
event. In Genesis 3:15 we see the promise of conflict between 
the godly line of the 'woman' and the line (or offspring) of the 
'Serpent'. In the cross and resurrection we see the conflict 
between good and evil (Christ and Satan) come to a head. We 
agree with M"Comiskey (1985:191) that the hebrew of Gen 3:15 must 
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refer in the first instance to a corporate offspring but that it 
is still in order to place Jesus Christ here as well. 
The promise (of Gen 3:15) in fact is far reaching. As 
M"Comiskey ( 1985: 191) puts it: 'In that dark day in human 
history, God acted on the basis of promise. The promise did not 
have its inception with Abraham. It figured importantly in the 
beginning of human history. It can be said to span all of 
redemptive history'. For M"Comiskey (1985:185), the category of 
promise indicated a covenant of grace and redemption between God 
and Jesus Christ. If this is the case the link between Abraham 
and Christ is all important. With M"Comiskey, we see the strong 
link in Galatians 3:16-17. Both Abraham and Christ exercise the 
double function of mediator and recipient of the promise. 
For us, the important aspect of the Abrahamic promise is 
that the seed of Abraham would be a 'blessing' to the 'world'. 
Hence we disagree with Gutierrez and Moltmann that the content 
of the promise was primarily a promise of liberation. 
Nevertheless we affirm Gutierrez's notion that Jesus Christ 
universalized the promise. The promise, as it is worked out in 
the New Covenant, is offered to the world. Now we submit that 
the promise does not relate to just one aspect of the human 
predicament (for example, individual alienation from God), but 
rather it relates to every aspect, including human suffering. 
Part of the 'blessing' must surely involve the divine response 
to human pain, as demonstrated in the life, death and 
resurrection of the Suffering Servant. If the Suffering Servant 
mediated the promise in and of itself, then he is the mediator 
between God and all humanity. 
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Brunner (1934:492-493) writes: 
The whole existence of the Mediator consists in making 
Himself one with humanity in its sin and sorrow. The 
Incarnation is no mere gesture; it is reality, stark and 
painful. Jesus drinks the cup of human existence in all 
its alienation from God, to the very dregs. 
We concur with Brunner's emphasis that Jesus particularly 
identified with the underside of society. Also Brunner 
(1934:495-496) reminds us that the Mediator, in his self-
sacrifice and in his bearing of the divine judgement, experienced 
his greatest identification with humanity. This Mediator 
suffered evil in order to confront evil and suffering. 
Now it is the resurrection which validates the mediatorial 
role of Christ. The resurrection speaks of victory, power and 
a future of freedom. Christ's present mediatorship reflects that 
he is the Risen One. Because the cross and resurrection form the 
historical focus of God's identifying with human pain, it follows 
that salvation, or freedom, is by way of the cross and 
resurrection. As we submitted in chapter four, the exodus did 
indeed reveal Yahweh's displeasure against oppression and he did 
liberate the Hebrews. The fact of their liberation, however, did 
nothing to stop them from continuing the phenomenon of oppression 
amongst themselves. It also did nothing to stop their future 
subjugations. There is no factual basis to deduce that God is 
always going to liberate in the same way as he did in the actual 
exodus event. As Yoder (1989:84), correctly points out: 'God 
does not merely "act in history". God acts in history in 
particular ways'. Therefore, God is always free to act in 
whatever way he chooses, but the prime act of freedom has taken 
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place in the cross and resurrection, and Jesus Christ was the 
prime Actor. 
To be sure, the exodus demonstrated God's concern for 
justice as well as his faithfulness to his covenant relationship 
with the Israelites. However, the cross and resurrection 
likewise demonstrate God's concern for human suffering as well 
as his faithfulness to the people. We agree with Kee (1978:106-
108) that suffering is not so easily removed. The promise of 
historical freedom can lead to despair if it does not 
materialise. But personal (psychological, emotional and 
spiritual) freedom is attainable no matter what the 
circumstances. This is because of the 'paradox of freedom' . For 
Kee (1978:107), Christian faith 'is not based on Exodus but on 
that more subtle combination of Calvary-and-Easter'. Needless 
to say, we are not down-playing the need of, and the call for, 
social liberation. 
4. IDENTITY WITH THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUFFERING 
Jesus Christ did not simply act and speak merely to help 
humanity and especially the victims of evil. We follow 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann in their insistence that humankind 
must respond to the Christ-event. This response includes the 
doing of justice. 
4.1 The Mandate To Do Justice 
In our view, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ was the 
greatest injustice in human history, even though we pointed to 
the voluntary nature of Jesus' actions. Jesus was not a 
masochist and therefore his tormentors are still guilty of their 
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actions. As the cross and resurrection were for us, it now 
places a special responsibility on humanity, namely, we are to 
do justice. We are not simply saying that we must do justice out 
of sympathy or solidarity with the oppressed. That idea should 
surely be seen as a given if we are serious about our 
responsibility as bearers of the 'imago Dei'. Rather, we are 
especially held responsible for working for justice because 
injustice has happened to the incarnate Son of God. 
As we affirmed in chapter four, the parable of the sheep and 
goats (Matt 15:31-46) is significant as far as God's expectations 
of us are concerned. With Gutierrez (1974:167, 1983:14), we take 
the 'least of these my brethren' to mean the oppressed or poor, 
be they believers or not. Sider (1989:97-98) asserts that one 
is no believer if one neglects the poor and oppressed. One can, 
of course, seek forgiveness, but Sider ( 1989: 98) poignantly 
points out: 'there comes a point -- and, thank God, God alone 
knows where! when neglect of the poor is no longer forgiven. 
It is punished. Eternally'. 
Why such divine anger (Matt 25:41) at the neglect of the 
poor? The parable asserts plainly that this neglect means 
neglect of Christ himself. Even then, this could be interpreted 
to mean mere disobedience to a command to love our neighbour. 
But if the assertions of the parable about the treatment of the 
risen Christ are related to the meaning of the Christ-event 
itself it becomes a different matter. If the Son of God 
existentially identified with those who suffer when he was in the 
world, then the cross and resurrection lead to a continuing 
identification today. Because God became incarnate in order, 
inter alia, 
suffering, 
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to confront and resolve the injustice of human 
the mistreatment of the poor today leads to the 
mistreatment of Christ. 
We are not advocating an ontological identity between the 
risen Christ and the oppressed in history. Yet in some way there 
must be a real identity because Jesus indicated that our entrance 
into the eternal life is dependent on how both he and the poor 
are treated in the same instance. Barclay (1958:360) interprets 
the Christ - poor relationship symbolically by using the analogy 
of a human father and son. If we wish to impress a father, then 
treat his own children well. However literally or symbolically 
we treat the parable, one thing remains, namely, how we treat 
Christ is manifested by the way we treat the poor. 
The mandate to do justice is for all people, especially 
those who perpetrate injustice through deliberate or indifferent 
actions. In this sense we appreciate Moltmann's stress on the 
equal responsibility of both perpetrators and victims. As far 
as the parable is concerned, one's lack of compassion is taken 
seriously by God. As Tasker (1961:239) puts it: 'it is not so 
much positive wrong-doing that evokes the severest censure, as 
the utter failure to do good'. With Gutierrez and Holtmann we 
affirm that 'doing good' includes the doing of justice along with 
responsible and creative stewardship of the environment. This 
is continuing the work of Christ and, as such, is not a hopeless 
participation in godless humanistic or utopia efforts. 
While we must do our part, this does not mean that we are 
to do God's work for him. As Childs (1992:408), in response to 
Holtmann, points out, there is danger in 'assuming an easy 
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continuity between divine and human liberation'. The sovereignty 
of God with regards to the coming in of the new creation or new 
age, cannot be contingent upon human responsibility. But human 
responsibility there is, a responsibility which constantly needs 
eschatological hope. Although already defeated, evil and 
suffering remain formidable foes. Our responsibility, as Paget-
Wilkes (1981:138) notes 'involves recognizing the cosmic nature 
of evil and working for its total overthrow'. Haight (1985:96) 
strongly emphasizes that human history is God's. The problem of 
this history, that is, the history of human suffering, points to 
our irresponsibility as co-creators with God. We qre called upon 
to be responsible, to properly exercise our role as the image of 
God in human existence. 
Obviously God wants all people to live justly. This applies 
especially to Christians, that is, the spiritual descendants of 
Abraham. We pointed out in chapter four that Gutierrez, cone and 
Moltmann would argue strongly for the personal dimension of 
liberation. Blacks are called upon to enter into personal and 
liberating communion with the Black Christ. Victims of social, 
economic and political oppression are encouraged to personally 
unite with the liberating Christ. Where necessary, repentance 
is called for, from both perpetrator and victim. Our own view 
is that any attempt to seek freedom from suffering is ultimately 
meaningless if one does not also seek personal salvation. Thus, 
the concept of the poor as 'anonymous Christians' is unacceptable 
to us. But whatever one thinks about the relationship between 
personal salvation and personal freedom from suffering, the 
mandate to do justice still remains. 
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4.2 Hope and Suffering 
We have been emphasizing that what happened to Jesus Christ 
is the reason for the justice-mandate. It would follow, then, 
that we would place supreme responsibility on the redeemed 
community of faith to exercise justice. While God would want all 
people to oppose unjust suffering, he would surely want obedience 
from those who follow the Christ who suffered. We agree with 
Gutierrez (1976:66, 1983:20, 1984:95-106, 1990b:56) who includes 
in the idea of conversion the basic element of solidarity with 
the oppressed. 
The challenge to do justice goes hand in hand with the 
exhortation to have hope. Why so much emphasis on hope? Why did 
Moltmann have to compose a 'theology of hope'? We would submit 
that it was because of the magnitude of evil and unjust suffering 
that still exist nearly two thousand years after the Christ-
event. The cry for freedom is as loud as ever. 13 Are the cross 
and resurrection a cause for despair because in reality they have 
failed to bring significant universal liberation or freedom from 
actual suffering? Or are they a reason for hope because the 
resurrected Christ, who was himself a victim but is now present 
with today's victims, can justly deal with injustice? Rather 
than the 'death of God', we can have the 'hope of God'. 
The church is to be seen as a community of faith with hope. 
It is to be seen as a redeemed community of freedom and rejoicing 
(Moltmann 1973:86-87). Furthermore it is to expect opposition 
from Satan and the kingdom of evil, especially in the 
confrontation with the powers that be. We concur with Gutierrez, 
cone and Moltmann that those who participate in the struggle 
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against evil and suffering will in fact experience redemptive 
suffering. similarly, we support Buthelezi's (1976:179-180) 
sharp distinction between oppressive and redemptive suffering. 
The suffering of both conscientized victim and supporter may 
be seen as redemptive in the light of the redemptive mediatorship 
of the Risen Crucified One. Only Christ is mediator. One may 
ask why anyone should suffer redemptively in the first place, 
especially if Jesus has already suffered at the cross. We wish 
to offer two answers. First, our suffering makes us to share and 
complete the suffering of Jesus Christ, who is the redeemer (1 
Pet 4:12-19). In our view, the parable of the sheep and goats 
indicates a dialectical relationship between Christ and the 
victim. Both Christ and victim are engaged in the battle against 
evil. 
Harvey Cox (1969:90) offers the view that the Bible is 
itself a 'theology of Resurrection'. Cox argues that Christians 
are to share in Jesus' death, as if the crucifixion, in relation 
to suffering, is ongoing. In fact, we might best show our 
'baptism' by entering into 'solidarity with the suffering and 
exploited of the world' (ibid). While we think cox was over-
secularizing the Christian faith, we would affirm his emphasis 
of our sharing in the suffering of Jesus for the sake of the 
victim. 
result. 
At the very least, the resurrection of hope would 
Fortunately for Christians, the very reality of the 
crucified and risen Mediator brings hope. With Pannenberg 
(1968:263), we advocate that hope exists because of the prior 
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vicarious suffering of Jesus. The Christ-event, along with the 
effect of the presence of the Risen Christ today, points to the 
victory of hope and ultimate victory over evil. 
Widyatmadja (1978:147) insists that every struggle entails 
suffering, but, 'where there is struggle, there is hope. Hope 
is something we don't reach yet'. According to Widyatmadja, who 
writes for Asian liberation, there 'is no resurrection without 
the cross and death of Jesus Christ'. 
Secondly, we suffer simply because the confrontation between 
good and evil, peace and suffering, constitutes confrontation. 
Only when the 'not yet' of the New Age is fully consummated 
(arrived) will this confrontation cease. 
Hendrikus Berkhof (1966: 175-177) argues that the cross 
stands at the centre of history whereas the resurrection bears 
relation more to the consummation of history. Nevertheless the 
'cross and resurrection are both together the secret of history' . 
Furthermore, Berkhof (1966:174) argues for a positive attitude 
on the part of the church despite the evil surrounding it. 14 
With Berkhof, we must insist that God is not distant and 
powerless in this present age. Rather, God is 'blessing' the 
world. 
As Zimmerli (1971:50) maintains, the curse upon the world 
comprised death, that is, 'loss of future and hopelessness'. 
However, the Abrahamic blessing comprises 'life, future, and 
hope'. Gutierrez and Moltmann concur with Zimmerli here, even 
though their understanding of 'liberation' might differ. The 
blessing was of course brought in by the atonement. Perry Yoder 
(1987:69) insists that the atonement should drive us to struggle 
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for shalom. To be sure, the struggle entails confrontation with 
oppressive forces of evil. However, Yoder (1987:69) opines that 
'rather than despair, the cross is the harbinger of hope that our 
struggle for God's shalom will one day bear fruit ••. ' We would 
emphasize that it is the victory of the resurrection that makes 
it possible to interpret the cross in this way. For the black 
situation, Moyd (1979:146-147) points us to the black Christian 
understanding of the resurrection of Christ as causing an ongoing 
resurrection in the life of the black person. This includes 
resurrection 'from the circumstances of human oppression'. It 
is an experience of victory. 
4.3 The Final Vindication 
If the cross and resurrection inaugurated the New Age (a la 
Moltmann and Gutierrez) then the consummation of the New Age will 
be realized by the historical return of Jesus Christ. At the 
cross, Jesus was the suffering, substitutionary Lamb. In his 
return, Jesus Christ will be the powerful and triumphant Lamb. 
According to Revelation 5:1-14, it is the cross which creates the 
Lamb's greatness, not his 'essential being', as Mounce (1977:148) 
points out. The Apocalyptic Lamb alone will have earned the 
right to culminate our eschatological redemption and execute 
judgement. The Suffering Servant will return as the victorious 
and vindicated Lord. 
For those who suffer 15 , especially Christians, the 
experience of Christ would be meaningless if it could not somehow 
touch their own lives. Fortunately the reverse is true; the 
victim and supporter can in the meantime struggle against evil 
in hope confident that the eschaton will vindicate their hope, 
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and will bear out their present trust in the victorious Christ. 
The future of freedom, inaugurated and pictured in the cross and 
resurrection, will become the present of freedom. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Firstly, one might say that God cannot stop oppression anyway, 
even if he wanted to. The most obvious objection to this would 
be the fact of God's omnipotence and providence through which God 
can and does do anything he wants to in his own creation. One 
could argue that God has given mankind absolute freedom of will, 
in order to promote human creativity. Thus God is forced to 
allow the practise of evil and oppression; man has freely fallen 
so to speak. We would reply, however, that the Christ-event 
(cross and resurrection) would then bear little relationship to 
the historical problem of oppression. The identifying suffering 
and judgement of Jesus on the cross was, inter alia the 
culmination of God's confrontation with the evil or oppression. 
The victory that Jesus realized was at least to say 'No' to the 
sin of human oppression. 
Secondly, one could maintain that God actually does not care 
about human suffering, and that we would be quite wrong to assume 
that the cross and resurrection have any bearing here. We would 
reply by pointing out that the whole incarnation event, from the 
birth of Jesus to his ascension, belies any possible divine 
indifference. If the Son of God goes to the trouble of adopting 
humanness, then he is at the very least concerned about humanity 
for its own sake. Why would Jesus willingly identify and suffer 
with and for us if God does not care? It is clear to us that a 
divine concern for justice was evident in the dying and rising 
of Jesus, whether there is a 'project of freedom' (Cone) or not. 
One could advocate, thirdly, that God is indeed concerned 
about human suffering, but for some reason or other is moving 
very slowly, putting much of the liberative responsibility upon 
the victims themselves. We would argue, however, that generally 
speaking the story of evil and pain seems as unbearable as it 
ever was. If the cross and resurrection did indeed establish an 
historical process of freedom, as our authors claim, then surely 
the bulk of liberative responsibility would fall upon God, rather 
than the victim. If the Son of God would choose to undergo 
suffering and victory for the poor or weak, he would surely see 
it through to its logical 'historical' conclusion. Even with the 
victim being called to participate in his or her own freedom, the 
resurrected Christ would now be bringing about universal freedom. 
But would he be doing it so slowly? If one is called upon to 
exercise faith in a coming freedom (Moltmann and Cone), then this 
call is tantamount to admitting that freedom is not obviously at 
large. The concept of the liberating presence of Christ becomes 
something that is difficult to accept. 
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Fourthly, one could sidestep the problem of suffering and 
simply say that God has bigger concerns at heart, and that 
suffering and evil will be dealt with at the eschaton (second 
coming of Christ) anyway. Our concern here is twofold. In our 
view, the revelation of God in word (prophets, Jesus, apostles) 
and deed (exodus, life of Jesus) makes it quite clear that God 
is affected by human suffering and evil. Also, if we deny that 
God is disturbed by evil and oppression, we make the Christ -
event meaningless here. We advocate that even if one rejects the 
notion of a programme of liberation, one can still maintain that 
God desires social justice, and that the crucified Jesus 
demonstrated an option for the poor. At the very least, the 
cross and resurrection give cause for hope that evil will be 
judged. There can still be mutual identification between Lord 
and victim. 
2. Obviously we are not presuming to speak for victims. They 
should be their own interlocutors. Our discussion is based upon, 
and related to, what Gutierrez, cone and Moltmann have to say. 
3. We are aware of the vast debate that exists concerning the 
nature of the incarnation, including the 'Godness' and 'Manness' 
of Jesus. For the purposes of this thesis, we are following the 
traditional Chalcedonian approach in reference to the full deity 
and humanity of the historical Jesus. However, we are cognizant 
of the limitations of Chalcedon and also strongly affirm the 
notion that the 'God' of the God-Man could suffer to the same 
degree as the 'Man' of the God-Man. We are dealing with a single 
personality in Jesus. For a good critical survey of the many 
views on the incarnation, see Millard Erickson's The Word Became 
Flesh (1991, Baker Book House). 
4. We hold to the 'historicity' of God the Son as Jesus, the so-
called quest for the historical Jesus notwithstanding. It is 
important for our thesis that Jesus was both God and Man, as over 
against the pictures of Jesus as seen in Nestorianism, 
Gnosticism, Eutychianism and such like. 
5. See Erickson (1983:648-652) for a good summary discussion of 
'powers' and Jesus' relationship to them. We would certainly 
submit that Satan is behind the 'powers' that oppress. To be 
sure, Berkhoff (Christ and the Powers, 1977) has argued for the 
powers (exousiai) as being an invisible background of 
'instruments' created to operate for mankind's existence and 
service to God. These powers, as reflected in human 
institutions, can be used for good or evil. In our view, Satan 
and his 'powers', or fallen angelic beings, exert influence in 
human powers. Paul, in Eph 6:12, seems to be arguing that the 
believer is involved in spiritual warfare even before human 
warfare. 
6. The biblical testimony (Matt 8:28-34; Lk 4:13; Jn 13:2,26-27) 
points to a continual confrontation between Satan, his demons, 
and Jesus, so much so, that Gustaf Aulen developed the classical 
motif of the atonement. For Aulen this became the Christus 
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Victor motif. (We will be looking at Jesus' victory over Satan 
later on). Satan attempted to destroy the messianic mission of 
Jesus through the classical wilderness temptations (Matt 4:1-10; 
Lk 4:1-13). We are not going to enter the classical 'pecare non 
potui t' or 'potui t non pecare' debate concerning Jesus here. 
What is of importance to us is that one of Satan's motives was 
to tempt Jesus away from the path of suffering. Jesus was asked 
to immediately and effortlessly satiate his hunger, leap off the 
Temple and be spectacularly rescued by angels, and accept all the 
wealth and power the world could offer. 
If Satan had succeeded, Jesus would have lost his messianic-
liberative credibility, so to speak. He would not have been in 
the position to identify with the poor and weak of the world, and 
would have had no authority over Satan. We believe Jesus could 
have sinned, although he was not bound to. Whatever the truth 
on the peccability issue, Jesus, we believe, was continually in 
battle with evil (sin) and Satan. We agree with Nels Ferre 
(1976:305) when he says: 'Enhypostasia, nevertheless, stands for 
the solid fact that in spite of all victories and even 
transfiguration experiences the struggle remained through the 
wilderness temptations, Gethsemane and until his dying cry of 
desertion by God'. 
7. Finger (1989:163) makes an interesting point concerning the 
personality of the powers. He asserts that the powers, which 
wish to make humans less personal, cannot be personal, as only 
God is fully personal. Finger says that the powers cannot be 
fully rational, because 'evil involves an intrinsic 
irrationality'. However, the powers are not merely impersonal 
forces, as evil shows a definite pattern of intentionality. In 
this way the powers can exercise a strong (if hidden) domination 
over human behaviour, ideologies and ins ti tut ions. We would 
maintain, however, that even fully impersonal powers could be 
used by personal beings. 
8. We are aware of the vast debate over the physical reality and 
nature of the resurrection of Jesus . Our position, which we do 
not have space to defend, is that Jesus did rise bodily and 
spiritually. 
9. Beasley-Murray (1986:145-146) presents his idea (with which 
we concur) of the relationship between Jesus and the Kingdom as 
follows: (1) Jesus is the Champion or Contender who has 
conquered Satan and evil (parable of the Strong Man. Mk 3:27). 
(2) Jesus is the Initiator of the Kingdom, following on from the 
ministry of John the Baptist. (3) Jesus is the powerful 
Instrument of the Kingdom, this being seen for example in the 
exorcism saying of Matt 12:28. (4) Jesus is also the 
Representative of the Kingdom (Lk 17:20-21). (5) Jesus is the 
Mediator of the Kingdom, as seen in the parable of the Bridegroom 
and his friends (Mk 2:18-19). Jesus, that is, mediates the royal 
fellowship of the impending wedding feast, and also brings 
healing and transfiguring powers (Matt 11:5). (6) Finally, Jesus 
is the Revealer of the Kingdom (Matt 11:25-26, 13:16-17; Mark 
4:11-12; Lk 10:21-22). Beasley-Murray (1986:146) agrees with 
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Fuchs in seeing Jesus assuming the ways of God in the parables 
of the Lost Sheep, the Lost coin and the Prodigal Son. 
10. Now if both the natural creation and believers await their 
final 'adoption', then this means that the overall process of 
freedom is not yet completed, both on a corporate and individual 
level. In our view, the 'historical' process of freedom can be 
understood as a series of separate though interlinked events, 
rather than a liberating flow as such. These events would 
include inter alia creation, judgement and the fall, incarnation, 
the cross and resurrection and the eschaton. The community of 
faith are the beneficiaries of these events. This is not to 
ignore the growing up of the Kingdom of God which itself contains 
or is manifested in (Gutierrez) the historical events of freedom. 
11. As creator, then, Christ has to do with both the physical 
creation and humanity. To be sure, Yahweh's 'curse' on creation 
at the fall of humanity implies a link between humanity and its 
environment. The presence of evil and suffering affects both 
humankind and nature. We fully affirm Moltmann's concern over 
the 'vicious circle' of humanity's violation of nature and the 
environment. The cross and resurrection affect both mankind and 
creation as far as evil and its defeat are concerned. 
Finger (1985:408-411) reminds us of the interlinkage in the 
Old Testament between the concept of creation and divine 
intervention in human history. The power of Yahweh displayed in 
the exodus was seen as creative power. Finger (1989:409) points 
out how Israel developed its faith in Yahweh as creator in the 
light of its exodus deliverance. This theme continues in the 
prophetic period in which Yahweh's creativity was seen in both 
the exodus and in deliverance from the exile. Israel could have 
faith in a God who was able to deliver her from suffering and 
evil. This was the God who created ex-nihilo. (cf Moltmann 
1969: 106.) The New Testament further develops the theme of 
creation, both in physical terms and redemptive terms. 
Redemptively, this is seen for example in the teaching that 
Christ is the Last Adam, who works with the Spirit from above (Jn 
3:3-8; Rom 8:9; 1 Cor 15:45-49) in bringing 'new life' to those 
who would accept it. In 2 Corinthians 5:17, of course, we read 
of Christians being described as a 'new creation'. We affirm, 
with Finger (1989:412) that our faith in redemptive creation is 
based on 'Jesus' struggle with the forces of evil, through which 
the "Author of life" was actually killed (Acts 3:15)'. 
12. We affirm the teaching that mankind has been given the 
'creative mandate' (Gen 1:26-28) in which we are to be faithful 
stewards of the earth. The fall of the race meant also the 
failure of the stewardship responsibility. We follow Cranfield 
(1985:196) who argues that Paul, in Romans 8:20-21, is teaching 
that 'the sub-human creation has been subjected to the 
frustration of not being able properly to fulfil the purpose of 
its existence, God having appointed that without man it should 
not be made perfect'. Liberation is then for the sub-human 
creation (that is from decay and death) as well as for human 
being. 
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13. Juan Hernandez Pico {1985:49) makes an interesting 
observation here. He observes that the Israelites cried out for 
freedom, quite understandably. However, the text does not say 
that they cried out to God: 
Theirs was simply the cry of the struggle for life against 
the threat of death, not in a confrontation with nature, 
but in the confrontation that takes place in history 
between intolerable social conditions created or ratified 
by human beings and the determination of human freedom to 
change such conditions. 
Pico adds that Yahweh heard their call anyway. 
14. In discussing the theology of spirituality and justice, 
Donal Dorr (1984:230-235) speaks of the value of prayer in a 
situation of evil and suffering. One can pray in desperation 
because of evil and what has to be done (like Jesus in 
Gethsemane), and one can pray in freedom of spirit, with a 
positive trust in the competence of God. In actuality, 
liberating prayer would be paradoxical, containing both the 
elements of desperation and freedom. 
15. We note with interest the Jewish contribution to the whole 
discussion of liberation. Marc Ellis, in Toward a Jewish 
Theology of Liberation (1987), argues for a responsible holistic 
liberation. The call is for faith and hope to move beyond the 
devastating impact of the holocaust. Ellis feels that Jew and 
Christian share a common responsibility in bringing about 
freedom. In a similar vein, Rabbi Dan Cohn~sherbok, in on Earth 
as it is in Heaven : Jews, Christians and Liberation Theology 
(1987) advocates a common bond between Jews and Christians on the 
peace and justice issue. Cohn-Sherbok places more value on the 
paradigmatic nature of the exodus than does Ellis. Like Ellis, 
Cohn-Sherbok feels both Jew and Christian share a common hope for 
liberation. 
CONCLUSION 
We will begin by asking ourselves just how our thesis of 
'Christ as Vindicated Judge', in relation to human suffering, 
applies to Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann. Of course we have 
already been doing this to some extent but now we need to 
summarize our position. The issue has been whether the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ have actually set up an 
historical flow of liberation from physical oppression. We must 
be careful to state yet again that Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann 
are not advocating a magical disappearance of evil and 
oppression. After all, we are called to participate in a 
s~ruggle for freedom. Yet Gutierrez, cone and Moltmann still 
talk about an historical movement or flow of liberation, as being 
the primary work of God, and which was focused in the life, death 
and resurrection of Jesus. 
Concerning the poor and socially oppressed, then, we have 
proposed the following points. Firstly, the Trinity is indeed 
inherently active against evil and its expression in the many 
types of oppression. Accordingly, we have no argument with 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann on the notion that God has opted for 
the 'poor' or oppressed. What we have done is to modify the 
notion to 'divine option for justice'. 
Secondly, 
liberation of 
the Trinity does indeed desire the freedom or 
the victim from evil and the oppressive 
consequences of sin, be it spiritual or physical. The 'pie-in-
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the-sky' gospel has no place in the multidimensional message of 
the Bible. However, what God wants for humanity and what we 
actually do can be two totally different stories. God never 
wanted evil and oppression to occur in the human story, but here 
they are. To put it differently, God has allowed sinful mankind 
to suffer from its own evil consequences, more often than not, 
to reap what it has sown (Rom 1-3). Human free agency has made 
humanity unfree. 
Thirdly, the victim of oppression can identify with the 
historical experience of Jesus Christ and thus with Jesus Christ 
himself. Similarly, Christ can now identify with the victim of 
today (Matt 25:31-46). Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann sometimes 
refer to this as the Christo-presence. Thus we would agree with 
Gutierrez when he advocates a unity or communication between the 
socially oppressed and Christ. Similarly, we would agree with 
Cone when he calls for a mutual identity between oppressed blacks 
and the 'black' Christ. Also, we concur with Moltmann when he 
calls for identity between the weak, the powerless, and Christ. 
These first three points have been expressed in God's 
revelatory activities in the human story (exodus, prophets) and 
fleshed out in the historical life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus. Agreeing with Cone to some extent, we have been arguing 
in this thesis that the identifying experience of Jesus is the 
'hermeneutical key' to understanding the relation between 
suffering and the cross and resurrection. With Weber (1979:195) 
we maintain that Jesus Christ identified with the human problem 
of suffering, separated himself from the powers of evil, and 
began the transformation of the human story. This transformation 
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is in process, although not in the sense of a 'liberating flow 
of history'. The human story awaits the ultimate event of 
transformation, that is, the second advent. 
This brings us to a fourth point, namely, God can and has 
redemptively or liberatively intervened in the human story. We 
have proposed, with Moltmann, that the human story, including the 
story of suffering, has been taken into the divine trinitarian 
story. In this way God has creatively identified with us and our 
problems, and has overcome them through the cross and 
resurrection. Evil and suffering still persist, but they do not 
have the last word on human history; the time will come when they 
will no longer be there. The ultimate end of evil will occur 
because God has suffered it for us and will speak the last at the 
eschaton. We strongly affirm Moltmann's position that God is 
able to suffer as a Triune God. Paul's claim (Ac 17:28) that 'we 
live and move and have our being' in God takes on deeper meaning, 
because our suffering can be God's suffering. 
Fifthly, however, liberation in our view would mean divine 
deliverance from existential evil and oppression as well as the 
progressive negation of them. However, the sheer weight of 
suffering that stubbornly pertains to the human situation does 
not speak to us of a specifically politically liberating God. 
But it speaks to us of a God who wants liberation. There is no 
contradiction here. The four-fold level of identification that 
Jesus Christ has with humanity, in relation to suffering, speaks 
of a God who is anything but indifferent. This same God calls 
for a justice-praxis on the part of the Church and individual 
believers. Both perpetrators and victims need to be 
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conscientized against evil and oppressive suffering. We can 
therefore speak of a God who is vindicated in his judgement on 
the unjust. It should be made clear that we are not denying the 
possibility of liberation in the mental, psychological or 
'spiritual' dimensions of anyone who might continue to be a 
political or social victim. 
Gutierrez (1990a:211) speaks of Christ as he who liberates 
us from sin, thereby liberating us from the 'very root of social 
injustice'. We have been suggesting, however, that sin and sin-
caused injustice seem fated to confront humanity until the 
eschaton - partial historical liberations notwithstanding. God 
calls us to do justice and judges us if we disobey. The Christ-
event (itself a divine act of justice) is the basis for this call 
and possible judgement. 
In chapter five we emphasized the centrality of the Christ-
event. While not denying the revelatory significance of the 
exodus liberation, we nevertheless advocated the 'way of the 
cross'. To be sure, the exodus reveals a God who is faithful to 
his promises, who desires freedom for men, and who owns and 
ensures a free future (Ela 1986:33-35). Exactly how God brings 
this about has been the subject of much theological discussion 
and debate. our contention has been that the great event or 
mechanism of liberation is the cross and resurrection. These 
last two do not promise existential freedom from suffering this 
side of the eschaton, but they do offer hope of freedom even in 
suffering. 
Jesus, in his identification, suffering, death, and 
resurrection, achieved victory for himself as well as for us. 
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In this we fully agree with Gutierrez, Cone and Holtmann. Our 
difference has been in the extent to which the victory is worked 
out in real life. If the cross and resurrection were meant to 
eradicate evil, especially sin-caused suffering or oppression, 
then we have a failure on our hands. This failure is not 
lessened by the risky call for the victim's participation in his 
or her own destiny. 
The on-going and extensive presence of evil and suffering 
may seem to call into question any victory achieved at calvary 
and the tomb as far as freedom from suffering is concerned. 
However, if victory is synonymous with freedom or liberation in 
at least the mental, psychological and spiritual dimensions of 
one's existence, then one can say that the cross and resurrection 
did achieve the goals of God. The call to do justice, on the 
basis of the work of Jesus Christ, is one of those goals. 
Indeed, the defeat of Satan and the powers motivates us to do 
justice. 
As we have stressed, in chapter five, just as Jesus 
fulfilled the role of Suffering Servant and Sacrificial Lamb, in 
his four-fold identification with us, so we should be prepared 
to suffer and sacrifice in our obedience to God. We are, of 
course, talking about redemptive suffering, not the meek 
apathetic acceptance of oppressive suffering. Berryman 
(1984:391), writing in the Central American context, refers to 
Oscar Romero's idea of combining sacrifice with struggle on the 
basis of the death and resurrection of Jesus when he has Romero 
saying: 
all those who have offered up their life, their heroism, 
their sacrifice - if they have really offered it with a 
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sincere desire to give true liberty and dignity to our 
people are incorporating themselves into the great 
sacrifice of Christ. 
We would not be as expansive as Romero who applies this sentiment 
to any Salvadoran who participates in the struggle for freedom. 
He is similar to Gutierrez in this approach. But we would affirm 
the general idea of participating in the work of Christ. It 
becomes all the more meaningful if one is already a believer in 
Christ. 
It is possible, then, to have hope in the midst of evil and 
suffering. We are indebted to Holtmann for his emphasis on this 
idea. The socially weak and marginalized can have hope for an 
equitable future. The racially oppressed can have hope that the 
identifying Christ will ultimately bring in universal solidarity. 
We all can have hope that, at least in the eschatological future, 
there will be no environmental mismanagement. The hope for the 
future, then, can influence the experience of the present. 
Furthermore, rather than encouraging a 'pie-in-the-sky-when-you-
die' gospel, the idea of hope should motivate both victim and 
perpetrator to seek justice now. We have a basis for faith and 
hope in the midst of suffering. Because Christ has identified 
himself with us, our faith and hope relate directly back to the 
cross and resurrection. Our obedience in doing justice is 
couched in faith and hope, causing us to have confidence in the 
God of freedom. There is no need for despair as such. 
Mary O'Driscoll (1984:105), following Populorum Progressio, 
advocates that efforts towards justice parallel the 'paschal 
mystery' of Jesus Christ, and comments: 'In the light of this, 
we can say that despair is the worst sin. To despair, means not 
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giving credit to God anymore'. Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann 
speak against despair and argue for hope. The victim can rise 
above the 'state of affliction'. We have emphasized that the 
second coming of Christ will usher in the victory achieved in the 
incarnation of God the Son. It will also once and for all 
eradicate evil and suffering. 
We also agreed with Gutierrez and Moltmann that Jesus 
fulfilled the Abrahamic Promise, and that this promise benefits 
us today because of what happened to and through Jesus in the 
event of the cross and resurrection. Our insistence has been 
that the promise is broader than a promise of liberation; it 
relates also to the need for personal salvation. 
Our overall contention has been that the theologies of 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann promise more than the gospel could 
deliver. It is one thing to maintain that God has demonstrated 
his preferential option for the poor through the exodus and the 
event of Jesus Christ. It is another thing to advocate that the 
cross and resurrection happened primarily to confront the problem 
of oppressive suffering, and that the cross and resurrection were 
part and parcel of an ongoing historical flow of liberation. 
We wish to concede that there might be possible objections 
to our thesis. Firstly, some may argue that to disallow an 
actual programme of liberation on God's part would in fact lessen 
the incentive for victims to struggle for freedom. Would it not 
be better if victims were invited to participate in a real 
divinely orchestrated liberative programme? It would be like an 
athlete actually running in a race rather than merely watching 
it or contemplating the possibility of such a race. We see 
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validity in the criticism. However, it still remains true that 
God, in Jesus, encountered and overcame evil and suffering. 
Whether or not we are guaranteed the subjective overcoming of 
suffering along with the experience of physical freedom does not 
alter the objective reality of Christ's victory for us. The 
existential experience of suffering does not negate the objective 
achievement of the Christ-event. Therefore it is reasonable and 
logical for the risen Christ to call us to do justice, thereby 
appropriating subjectively what Christ has objectively 
accomplished for humanity. 
A second criticism, from evangelicals,might be that we have 
not properly dealt with the relation between the ethics of 
freedom and the faith of salvation. w.e have in fact maintained 
our position of a legal (forensic) element in the atonement as 
well as the need for personal salvation. Nevertheless, we would 
state that our main concern in this thesis had been the problem 
of suffering and its connection with the theme of liberation. 
It has been stressed that the pain of suffering is surely the 
same for believers (in Christ) and non-believers. In fact it 
could be worse for believers, as their so-called liberating God 
may not be seen to be doing much liberating. We have emphasized, 
however, that God would oppose the oppression of any victim. God 
is by definition a God of justice. The cross and resurrection 
are the basis for this. Likewise, the call to do justice applies 
to everybody, be they victims or perpetrators, Christians or non-
Christians, religious or non-religious. our personal 
understanding of faith-salvation does not have to (and we do not 
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intend it to be) confused with any ethical demand God might make 
on mankind as a whole. 
A third criticism, from liberation theologians, might be 
that we have confused the issue of freedom by insisting that even 
victims need personal salvation (vertically) for any horizontal 
freedom to be ultimately meaningful. Our reply would be 
virtually the same as our response to the evangelical criticism. 
We would give a reminder, however, that in this thesis we have 
affirmed the distinction between mankind's horizontal 
responsibilities before others and his vertical responsibility 
before God. However, our difference with Moltmann and especially 
Gutierrez and Cone has been our insistence that there is a 
forensic element in the holistic atonement, as over against a 
purely liberation or deliverance approach. This has caused us 
to advocate a call for freedom and justice, but only on the basis 
of the prior, and ultimate need of personal salvation for every 
human being. 
A fourth criticism will be that we have been 'Barthian', and 
thus too Christo-centric. We still stand by our thesis and 
remain indebted to Cone and Moltmann for the idea that God takes 
our suffering in a deeply personal way. Whatever 'infinite 
qualitative distance' there might be between God as Creator and 
us as creatures, the possibility of intimate union between the 
divine and human person still remains. For us, the cross and 
resurrection indicate that Jesus was/is the hermeneutical key to 
interpretation of both reality and our experience, because of his 
entry into, and direct assumption of, our humanness. 
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In our view, the strength of our thesis lies firstly in the 
fact that it has realistically accepted that evil and the 
consequence of suffering are here to stay until the 
eschatological return of Christ. To be sure, Jesus overcame evil 
in his death and resurrection. His overcoming of evil, however, 
does not necessarily imply the absence of evil, especially if 
'evil' is located in the acts and intentions of persons. The 
possibilities of evil and oppression exist as long as people and 
Satan exist on this side of the eschaton. 
Gutierrez, Cone and Moltmann do not by any means down-play 
the power and impact of evil and its consequences, even if they 
do not hold to a real Satan. However, the advocacy of an 
historical flow of liberation implies, at the least, a decrease 
in the presence and influence of evil and oppression. In our 
view, however, one sees instead the persistence of evil and sin-
caused suffering which remain concretely experienced by many 
people. The victim does not have to become disillusioned in the 
Liberator Christ or think that the cross and resurrection have 
in reality 
suffering. 
done precious little in relation to his actual 
Knowing that God is for justice, the victim can still 
hope and take courage because Christ identifies with his or her 
pain. This brings us to what we consider is a second 
contribution of our thesis. We have seen that Cone, Gutierrez 
and Moltmann claim that God judged oppression, as a concrete act 
of sin, through the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. Judgement is still part and parcel of their emphasis on 
liberation. More importantly, Gutierrez and Cone, but especially 
Moltmann, argue that both victims and perpetrators will be judged 
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on the basis of their 'justice-performance'. Now our contention 
has been that the cross and resurrection have given God the 
incontrovertible right to exact judgement. This would apply 
whether one is talking about overall judgement, or about 
judgement primarily in relation to one's justice performance. 
In the context of our horizontal responsibility, then, God 
can judge us on at least two levels. He can judge us simply 
because we have failed to love the neighbour (the oppressed). 
However, he can also judge us because we might have mistreated 
others in the same way as Jesus was mistreated in his historical 
experience. The sheep and goats parable also points to this. 
In chapter five we described Jesus as the representative victim 
for victims. Thus he is vindicated in his judgement on 
oppressors and evil. Of course we must be careful not to promote 
a vindictive Christ who will by any means 'get his own back' on 
oppressors. Vindication is not vindictiveness. God, of course, 
can judge both Christian and non-Christian perpetrators on the 
same basis. 
Rather than a theology of liberation as such (Gutierrez or 
cone), we have instead been advocating a theology of justice and 
judgement. Rather than all of history being eventually liberated 
(Gutierrez), even with the help of a returning Liberator, we hold 
to the certainty of a radical 'Great White Throne Judgement'. 
Only after this will Moltmann's Coming Kingdom have fully come. 
our thesis, thirdly, gives a strong framework for 
understanding God's solidarity with human suffering. This is 
reflected in Christ's four-fold identification with suffering 
humanity. Christ identifies with the suffering of Christians and 
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non-Christians. It has been shown that the very nature of God 
lends itself to this identity. We have fully affirmed Moltmann's 
insistence on the passibility of the God in the God-Man, Jesus, 
as well as of the Trinity in general. While we opposed 
Moltmann's panentheism, we have nevertheless supported his 
assertion of God's closeness. 
Gutierrez and Cone have been shown to advocate the identity 
between Christ and the victim. God wishes to see freedom from 
suffering not merely because he understands it, but because he 
has experienced it. He has called humankind to responsible 
stewardship, be it in the dimension of race, power, gender, 
economics or environmental management. Our failure in these 
areas results in human suffering. God has demonstrated his 
faithfulness to us, by showing his constancy (Abraham, exodus), 
and his identity (Christ-event) with us. The ultimate victory 
over Satan, evil and suffering allows us to claim that God and 
righteousness have the last laugh. 
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